Dominax273, et al. v SD 2025 Civ 19
DominaX273, et al. v SD [2025] Civ 19
| Date of judgment | 8th December 2025 |
| Judge(s) | Judge Hmquestionable, Former Judge Creative, Justice Ed (in his position as Judge), Former Judge Deloulou, Judge Ppatpat, Former Judge Terak, Judge Thyme, Justice Literal (in his position as Judge) |
| Torts |
In the alternative,
|
| Verdict | Not liable on all counts |
| Awards | |
| Applicable persuasive precedent |
|
JUDGMENT by Judge Hmquestionable
Introduction
[1] Does the Supreme Court have any legal duty to vote on or hear matters before it? That is the question which petitioners have brought before this court.
[2] Petitioners allege that the government is liable for Breach of Civil Rights (the “BCR” claim), or, alternatively, Administrative Misuse of Power (the “AMP” claim), owing to the Supreme Court’s failure to vote or hear matters before it. The rights which the petitioners allege have been breached are the right to redress of grievances, a fair hearing, Liberty and Security of the Person, and the right to speedy proceedings.
[3] Defendants rebut that they have not violated any rights, and contest some of the other portions of the various counts.
Procedural History
[4] It is somewhat necessary to address the procedural history of this case. Every judge of the Inferior Court has been recused from this case, and the rarely used Article 10 §2.1. of the Constitution has been employed. For reference, that section reads:
“§2.1. Judges must recuse themselves in the event they may have, or may appear to have, a conflict of interest in the case except in the case where no other Judge can be provided. (emphasis added)”.
[5] This being the case, I have been reassigned as the Judge in this matter, despite previously recusing myself from it.
Repeated Delays by State
[6] I also note that the defendants have repeatedly delayed the trial by failing to adhere to my court orders on the time limits for certain actions. Due to this, the defendants have skipped their opening statement and certain other parts of trial, including a number of ancillary hearings. This type of behavior is highly improper. All parties should comply with court orders unless there is some reasonable excuse for them not doing so.
The BCR claim
[7] I shall begin with the BCR claim. These are the elements required for the claim to succeed:
- (a) Employee or body of the State;
- (b) Violating statutory or constitutional rights;
- (c) Intent or recklessness.
Body of the State
[8] The plaintiff pleads that the "State of SimDemocracy’s governmental body of the Supreme Court” is the violating body in this case. This is not contested by the defendants, and the court accepts this pleading.
Violation of Statutory Rights
[9] Plaintiff alleges that the right to redress of grievances, a fair hearing, Liberty and Security of the Person, and the right to speedy proceedings have been violated, due to the defendants’ actions in not hearing the appeal of SD v f3rri5_ [2025] Crim 30 for a period of 3 months, not voting on the appeal of SD v dominax273 [2025] Crim 7 for 1.5 months, not voting on the appeal of SD v Guava [2025] Crim 95 for a period of 2 months, causing the defendant in that case to be detained for a lengthy period of time, and declining all petitions before the court.
Right to a Fair Hearing
[10] The Constitution states that “Every person shall be entitled to a fair hearing by a competent court in accordance with law.”.
[11] According to precedent from In re Penalties and Tickets Act [2025] SDSC 17, this means that “a person in front of a competent court, be it before criminal trial, civil hearing, appellate hearing, or otherwise” has their rights guaranteed. In other words, when someone has a hearing before a competent court, the hearing must be fair.
[12] Given that this claim is based on allegations that the plaintiffs did not have a hearing, claims based on this right must fail.
Right to petition for redress of grievances
[13] The Constitution states that “Every person shall have the right…to petition for redress of grievances”.
[14] In In re No More Robbing the Reserves Act 2025 [2025] SDCR 10, I stated that “this right extends solely to the ability to "petition" for redress of grievances. It does not specifically apply to the Judiciary. Rather, it is a right for every person who has been aggrieved to complain about their issues to the respective body to which the grievance is directed. However, just because one has the right to complain about a matter does not mean that anything will come out of the complaint.”.
[15] It is perhaps useful to clarify what may violate the right to petition for redress of grievances. For instance, if the government were to make a law stating that people were not permitted to create and sign petitions for laws to be changed, that would violate this right.
[16] There is no right to redress of grievances, as the petitioners suggest. If this were the case, any person who has a problem will be entitled to a solution from the government, despite however insignificant or absurd the problem may be. This is clearly not what the right to “petition for redress of grievances” refers to. The claim based on this right must also fail.
