In re CPA 25§1.2 2026 SDCR 18
Question of Law in Juliana v Tech Support [2026] Civ 2 [2026] SDCR 18
| Date of judgment | 19th February 2026 |
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| Held |
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| Ruling | 3-0 |
| Applicable precedent |
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MAJORITY OPINION by Judge Muggy
(With Judge Brandmal agreeing and Judge mypenjustbroke concurring)
Introduction
[1] This case comes before the Court as a question of law from Judge Hmquestionable stemming from the fact that the defense in Juliana v Tech Support [2026] Civ 2 had not responded to the Court within 48 hours of being given instructions, thus, pursuant to §1 Article 25 of the Courtroom Procedures Act 2025, they should be considered inactive, and further pursuant to §1.2, the case should default to the plaintiff.
[2] As this case was held in summary, the Court invited no opportunity for argumentation.
[3] Over the duration of this case, a stay was granted on Lucas v Notcom [2026] Civ 5 and Appeal of Lucas v Notcom [2026] Civ 5 [2026] SDCR 21.
Is §1 Article 25 of the [[Courtroom Procedures Act 2025] unconstitutional?
[4] In determining whether a piece of statute is unconstitutional, we must first look at the plain text to check for glaring inconsistencies between the statute and the Constitution. Following that, Article 25, §1 of the Courtroom Procedures Act 2025 reads as follows:
§1. Unless otherwise stated, any participant in a set of legal procedures shall be considered inactive if they, upon being given instruction by the court or when it is their time to provide argumentation, testimony, evidence, cross-examination, statements, instruction, etc. do not reply within forty-eight (48) hours.
- [4.1] While a plain reading of the text may indicate that there is no leniency in judicial timelines, one must consider the fact that this section does not impose any particular sanctions on an individual for being inactive, so the 48-hour period that it imposes is constitutional even after we apply Nighteye (Appellant) v LordDeadlyOwl (Respondent) [2020] SDSC 5, additionally because participants may ask for extensions to the deadline (§1.1.1) and the like.
[5] Despite the fact that the strict deadline in §1 is constitutional, courts should still show leniency to parties no matter what, considering doctrine set out in Nighteye has held true for this long because of the very real consideration that participants in legal proceedings have to deal with events in real life before being able to participate in a case on SimDemocracy.
Sanctions as Applied Following Inactivity
[6] While §1 Article 25’s constitutionality stems from the fact that it doesn’t immediately impose sanctions on a participant for being inactive, problems arise once we look at §1.2, which reads:
§1.2. If either side during civil proceedings becomes inactive, or fails to follow courtroom procedures in a reasonably timely and speedy manner the case shall automatically be found in favor of the other side.
[7] As said in [4], Nighteye doctrine is pulled from the fact that peoples’ lives in the real world take precedence over participation in SimDemocracy. It also stems from one’s Right to Fair Trial, given the fact that if we allowed no leniency and a party simply could not respond due to real-life circumstances, then they would never have the opportunity to respond in the first place.
[8] In §1.2, the wording is strict; once found inactive, a participant in a civil proceeding will lose by default. It offers no leniency to participants and, thus, seemingly violates the very explicit doctrine set forth in Nighteye, which is in effect an expansion on one’s Right to Fair Trial (see [7]).
[9] While civil proceedings often come out of individuals seeking to get compensation for their rights being infringed, that does not then mean that §1.2 is protecting their rights by giving them an implicit Right to Speedy Trial. Instead, it grossly violates the rights of the offending individual by not considering real-life circumstances and limitations whatsoever. In the event of constitutional rights conflicting, if one was to assume such to be the case here, unlike this Court, the Right to Fair Trial should hold precedence within reason.
[10] Due to §1.2’s strict wording and the fact that it leaves no room for leniency, it directly violates one’s Right to Fair Trial by disregarding the fact that real-life circumstances may not allow for them to respond in a digital court on time.
[11] Given the above, this Court is satisfied to make the determination that Article 25 §1.2 of the Courtroom Procedures Act 2025 is unconstitutional.
Reasonable Leniency When it Comes to Sanctions
[12] In the Courtroom Procedures Act 2025, Article 25 §1.2 isn’t the only one of its kind, as there’s another section in the act, being Article 20 §4, serving functionally the same purpose, which reads:
§4. Should either party fail to respond to the pre-trial, the case will automatically be found in favor of the party present.
[13] Where Article 25 §1.2 errs is something Article 20 §4 remedies through §4.3, which states that if a party “ha[s] a reasonable excuse for their absence and could not […] give notice, th[e] section won’t apply,”, showing a reasonable degree of leniency in the statute.
[14] Given this, before ruling a case in favor of any party or outright dismissing a case due to inactivity in the pre-trial of civil proceedings, the presiding judge should show leniency to allow for the inactive party (or parties) to explain their inactivity pursuant to §4.3, as if they go ahead and rule, the inactive party (or parties) would have to go through the oftentimes lengthy appeals process.
[15] Generally, before imposing sanctions due to deadlines being violated, a Court should allow a participant to explain their inactivity before the Court, in order to avoid violating their Right to Fair Trial and to stay compliant with the principles set in Nighteye.
Verdict
[16] Article 25, §1.2 of the Courtroom Procedures Act 2025 is unconstitutional.
[17] All current ongoing civil proceedings may not defaultly rule in favor of any given party pursuant to Article 25 §1.2 of the Courtroom Procedures Act 2025, and if done pursuant to Article 20 §4 should give the offending party the opportunity to explain their situation.
[18] The stays placed on Lucas v Notcom [2026] Civ 5 and Appeal of Lucas v Notcom [2026] Civ 5 [2026] SDCR 21 are lifted.
Dicta
[19] The Senate could have very easily fixed the unconstitutionality of Article 25 §1.3 by adding a section like Article 20 §4.3, and it astounds me that this provision has been allowed to stand for this long.
CONCURRING OPINION by Judge mypenjustbroke
[20] I agree with the verdict as is. That being said, the legislative process that Judge Muggy recommended in [19] is too light of advice for this problem. Since the Speedy Courts Amendment Act 2025 was passed in October of 2025—which first introduced this problem—questions have abounded from both the legal and general community of the nation regarding the Constitutionality of the Art. 25 § 1.2 provision. In short: the Senate could have fixed this, but it has come to judicial intervention to declare that subsection void.
[21] Default judgments are powerful, and they must be entered judiciously; a corollary is that they are powerful tools for Defendants. The Senate’s past philosophy for terms myriad—which I, admittedly, am not innocent of partaking in—has been to only fix something when a strong enough voice comes along and demands it. This is one of those times. I warn our nation, in dicta, to not let that happen again.
[22] In conclusion, I concur with the Opinion and agree that Art. 25 § 1.2 of the Courtroom Procedures Act is unconstitutional.