F3rri5 (Appellant) v SD (Respondent) 2026 SDCR 22
f3rri5_ (Appellant) v SD (Respondent) [2026] SDCR 22
| Date of judgment | 8th March 2026 |
| Judge(s) |
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| Held |
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| Ruling | 2-0 (See Discussion page regarding Judge Hmquestionable) |
| Applicable precedent |
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MAJORITY OPINION by Judge Muggy
(With Judge mypenjustbroke concurring)
Introduction
[1] This case comes before the Court as an appeal by the original defendant, Ferris (737243750870417529) through legal counsel Ppatpat (1397846184676032562) on the basis of the original trial court erring in its application of mens rea for the charge of Abuse of Permissions.
[2] The State, instead of acting as the respondent, opted to join the appellant through its own appeal, pointing out various errors in the original case and arguing that such disastrous errors necessitate the case be remanded to the Inferior Court for retrial.
[3] As there was no legal body that the Court could call on to act as the respondent, it opted to not hear a response at all.
Legal and Procedural Issues in SD v f3rri5_ [2025] Crim 30
[4] Both the appellant and the State reach the conclusion that the original trial Court erred in the application of mena rea as it pertains to “malice” as required by Article 30 of the Criminal Code, further, they both refer to how the verdict is wholly inconsistent with Ad Hoc Advocates LLP, ex parte adeacentpear (Appellant) v State of Simdemocracy (Respondent) [2025] SDSC 15.
[5] While this Court agrees that the original court errs in the face of [2025] SDSC 15, it notes that as it was written before said verdict was issued by the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court even refers to it as a case that was following long-standing precedent, saying in [23] that “it is indeed completely proper […] for a court to follow long-standing precedent unless a higher authority states otherwise,” this Court will not heavily rely on the original court’s verdict being inconsistent with [2025] SDSC 15.
[6] If this Court were to stop at recognizing that the trial court erred in its application of mens rea, as the appellant did in their argumentation, it would certainly agree with the appellant that expunging the verdict would be the best remedy, as the Supreme Court also determined in [2025] SDSC 15. However, there exists far more overarching issues with the case’s handling itself, as pointed out by the State, and thus this Court will continue its analysis to find the appropriate remedy.
[7] The Court now turns to the original court’s actual verdict, or rather, lack thereof. As the State points out, the verdict is entirely “whereas” statements, a verdict on the defendant’s guilt, and an informally written post-script. This presents a unique problem, being as to whether or not the lack of legal reasoning is grounds for remedy to be granted as it relates to the issuance of a decision.
[8] This Court shall now seek to determine every substantive and procedural error in the original verdict, and from there determine the approximate remedy in accordance with the law and the interests of justice.
[9] To begin, we look at how the verdict was actually written. As said in [7], it is composed of various whereas statements without any constructed legal reasoning attached. Fundamentally, the job of any trial court is to outline how it reached its legal conclusions. By not doing so, the original trial court made logical jumps, from stating that jest is not a defense in [1] to saying that the defendant’s actions were reckless in [7] and that they acted with malice in [8]. Without an analysis of how the elements of the crime were fulfilled, the verdict has essentially no legal or persuasive weight.
- [9.1] Out of basic principle, and because Ad Hoc Advocates LLP, ex parte adeacentpear (Appellant) v State of Simdemocracy (Respondent) [2025] SDSC 15 requires it, an analysis of whether the prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt that there existed the mens rea component in a non-strict liability offence is absolutely necessary for a verdict to be reached on the defendant’s guilt.
[10] We now move to how the original trial court omitted something incredibly major in its verdict, being the actual sentencing of the defendant. While there exists the summary box at the top stating that the defendant was sentenced to a 12-hour mute, it is just that, a summary box. It isn’t part of the actual written verdict, which must include all necessary elements, including reasoning, the verdict on the defendant’s guilt, and the following sentencing if applicable.
- [10.1] For all intents and purposes, anything stated in any given verdict’s summary box that isn’t actually reflected in the written verdict holds no legal or persuasive weight, and is to be considered inapplicable.
[11] Finally, there existed a procedural issue in the actual proceedings of the trial itself, where the trial court decided to allow Ppatpat to testify as an expert witness simply because he was a “legal expert”. Due to this admission, the witness was able to present their own opinions on questions of law and the facts of the case, something that is only the power of the trial court to determine as they relate to the defendant’s guilt. While there is no way to measure how much this affected the Court’s view on the law and the facts of the case, there exists a serious problem wherein the Court’s proceedings were “infected” by the witness’s testimony.
- [11.1] In future criminal proceedings, witnesses requested to be admitted as nothing more than “legal experts” are to be rejected, as their testimony has no place in a courtroom, as the judge serves as the one and sole legal expert when it comes to questions of law in a case pursuant to Article 10 §3 of the Constitution. This presents a redundancy in allowing legal experts to testify on their opinions as they relate to questions of law in a case.
- [11.2] As it relates to briefs in the nature of amicus curiae, this Court accepts the circumstance in which the public interest may be vested in any given case, and thus briefing may be helpful to the trial court in order to develop jurisprudence in the interests of justice and the citizenry.