Liberty and Security of the Person
[17] The Constitution states that “A person arrested or detained under due process as described in §2 for any reason, including issues affecting public safety and concerning the Terms of Service of the respective platforms, may appeal their arrest or detention to a competent court.”.
[18] The petitioner has not alleged that they have not been able to appeal their arrest or detention to a competent court. The claim therefore fails on this end as well.
Right to speedy proceedings
[19] The petitioner has not informed the court of where this “right to speedy proceedings” originates from. It is not found in the plain text of the constitution.
[20] With regard to the implied rights section of the Constitution, petitioner has provided no argument as to why the right to speedy proceedings is implied. The bill of rights should not be extended to cover everything under the sun. If such extensions are made, the text of the bill of rights would cease to have any meaning. This claim therefore also fails. Similarly, the BCR claim fails.
The AMP claim
[21] The second claim by the plaintiffs is based on the Administrative Misuse of Power tort. The elements to this tort are:
- (a) Use of administrative or executive power;
- (b) Contrary to law or legal authority;
- (c) Explicit or implicit individualized right.
Use of administrative power
[22] Plaintiff submits that the voting on cases by the Supreme Court is the use of administrative power. This is not contested and is accepted by the court.
Contrary to law or legal authority
[23] The law or legal authorities which petitioner cites are the same as those covered in the BCR claim. They are therefore dismissed for the same reasons.
Conclusion
[24] It is unfortunate that some of the defendants have waited such lengthy periods of time for their cases to be rejected by the Supreme Court. It is furthermore a stain on our justice system for defendants to be detained for months on end without trial due to the inaction of the highest court of the land.
[25] Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, however, their redress does not lie by way of the BCR and AMP torts.
[26] I therefore find the defendants not liable on both the BCR claims and the AMP claims.
[27] I heard the parties on costs.
Costs
Main costs
[28] Costs are paid in general from the losing party (the plaintiffs) to the winning party. Using the rate set in NotCommunist366 v SDIOA [2025] Civ. 14 and ppatpat and brandmal, et al. v AerospaceEnjoyer [2025] Civ 27, attorneys fees is to be calculated at a standard 225 tau.
[29] The defendants state that they have spent 16.7 weeks working on the case, and that I should therefore award 3757 tau. They additionally state that I am able to award an amount over the statutory maximum, because the case was brought by multiple plaintiffs against the defendants.
[30] I agree with this analysis. The CPA does not recognize group litigation by plaintiffs, and only recognizes group litigation against a class of defendants. Therefore, each plaintiff will have to bear the costs of the losing party, as if they had brought the cases individually against the defendant.
[31] However, I question how much additional work the defendants have done to prepare for one case with multiple plaintiffs. Each plaintiff brought nearly the same case through the same attorneys, and the only exception to this was plaintiff Ferris, who was represented separately. Ferris also brought a substantially similar case with the same set of facts.
[32] Therefore, I see fit to split the costs of the defense equally between each defendant.
[33] However, I disagree that the defendants have spent 16.7 weeks solely on this case. As stated in NotCommunist366 v SDIOA, it is unlikely that an attorney only works on one case for the entire week. I would therefore half the requested costs according to that case, and set the costs at 1878 tau.
Frivolous pleading by Plaintiffs
[34] The Defense invites me to award additional costs due to the attempt by the plaintiffs to add on a number of plaintiffs to their case who had not agreed to be represented by the plaintiffs’ attorneys. I will add on half a week’s pay as costs for that frivolous pleading, which seems to have been resolved rather quickly in pre-trial. 112 tau is therefore awarded to the defendants in addition to the costs determined earlier.
Delays and improper conduct by Defense
[34] Throughout the course of this trial, the Defense has conducted itself in an improper fashion, including by ignoring multiple court orders to respond within a set time limit some 6 times throughout the trial. As I have detailed earlier in this verdict, and in a separate probable cause finding for Contempt of Court, these are highly serious violations of the defense’s duty to the court. I will therefore award 6 sets of 112 tau as adverse cost orders against the defense, to be paid to the plaintiffs.
Conclusion
[35] In conclusion, the total costs for the defense, subtracting adverse cost orders, is 1318 tau. Each plaintiff therefore has to pay 330 tau to the defense, having rounded up from 329.5 tau. This is to be paid in 2 days from the pronouncement of this portion of the costs portion of the verdict in court. Enforcement orders may otherwise be made through the usual routes.
