Dragoncrxst (Appellant) v SD (Respondent) 2026 SDCR 30
dragoncrxst (Appellant) v SD (Respondent) [2026] SDCR 30
| Date of judgment | 31st March 2026 |
| Judges |
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| Held |
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| Ruling | 3-0 |
| Applicable precedent |
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MAJORITY OPINION by Judge Mypenjustbroke
(With Judge Tech Support and Judge Matt Cheney agreeing)
Introduction
[1] This case arises as an appeal of SD v. dragoncrxst. [2025] Crim 138 (the “underlying case”). In the underlying case, the Inferior Court found Appellant dragoncrxst. (“Jess” or “Appellant”) guilty of First Degree Harassment under Article 56 of the Criminal Code 2020. Consequently, the Inferior Court sentenced Appellant to the following: a thirteen month ban, a two week mute, and a fine in the amount of one tau.
Issues
[2] The instant appeal presents one issue of import. We are tasked with finding whether repetitive conduct causing apprehension occurred, as is required by statute.
Standards of Review
[3] We hear this case—practically—upon the standard of whether the Inferior Court clearly erred in its findings that, in the underlying case, Respondent’s evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant caused the victim to suffer multiple instances of apprehension.
I. The Statute’s Necessary Reading
[4] In pertinent part, the statute at bar reads that “[a] person commits first degree harassment if they repeatedly and intentionally caused a person or group of persons to feel undue or unjustifiable apprehension, alarm, or distress.” Criminal Code 2020, Art. 56, § 1. For a defendant to be convicted of first degree harassment, they must cause a person or group of persons to feel a specific emotion or disjunctive set of emotions. Of those emotions, the options available are either apprehension, alarm, or distress. Additionally, there must be a repetitive causation of these emotions. Finally, the mens rea of this case is set as “intentionally,” which is a necessarily “purposeful” standard. See Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(a) (Am. L. Inst. 1962).
II. Determinations at Law—On Apprehension
[5] Apprehension, a term largely interwoven within the tapestry of our criminal code, is not defined in our statutes. Now, this is not a terrible moral failure, as SimDemocracy is not real life and cannot be treated as such. See generally Nighteye (Appellant) v. LordDeadlyOwl (Respondent), [2019] SDSC 5. However, in this instance, ascertaining the definition of an element central to the instant controversy requires judicial notice. Thus, we look to the trusted sources. The bare infinitive “apprehend,” the base of our “apprehension,” is defined as “[t]o take hold of . . . with the mind . . . to conceive, believe, fear, dread[.]” Apprehend, Black's Law Dictionary p. 130 (4th ed. 1968). This comports with the Inferior Court’s interpretation of the word in SD v. Panzzrr, [2025] Crim 54, [10]. Thus, we take the abstract noun “apprehension” to mean the conception, belief, fear, or dread of a future event.
[6] Reaction is a term with a similar situation to apprehension. It, too, has no place within the lexicon to call home. Thus, we must examine the sources again and ascertain this central definition. "Reaction" is not listed in the legal dictionaries; however, it is listed nominally to mean “to respond or behave in a particular way in response to something.” Reaction, Oxford Languages.
III. Does apprehension require reaction?
[7] We know not—at this point in human and technological development—how to effectively and efficiently ascertain apprehension but for the reaction of the apprehender. What’s more, such subtleties and nuances, such as body language, aghast expressions, or otherwise trivial faculties that we may nominally understand as apprehension, do not exist upon a purely digital forum. It makes sense, then, that a showing of apprehension requires an outward reaction or communication of such apprehension. However, as was noted below in [8], an affidavit may be a sworn showing of apprehension, as “it is possible for affidavits to serve as the basis of conviction, when the allegations in the affidavit are able to dispel this inherent deficiency, owing to the surrounding corroboratory evidence.” Id.
IV. Did repetitive conduct causing apprehension occur?
[8] Appellant contends that, “whilst providing evidence as to apprehension in Exhibits 6 and 7 can be sufficient to show apprehension as to the events in Exhibits 6 and 7, they are plainly not sufficient to show apprehension for all the exhibits.” Exhibits 6 and 7, as shown in the judgment, are shown as two separate pieces of evidence that each establish an independent instance of harassment as to the charge. Following these instances, each respective piece of evidence, importantly, shows an instance of apprehension dependent entirely upon the context of the instigation. These pieces of evidence are undisputed, as Appellant notes supra in this paragraph. We thus know that, as Appellant maintains, the instigations, which also necessarily caused apprehension, exist in the record.
[9] The statute only requires that two or more instances of apprehension exist. Additionally, the victim’s apprehension is shown in their affidavit to the State, which was presented at trial. Upon proof that apprehension exists, the requisite mens rea is presumed, as shown below in [4] and in statute at Criminal Code 2020 Article 56, § 3. We are reluctant to overturn a trial court’s findings of fact, especially one where the nuances of such issues like apprehension and conduct are not disputed. Any evidence that further attempts to add evidence to a controversy to provide proof of its happening is presented gratis—or in excess, free of charge—unless such evidence severely undercuts the presenter’s claim or defense. Indeed, Appellant’s concession here—that such harassments and apprehensions exist—dooms its appeal.
Verdict
[10] The judgment of the Inferior Court in [2025] Crim 138 is affirmed.