In re Deputy Executive Officer Appointments 2025 SDSC 28
Summary Decision - In re Deputy Executive Officer Appointments [2025] SDSC 28
| Date of judgment | 4th September 2025 |
| Justices |
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| Held | Presidential appointments do not include direct appointments of Deputy Executive Officers. |
| Ruling | 3-0 |
| Applicable precedent |
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MAJORITY OPINION by Chief Justice TheLittleSparty
(with Justices IvyCactus and Ed agreeing)
Introduction
[1] In response to apparent senatorial inaction, President Delulu took it upon themselves to fire the then present Secretaries of Expansion and State respectively. In their place, the President appointed Muggy and Thommy as “Deputy Secretary” of each department respectively, as well as the Acting Secretary for each department. These appointments were subsequently challenged by TheMainCharacter7393, and in their request for a review an injunction was granted halting the appointments, prohibiting the President from making any similar appointments, and prohibiting other Acting Secretaries from appointing Deputy Secretaries until either their confirmation by the Senate, or such time as this Court has reviewed the circumstances of the case, and rendered a decision.
Summary of the Petition
[2] The petition consists primarily of a quotation from the Executive Departments Act, in particular Article 1, Section 6, which states:
“§6. Executive Officers may name a member of their department as their deputy who shall be able to exercise the powers of the office during the absence or incapacitation of the Executive Officer.”
[3] Alleging that the above section restricts the appointment of Deputy Secretaries to only duly appointed and confirmed Secretaries of departments, the petition asserts that the President’s appointments were unlawful.
Summary of the Response
[4] This case was heard summarily by the Court, and as such invited no response.
Notes on Unitary Executive Theory
[5] As referenced within In re Article 4, s5 of the Executive Act 2023 [2025] SDSC 9, the principle of a “unitary executive” relies on the premise that executive power, as written in the Constitution, flows from the singular source in the presidency. In re Article 4, s5 goes to some length to clarify the nature of this concept, particularly in the discussions relating to topics such as cannibalization of powers between branches, individual discretion of the Executive branch, and that the powers vested in the presidency largely rely on the individual holding the position’s ability to require their orders be followed, including through replacing officials. A few of these concepts are outlined below, for the purposes of full consideration in the process of interpreting the President’s actions.
- [5.1] In relating to the concept of cannibalization of powers, In re Article 4, s5, drawing heavily on In re War and Peace Act 2024 [2024] SDSC 1, defines cannibalization as “the usurpation of one branch’s authority by another branch.” In re Article 4, s5 was, in particular, defining for the concept because it clearly delineated the nature of, and prompted further legislative extrapolation around, the generally ill-defined boundary between much of the Executive’s power and senatorial power. In so doing, it explicitly defined the Constitutional power of the Senate to confirm Executive Officers as not being cannibalization.
- [5.2] In defining cannibalization as such, but still identifying an issue at hand, the basis for the Unitary Executive was then defined, specifically addressing the separate but related issue of “Fragmentation”.
- [5.2.1] “Fragmentation” may be summarized as “power within the Executive being stolen not by another branch, but through the creation of another figure within the executive who wields authority outside the President’s scope”.
- [5.2.2] Fragmentation therefore can be said to be a violation of Unitary Executive theory, in that when it occurs, it undermines the authority and powers of the Executive in conflict with the Constitution.
- [5.2.3] The original framework for “Fragmentation of the unitary executive” was “it may not create parallel authorities that enforce laws without the President’s oversight”, referring simply to the Senate’s lacking the basis to create executive power structures separate from the President, rather than to the broader political concept of the “Unitary Executive”.
Questions Raised
[6] The sole major question posed in the petition was this:
- [6.1] Are the appointments made by the President in conflict with the Executive Departments Act of 2025?
[7] Beyond this, a number of adjacent questions are raised which must by necessity be answered in the process of addressing the primary question.
- [7.1] Does SimDemocracy’s Unitary Executive permit the President to appoint Deputy Secretaries to departments, and name them as Acting Secretaries?
- [7.2] Is the President an Executive Officer? Further, can the President appoint themselves as an acting Executive Officer?
Responses to Questions
[8] First, is the President an Executive Officer, and/or may they appoint themselves as an acting Executive Officer?
- [8.1] The Constitution clearly states in Article 7, Section 5:
“§5. Executive Officers may not simultaneously be President, Senator, Judge or Justice.”
- [8.2] Given that the President may not concurrently be an Executive Officer, and this can very easily be extrapolated to mean that the President may not serve in the capacity of an Executive Officer in the role of “acting Executive Officer” either.
[9] Next, it must be considered whether the Unitary Executive framework permits the President to appoint Deputy Secretaries.
- [9.1] The President is implicitly empowered to appoint Executive Officers in several areas, including by “wielding executive authority”, “[having] primary authority of the organization and management of the core territories of SimDemocracy”, “[creating executive bodies] by decree of the President”, and “[having] the power to hire staff to assist with their duties”.
- [9.2] Executive Officers, of which the President may not be one, are explicitly empowered by the Executive Departments Act to name a Deputy who is empowered to exercise the powers of office during absence of the Executive Officer.
- [9.3] Where a case for vertical cannibalization of powers (Fragmentation) might exist under different circumstances, in this particular case the authority of the President extends to include removing and appointing new Executive Officers in the event of their absence or incapacitation. Given that appointing a new Executive Officer in these circumstances serves to accomplish the exact same goal as appointing a Deputy Executive Officer, it cannot be said that restricting the President’s authority to appoint such a Deputy unduly restricts the President’s overall authority. As such, pending any changes to legislation, the role of Deputy Executive Officer is not one which the President is able to appoint, and is instead limited to being appointed to by Executive Officers.
- [9.4] Put another way, legislation created a particular executive power within the broader scope of the Presidency, but assigned the power to an individual whom the President appoints. This does not serve to undermine Presidential authority, but merely reflects that the President may not personally take up lower roles to suit their own needs, and rather must appoint an individual into the role which possesses the power, in order to accomplish the particular task allotted to that role.
[10] Finally then, it can be asked: Are the appointments made by the President in conflict with the Executive Departments Act of 2025?
- [10.1] The answer here is yes, the President unlawfully appointed two individuals as Deputy Executive Officers, something which the President is not authorized to do, in an apparent effort to bypass the Senate’s explicit power to confirm Executive Officer appointments. As it stands, this actually serves as a Presidential attempt to undermine Senatorial authority, and is doubly unjustifiable.
Decision
[11] Both appointments to Deputy Executive Officers are unlawful and unconstitutional.
- [11.1] The President may not appoint directly to the position of Deputy Executive Officer, nor may the President appoint themselves as either Deputy or Acting Executive Officer.