In the matter of Judicial Civil Immunity [2025] SDIC 15
Issued by Judge Hmquestionable on 25st September 2025
Introduction
[1] This is a decision arising from an ancillary hearing pursuant to Article 29 of the Courtroom Procedures Act, carried out by the Court so as to determine the matter of whether the Supreme Court has civil immunity.
[2] Briefly, the relevant facts of this case are that the Petitioner has filed suit against the Supreme Court, alleging a variety of tortious conduct. The Court requested briefing by both parties on whether the Supreme Court is judicially immune from suit. The Defendant failed to respond within the time limitations set out by the Court, and the court summarily ruled for the plaintiff.
[3] The Defense appealed my decision. I now set out my reasoning as follows. Failure of respondent to respond within time limit set by the Court [4] The Defendant failed to respond within the 72 hour time limit set out by the Court. The Plaintiff asked me to take a “negative inference, contempt, or default partial judgment” from this failure to respond.
[5] I decided to make a default judgment for the Plaintiff in this matter. There is no negative inferences to be taken from the State’s failure to respond as we have not fully started on the trial, and I decided not to undertake contempt proceedings as representation for the Defendant had repeatedly informed the court of their real-life commitments which were taking up time.
[6] However, I am of the opinion that when the Defense fails to respond within a reasonable time, the Court cannot be expected to wait for them constantly, Nighteye (Appellant) v LordDeadlyOwl (Respondent) [2020] SDSC 5 concerns notwithstanding. This is also not the first instance where the Defense has failed to act on time. Therefore, I did not grant further extension and found in favor of the Plaintiff on this matter, as I had received no arguments to the contrary.
Appeal by Defense
[7] The Defense appealed, citing legal arguments (which should have been submitted during the ancillary hearing). I summarize the arguments as follows – Inability of the Supreme Court to appeal a ruling by this Court violates equal protection, as the Supreme Court will not be able to appeal the ruling to a competent court, or if they appealed the ruling to themselves, they would all be biased; and, Constitutional vesting of powers in the Judiciary gives rise to the implication that the Judiciary should be permitted to exercise aforesaid powers without fear of prosecution, and strengthens the right to equal protection, rather than undermining it.
[8] The Plaintiff argued that there are constitutional measures for what to do when Justices are recused. They also submitted an argument relating to the right to revolution.
[9] I shall quickly dispose of argument 7(b). The Constitutional vesting of powers is below the supremacy of the Bill of Rights. This is elucidated in Article 29 of the Constitution: “§2. Any constitutional or lower laws which unlawfully infringe on these rights shall be void and of no effect.”. I am not satisfied that the Supreme Court being immune undermines the right to equal protection, which reads: “§1. Every person shall be equal before the law and be entitled to equal protection of the law.”. There is no interpretation of this sentence that can lead one to believe that making persons unequal before the law can cause others to be more equal before the law.
[10] I shall also be disregarding the argument by the Plaintiff on the Right to Revolution. I am of the opinion that it is not relevant to the issue at hand.
[11] This leaves us with the issue of 7(a), which is that the Supreme Court would be biased in hearing the case before them, as it concerned themselves, and this would lead to a violation of the rights of the Supreme Court. I am not satisfied by this argument. The right to equal protection reads: “§1. Every person shall be equal before the law and be entitled to equal protection of the law.”. It is extremely clear that the Supreme Court is not a person. Rather, it is a government body. The Justices on the Court are not entitled to protection of rights under this Article either, as the case is not brought against them, but rather against the institution of the Supreme Court.
[12] Additionally, a violation of the Bill of Rights by the law does not generally lead to the understanding that one has immunity. Rather, it would mean that the law or precedent in question is unconstitutional and should be quashed by way of Judicial Review, or otherwise.
Conclusion
[13] Therefore, based on the arguments presented, I rule that the Supreme Court has no civil immunity.
Contempt of Court-Probable Cause Finding
Issued by Judge Hmquestionable on 2nd October 2025.
Preamble
[1] WHEREAS The Court is empowered to refer cases of contempt of court to the Department of Justice for Prosecution if satisfied that a party may have committed contempt of court, but contempt is not committed in the face of the Court, pursuant to Article 21 Subdivision 1 Subsection 3 §1. of the Criminal Code;
AND WHEREAS The Court is satisfied that there is probable cause that the Attorney for the Defendant, Muggy, has committed Contempt of Court;
NOW, THEREFORE, The Court refers the conduct of the Attorney for the Defendant to the Department of Justice for Prosecution.