[12] As we have now covered all of the mishaps in legal and procedural matters of the original case, this Court shall now have to determine the adequate legal remedy for the rendering of this verdict.
[13] While the appellant and the State agree on the verdict’s illegitimacy, they deviate in the appropriate remedy, with the appellant seeking the expungement of the verdict, as done in [2025] SDSC 15, while the State seeks to have the trial reheard in its entirety due to its inconsistencies with law and its procedural issues.
[14] Ordinarily this Court would agree with the appellant, because they already served the sentence, the reasoning of the verdict would be negated, and it could not be used against them to prove previous criminal activity. Though, what happens when the trial court fundamentally errs in providing legal reasoning and sticking to the correct procedures?
[15] This Court is inclined to agree with the State that the case should be remanded back to the Inferior Court for retrial because, as they also argue, it’s useless to expunge a verdict that doesn’t really make any supported conclusions whatsoever. So, in light of the original court’s considerable errors, we consider it necessary for the appellant’s case to be properly heard and their guilt properly reasoned, thus siding with the State on the matter of remedy.
Verdict
[16] The verdict reached in SD v f3rri5_ [2025] Crim 30 is hereby vacated in full.
[17] The matter is further remanded back to the Inferior Court for a retrial to be conducted in a legally consistent and sound manner.
Post-Script
[18] It may seem questionable to some for this Court to outright prohibit the admittance of witnesses called on solely for being “legal experts,” but in its opinion, repeating such an erroneous error would be in contradiction with the interests of justice and the application of law by the courts.
CONCURRING OPINION by Judge Mypenjustbroke
[19] The issue before this court is not necessarily whether any procedural defects exist and, by derivation, how severe those defects are. Rather, the proper question we are presented with is more sinister and complex: what happens when judges render judgments either inconsistent with current law or incomprehensible in the context of the facts of that case?
[20] The Supreme Court has provided timely guidance in part in Question of Law—Stare Decisis in the Court of Review [2026] SDSC 8. The Supreme Court not only reviewed the Court of Review’s judiciary power in [2026] SDSC 8, but—in ruling—it also implicitly affirmed this Court’s power to regulate itself and, by principles of judicial hierarchy, the lower court. See id. at [16]. In short, this Court confronts itself and its child—the Inferior Court—in a matter of actus legis nemini facit injuriam.
Did the Inferior Court commit a procedural error? [21] We first look to the procedure of [2025] Crim 30. The only real errors that we are required to examine are those of at least nominal consequence to the defendant, as Courts—as a matter of policy—must always look upon evidence and testimony in a light that reflects the parties’ respective burdens of proof. In this case, those supernominal errors are twofold and discussed respectively: the error of [2025] Crim 30’s verdict and the court’s admission of a “legal expert” into its proceedings.
How severe were these errors? [22] The first error we are required to examine is [2025] Crim 30’s rendering of its verdict. Judge Heinrich wrote a sentence in the summary box, but he did not actually write that sentence in his judgment script. This is an error neither reconcilable with modern proceedings nor tradition, and I am convinced that it conflicts with Appellant’s Right to a Fair Hearing. See generally S.D. Const. Art. 21, § 1 ("Every person shall be entitled to a fair hearing . . . in accordance with law”); see also S.D. Const. Art. 10, § 3.2. (“Judges must provide the legal reasoning behind their judgements, citing relevant legislation and precedent”). “[I]n accordance with law” provides deference to the legislature to determine the best generalized procedure for the judiciary. Id. In this case, the legislature provided the Inferior Court with a mandate that the court “shall . . . deliver a sentence” after the conclusion of the hearing and relevant proceedings. Courtroom Procedures Act 2025 Art. 8, §1.9. In this case, while a sentence was summarized, none was given in judgment. As the majority noted, a summarized sentence—without presence in the judgment—is no sentence at all, is unconstitutional, and is judicially void.
[23] The second error we must analyze is the court’s allowance of a “legal expert” to be allowed to testify on matters of law. Ppatpat was allowed to testify as an expert witness pursuant to Article 1 of the Evidence Act 2025. The error we ought to find here is not one of legality. An expert witness is both statutorily provided and, no doubt, useful for matters where the subject matter necessitates expert explanation. Instead, the error we ought to find is one of redundancy and policy.
[24] A judge is, in itself, an expert on the laws and legality of a proceeding or behavior. The role of the Inferior Court, moreover, is to use its judicial expertise to adjudicate a matter based upon the facts and arguments provided in trial and cross-referencing those with the common or statutory law. See S.D. Const. Art. 10, § 1. While no doubt a proponent of the development of SimDemocracy’s jurisprudence, Ppatpat was not the judge in that proceeding, and, as such, his “expert” testimony was not relevant to that proceeding, as the relevant expert existed as the adjudicator. A redundant expert for a party in a proceeding is never relevant, and a judge serves as a legal expert for all parties to a case.
Conclusion
[25] I agree with the judgment that the majority has articulated, but—for the above reasons and nuanced issues—I cannot wholly agree with the reasoning. For that reason, I concur.