Introduction
[2] This contempt order arises from the shameful conduct of counsel for the State and for the private defendants, Muggy. The attorney for the defendants (“attorney”) has repeatedly disobeyed court-orders through disobeying time limits, and has completely failed to adequately represent their clients at important moments of the trial.
[3] The facts of the related suit are not material to the contempt order, and I shall not be listing them. Findings of Fact
[4] The Court makes the following findings of fact –
- [4.1.1] On the 12th of September, the Court directed the Defense to make opening statements. The attorney failed to do so, and instead submitted a motion to dismiss.
- [4.1.2] On the 13th of September, the Court adjourned for parties to prepare briefing on the matter of the motion to dismiss. The Court provided a period of 2 days for each party to prepare the abovementioned briefing. The Plaintiff submitted their briefing on time. The Attorney failed to do so, and after multiple reminders by the Court and the Plaintiff, submitted their briefing on the 19th of September, some 6 days later.
- [4.1.3] Immediately afterwards, the Court directed parties to make submissions on the definition of “Administrative Power”. Once again, the Attorney did not make submissions within a reasonable time-frame. In fact, the Attorney did not submit the requested definition at all, and instead resubmitted their motion to dismiss.
- [4.1.4] Finally, on the 22nd of September, the Court directed the parties to make submissions on the existence of judicial immunity, which was an important portion of the case. The Court ordered submissions to be made in 72 hours. Once again, the Attorney failed to make the submission in time.
- [4.1.4.1] Similar to [4.1.3], the Attorney did not make the submissions on this important matter at all, and the Court thus found summarily for the Plaintiff, on the 25th of September for the matter of judicial immunity.
- [4.1.5] The Court then required the Defense to submit its opening statement. Some 10 days had passed since the request was initially made. However, the Attorney once again failed to comply with the Court Order, and 48 hours later, the Court proceeded to evidence presentation, without hearing the opening statement of the Defense.
- [4.1.6] The Court then directed the Defense to respond to evidentiary submissions on the 29th of September. The Court provided a period of three days for the Defense to respond, as well as a Court order on the second day for the defense to respond within 48 hours. The Attorney once again failed to respond within this time limit.
- [4.2] These actions make up a disturbing pattern of dereliction of the attorney’s duty to the Court, and to their Client.
Indirect Contempt
[5] The only difference between direct and indirect contempt of court is that contempt of court must be committed in the face of the court to be direct, and the court must be satisfied that “immediate steps are necessary for the protection of the fair hearing or the administration of justice”.
[6] The Court is not satisfied in this manner. The defendants in the case are the Supreme Court, as well as every justice presently sitting on the Supreme Court. The Court is of the opinion that the aforementioned Justices and the State would have sufficient legal knowledge as to hire a competent attorney, as well as to have some idea as to their strategy at trial. Therefore, the level of immediacy required for direct contempt is not reached, as the Defendants are well able to manage their representation before the Court, and would be able to and have the understanding of when to replace their attorneys if they believed it necessary.
[7] However, the Court is satisfied that there is probable cause that Contempt of Court has occurred. The Attorney has disobeyed no less than two court orders relating to response times, and has also repeatedly failed to respond to court in a reasonable and timely manner, resulting in their Clients not receiving representation for those sections of the trial, and has also through that same action caused severe delays to the judicial proceedings of the case.
[8] This may satisfy the definition of Contempt of Court, which is:
§1. A person who intentionally disobeys a lawful judgement or order of a court, or breaches any undertaking or legal obligation to a court, or acts in a manner that disrupts judicial proceedings or prejudices the administration of justice, commits contempt of court. (emphasis added)
Conclusion
[9] I find probable cause that the Attorney, Muggy, has committed contempt of court, and refer her conduct to the Department of Justice.
Decision 1 on Motion to Dismiss
Issued by Judge Creative on 6th October 2025.
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1HR49mlam5MAvHPL_GxXcEOALlW_ukn78yZlOqYmVkMs/edit?tab=t.0
Background (Condensed)
[1] This matter, Petitioners of the Supreme Court v. State of SimDemocracy (formerly Notcom & Ben v. SD Civ 19, also referred to as Domina, Ferris, Guava, g470 & the Redacted 9 v. SD), concerns a motion to dismiss filed by Counsel for the Defense, Justice Ed, on October 4th, 2025.
[2] The Defense argues that the previous presiding judge failed to determine which party, the State or the individual Justices, would be held liable in the event of a favorable ruling for the plaintiffs, leading to ambiguity. Two prior rulings had conflicted on this issue: one treating the Justices as defendants personally, and the other identifying the State as the true defendant.
[3] Relying on Article 29, which provides that a breach of civil rights occurs when “a government employee or a governmental body” violates citizens’ rights, the Defense maintains that liability must fall on either individuals or institutions, but not both. They further cite the complaint’s language naming “the Supreme Court Justices” as “very clear”, arguing this shows intent to sue the Justices personally, not the institution.
[4] The Defense contends that the State Attorney’s Office (SAO) may represent only the State or its institutions under the Executive Departments Act, not individual officeholders. Therefore, they argue, the present configuration of parties is procedurally improper and the claim should be dismissed.
[5] The plaintiffs counter that claims against high officeholders are not inherently improper, as exempting them from liability would undermine the rule of law. They argue that Article 29 permits claims against both employees and institutions, and that the SAO may properly appear since the defendants act in their official capacities.
[6] Plaintiffs further assert that the complaint targets the Justices in their official roles, not as private individuals, and that the case’s title was assigned by the former presiding judge for procedural clarity, not to define liability.
[7] In reply, the Defense insists that the complaint clearly separates liability, assigning it to the Justices in one claim and to the Court in another, and that Article 4 of the Civil Code defines legal entities as distinct from their members, precluding the blending of institutional and individual liability.
[8] Plaintiffs conclude that the question of proper identification of the defendant is a matter for determination after evidence is heard, not a basis for dismissal at the pleading stage.
Jurisdiction
[9] The Court affirms that it possesses jurisdiction to hear and determine the present matter. Pursuant to Article 16 of the Civil Code, this Court is competent to adjudicate civil claims and all issues arising thereunder. The Court further holds jurisdiction to rule on the motion to dismiss filed by the defense, as it was properly presented before this bench and pertains directly to the proceedings now underway. Considerations
[10] The Court, having reviewed the pleadings, arguments, and submissions of both parties, now turns to consider the motion to dismiss filed by Counsel for the Defense.
[11] Beginning with the principle issue brought forth by the Motion to Dismiss, Article 29 of the Civil Code establishes the basis of civil liability for breach of civil rights to be “a government employee or employees, or a governmental body,” The text, which although provides an, or, does not have explicit language that compels a plaintiff to elect between suing the individual officeholder and the institution. The provision merely distinguishes the possible subjects of liability, not the exclusivity of their pursuit.
[12] Counsel for the defense argues that properly identifying the defendant is essential for the case to proceed, and the ambiguity in identification of the defendant by the plaintiffs makes the claim improper and should be dismissed by this Court. This claim of ambiguity is partially untrue and arises from a misidentification from the previous counsel for the defense of who they are representing and a misreading of the text of the complaint.
[13] Counsel for the plaintiffs argues that identifying the proper defendant is not a threshold issue, but rather one that is resolved once all evidence has presented, this is also untrue, as the determination of the proper defendant is a matter of pleading and procedural sufficiency, not of evidentiary weight. Before the Court can reach the merits of a claim, it must first be established against whom the claim is properly directed.
[14] Thus, the supposed inconsistency identified by the defense, the uncertainty as to whom the suit is properly brought against, would ordinarily satisfy the criteria for dismissal of the first claim. However, in the present case, the Court notes that such ambiguity did not originate in the plaintiffs’ pleadings, but rather arose from the representations and submissions of prior defense counsel. It would therefore be inequitable to permit the defense to invoke as a ground for dismissal an inconsistency for which it bears substantial responsibility.
[15] The previous counsel for the defense either by omission, or action, misidentified that the complaint was brought against the individuals behind the Supreme Court, rather than the Justices of the Supreme Court. This separation can also be identified as the separation of obligations found in Art. 4 of the Civil Code between the natural persons behind a legal entity and the legal entity itself.
[16] As such representation by the State Attorney’s Office would also be proper under such circumstances as the Justices of the Supreme Court are intrinsic parts of the State, allowing the SAO to represent them by statute.
Decision
[17] The defense’s contention that the plaintiffs have failed to properly identify the liable party is unconvincing. The ambiguity complained of arises not from the text of the complaint, which clearly brings the claims against the Supreme Court of SimDemocracy and its Justices in their official capacity, but from the mischaracterization of pleading by prior defense counsel. It would be improper to dismiss the claim for an inconsistency of the defense’s own creation.
[18] The Court finds that the plaintiffs’ suit is properly construed as being brought against the Supreme Court of SimDemocracy and its Justices in their official capacity, as components of the State, and not against the Justices as private individuals.
[19] Consequently, the representation of the defendants by the State Attorney’s Office is deemed proper pursuant to Article 2 §4 of the Executive Departments Act, as the Justices, when acting in their judicial capacities, constitute instrumentalities of the State for the purposes of civil liability.
[20] The Court therefore holds that the complaint satisfies the threshold requirements of proper pleading, party identification, and representation. The alleged violations, if proven, may give rise to liability under Article 29 of the Civil Code, and it is for trial, not for a motion to dismiss, to determine their merits.
[21] Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.
Decision 1 on Motion to Dismiss
Issued by Judge Creative on 10 October 2025.
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1jDDqw1JpSVYr_4My-m0GtXiqArJ7ET4ZeVjs0X0JyYs/edit?tab=t.0
Background
[1] This matter, Petitioners of the Supreme Court v. State of SimDemocracy concerns a motion to dismiss filed by Counsel for the Defense, Justice Ed, on October 10th, 2025. On grounds that plaintiff Dominax did not reach the merits to have natural personhood which is their purported standing to bring this suit.
[2] Counsel argued that plaintiff Dominax was not a natural person under the Civil Code of SimDemocracy, arguing that the law requires membership in SimDemocracy to qualify as a natural person. Rights and obligations begin at the moment a user joins, but they are contingent on this membership.
[3] Additionally, the defense brought that the Criminal Code defines a person for criminal liability as “§5. A person is defined as any user who has, or had, the capacity and intention of participating in SimDemocracy.” arguing that unlike the civil code, the criminal code makes former members sufficient to establish status as a person.
[4] Further, counsel argued that according to Article 13 §3 of the Constitution, to be considered a citizen of SimDemocracy requires active presence in any territory. Noting to the court that plaintiff Dominax was banned on February 2nd for an 18 month period in SD v Dominx273. With this ban period yet to be completed.
[5] Under this fact, counsel argued that banning a person would legally require removing them, and their presence from all territories, which would lead to their citizenship suspended. At the time this suit was filed, and when the alleged violations by the state happened, Dominax was not a member of any territory of Simdemocracy and thus also could not be a natural person under the Civil Code. Thus ending the motion as follows: “The law is very clear, and makes a very sharp contrast on who counts as a person. Plaintiff Dominax has no standing to bring the suit and therefore it should be dismissed.”
[6] In response, plaintiffs submitted as follows: “Defining someone's natural personhood away is Nazi shit. Don't accept this.”
[7] Further, they argued that plaintiff Dominax is a participating member of the bicamel republic, and therefore active in a SimDemocracy territory. Thus allowing standing for remedy, arguing that this interpretation of the law makes appeals impossible because the banned users are removed from their attribute as a natural person.
[8] Counsel for plaintiffs continued by stating that if rights and obligations are contingent on membership in the territories of SimDemocracy, then banned people have no rights, ending with “Ridiculous and desperate claims this court should unequivocally reject.”
[9] In response, counsel for the defense argued that bans include a ban "from all territories of SimDemocracy", the plaintiff being present illegally in those territories does not make their standing as a natural person valid.
[10] Counsel further argued that on the point about rights, natural personhood is a civil law concept which only defines who has standing to bring civil actions, and who has civil rights and obligations under the civil code. It does not include other rights such as due process which exist independently under the Constitution.
[11] Finally, counsel for the defense noted that being in any territory does not count to establish Civil Code natural personhood as §1 explicitly says "r/Simdemocracy", though they do contend they would be fine if the discord server was included under “r/SimDemocracy”
Jurisdiction
[12] The Court affirms that it possesses jurisdiction to hear and determine the present matter. Pursuant to Article 16 of the Civil Code, this Court is competent to adjudicate civil claims and all issues arising thereunder. The Court further holds jurisdiction to rule on the motion to dismiss filed by the defense, as it was properly presented before this bench and pertains directly to the proceedings now underway.
Considerations
On Natural Personhood
[13] To this Court there is one matter to be considered here to properly resolve the principle issue on whether plaintiff Dominax has standing to bring forth this suit or not. That being whether, under the laws of SimDemocracy, the status of “natural person” depends on active membership (citizenship) within r/SimDemocracy, or whether such status may continue to apply to a user who has been banned or otherwise excluded, for the limited purpose of determining standing in this proceeding.
[14] The counsel for defense first brings the argument that plaintiff Dominax was not a natural person under SimDem law as the article defining it under the Civil Code requires membership in SimDemocracy. Thus defined as “§1. A natural person is any member of r/SimDemocracy that isn’t a bot, that's recognized as having rights and obligations under the law from the moment they join r/SimDemocracy and its associated servers.”
[15] Secondly, they argue that “rights and obligations begin at the moment a user joins, but they are contingent on this membership.” This statement by a legal professional such as Justice Ed would under hostile interpretation mean that once the State removes membership from anyone they no longer have rights, nor would they have the basic obligation of respecting and following the law.
[16] Such an interpretation would render the State’s easiest victory over terrorism, by merely removing a person’s membership (or citizenship, as the terms are used interchangeably), the affected individual would cease to possess any rights or obligations under the law. The State could then simply ban them without due process, or, conversely, those individuals could act unlawfully without consequence, as their legal obligations toward the State would no longer exist.
[17] Of course such a hostile interpretation to the Justice’s words does not share companionship in this Court, it is understood charitably that Counsel for Defense instead meant that the exercise of civil rights and duties under the Code is contingent upon membership. Ergo surrounding the capacity of exercise plaintiff Dominax would need to have standing in a suit.
[18] While §1 of the Civil Code defines a natural person as “any member of r/SimDemocracy,” the Court interprets this clause as identifying the moment at which natural personhood attaches, not the condition upon which it depends. The provision is silent as to cessation, and absent express language to the contrary, this Court will not presume that the intention is that natural personhood to be extinguished by the loss of membership.
[19] Rather what is limited under a ban or cessation of membership is a person’s capacity of exercise, a rather small but important distinction must then be made, between a user’s capacity of enjoyment and capacity of exercise in SimDem. The difference between capacity of enjoyment, the abstract ability to have rights, and capacity of exercise, the ability to act upon them.
[20] Under this interpretation of statute, plaintiff Dominax would certainly have a limited capacity to exercise their rights, such as for example their right to liberty (within SimDemocracy), and thus would not be able to acquire rights and obligations under the Civil Code, Art. 2 §2 “Every natural person has the capacity to acquire rights and assume obligations, except as limited by law.”.
[21] What this limitation of capacity does not do though is abridge plaintiff Dominax’s rights under the constitution. As the Civil Code does not exist independently of the constitution, it operates within the constitutional framework and remains subject to its guarantees. Consequently, any statutory limitation on civil capacity must yield where it conflicts with fundamental constitutional rights.
On Membership
[22] The counsel for the plaintiffs argues that Dominax is an active member of the Bicamel Republic and therefore active in a SimDemocracy territory. Fulfilling the statutory requirement of being a participant of “r/SimDemocracy and its associated servers.” The Constitution provides that the core territories of SimDemocracy are,“§1. Territories that have their democratic-continuity guaranteed by constitutionally defined Supervisors (. . .)”. And “§3. One need only maintain a presence in any given core territory to be considered a citizen of SimDemocracy.”
[23] The only issue here being that the Bicamel Republic is not a core territory of SimDemocracy and is only a colony, the Constitution does not provide express text on whether colonial citizens are citizens of SimDemocracy or not, but for the purposes of this case the Court will accept that colonial citizens are granted citizenship in SimDemocracy too.
[24] With this interpretation this Court could say that plaintiff Dominax would fulfill the criteria necessary to be a citizen of SimDemocracy, with their natural personhood being ‘given’ once they had originally joined SimDem. But, this would ignore the fact that they are currently serving their ban, bans include a ban "from all territories of SimDemocracy" which the BCR falls under, though it is not in this Court’s competence to do anything other than point this out.
[25] Additionally, this might serve as plaintiff Dominax’s counsel accidentally ‘snitching’ on them, though again not under this Court’s purview.
On Capacity and Standing
[26] As mentioned briefly Dominax instead of facing a removal of their natural personhood, faces a lawful limitation on their capacity of exercise, and thus the counsel for the defense argues has no standing to bring this suit.
[27] After careful review of the laws and jurisprudence of SimDemocracy, this Court finds no norm expressly defining “standing,” the criteria required to bring a civil suit. In the absence of such provision, this Court defines standing as the legal capacity and legitimate interest necessary to initiate proceedings before a civil tribunal, that is, the recognized ability of a person to assert a right or seek a remedy under the law. Standing therefore depends on two essential elements: first, the possession of civil capacity to act in law, the capacity of exercise, and second, a direct and personal interest in the outcome of the case.
[28] Following such a definition, plaintiff Dominax fulfills the second criteria, being that they have a direct and personal interest, as the civil complaint states “On or about 23 June 2025, the user DominaX273 (User ID: 717869696959119383) (through counsel) filed an appeal of SD v dominax273 [2025] Crim 7. It took until 14 August 2025 (over a month and a half later), for the Justices to conclusively vote to not hear it.” In the opinion of this Court, these alleged facts establish probable cause to believe that the plaintiff is personally and directly affected by the alleged inaction of the Justices, thereby satisfying the second requirement of standing.
[29] Onto the first criterion, whether a person banned from r/SimDemocracy and its associated servers retains the capacity of exercise necessary to bring a civil suit before this Court. In accordance with Art. 21: Right to a fair hearing, plaintiff Dominax, though lawfully has their capacity of exercise limited, retains the right to a fair hearing.
[30] Article 21 §1 provides that “Every person shall be entitled to a fair hearing by a competent court in accordance with law.” The Court notes that this right is conferred upon every person without distinction or qualification. The term “person” is employed here in its broadest sense, encompassing any individual recognized by law as having legal personality, regardless of their current civil status or membership.
[31] Thus plaintiff Dominax, though has limited capacity of exercise retains the capacity to act in law, that is to say that they retain the capacity to bring about suits, though their other rights may be limited from exercise, and fulfills the first criterion for determining standing.
Obiter Dicta (Creative Yapping)
[32] Though this Court has no expectation that the views expressed herein will hold persuasive weight in other cases, it nonetheless feels compelled to comment upon certain matters raised in these proceedings.
[33] The absence of any statutory definition of standing within SimDemocracy’s laws and especially in the Civil Code is a lapse and oversight in my capacity of drafter of the same Civil Code, and an oversight on later legislatures not defining an admittedly important concept that has substantive consequences to the administration of civil justice.
[34] “Defining someone's natural personhood away is Nazi shit. Don't accept this.” is a frankly crazy funny submission that almost ended being the only submission by the plaintiffs in response to this motion, the plaintiffs could be a little less suicidal.
[35] I feel that an important factor in the issues brought here is the ambiguity in what allows someone to bring forth suits, i.e. their capacity of exercise, and this got applied to their status of natural personhood and not the limitations or not on their capacity of exercise, though capacity is mentioned in the Civil Code, though the distinction between enjoyment and exercise are not explicit.
Decision
[36] As plaintiff Dominax fulfills the criteria set forth by this Court to determine standing, and in accordance with the Constitution and the Civil Code of SimDemocracy, this Court denies the motion to dismiss these charges for lack of standing.
Decision on the Appeal for a motion on granting a Court Order for a Bill of Particulars
Issued by Judge Terak on 17th November 2025.
[1] A Bill of Particulars is not just a criminal tool but can be used in civil cases as well.
[2] A Bill of Particulars (BoP) is a tool to clarify the charges brought before a court to allow the opposing party, usually the defending party, to accurately defend against all claims brought against them.
[3] The Petitioner in this matter (Defence) claims that the Complaint filed by Petitioner in the Case (Defendant in this motion) has not done its due diligence in clarifying the claims brought before the court. Therefore, they argue, the court would have to consider an enormous amount of variations while at the same time not being specific enough in its pleading to clarify which right actually was violated and thus is basis for the claim brought.
[4] The Defendant in this Motion (Plaintiff in the matter) argues that a bill of particulars would unduly restrict their ability to argue their case as it risks restricting arguments brought forth from the plethora of torts and claims made.
[5] It is decided as follows: A bill of particulars is to be provided that details all claims brought forth as well as the violations alleged by the Petitioner in the Trial. Where a tort allows for multiple ways to fulfil it, the variation chosen to pursue in this case has to be specified. If multiple versions stand equally next with each, they need to be declared as such. Different actions shall be declared as being different.
[6] An ambiguity that allows the Court to pick from multiple versions of the same tort would shift the court into an inquisitorial position as a closer direction of the trial in the examination and valuation of evidence would be required, which violates the adversarial system.
[7] This does not unduly restrict the Petitioners (in the matter) ability to prosecute their case as they are free to bring any argument and make any claim for violation known within the original Complaint filed. Claims that are not included in the original complaint and thus can not be included in the Bill of Particulars may be filled separately.