In re EO 143-04 2025 SDSC 24
In re EO 143-04 [2025] SDSC 24
| Date | 7th October 2025 |
| Judges |
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| Held |
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| Ruling | 4-0 |
| Applicable precedent |
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MAJORITY OPINION by Justice Ed
(with Justice TheLittleSparty and Justice Syndicality agreeing, and Justice Ivy Cactus agreeing except for [23])
Introduction
[1] The petitioner is seeking a review into EO 143-04 mainly on the basis that it violates Article 25’s prohibition on forced or compelled labour.
[2] EO 143-04 directs that whoever sees a specific order phrase message by the President must buy the President ice cream.
Summary of Petition
[3] The petitioner begins by claiming that the EO violates Article 25's prohibition on compulsory labor. They argue that requiring executive employees to purchase ice cream for the President constitutes forced labor, as noncompliance with the binding order could be grounds for termination. They reason that being terminated materially worsens their position, thereby creating coercion to obey the order. They further argue that such duties fall so far beyond the normal scope of executive functions that they cannot be considered part of an employee's duties.
[4] They then argue that the EO is Wednesbury unreasonable, meaning so irrational that no reasonable authority could have made such a decision, and therefore should be struck down.
[5] They lastly argue that the EO violates Article 23’s protection of citizens’ debt and an implied liberty to use someone’s money under Article 22, because it compels executive employees to spend their own money and labor to purchase ice cream for the President without compensation, which they claim constitutes an unreasonable seizure of their property.
Summary of Response
[6] The respondent argues that the EO does not impose penalties or mandatory consequences for non-compliance, and that firing an employee for ignoring a playful executive order would be unreasonable.
[7] The respondent then claims that the EO’s precise wording, "whoever sees that message first must buy me ice cream", effectively means the President would always be the first to see the message, thereby only compelling the President to buy their own ice cream.
[8] The Court received one amicus brief, from former Justice TheMainCharacter, mainly in support of the respondent arguing that the EO only applies to executive employees, and that it is simply an additional duty to their position, and their right to resign under the Article 25§2 negates violations of the compulsory labour clause as the employees always have the choice to resign from the job.
On the Respondent’s Interpretation of EO-143-04
[9] The Court rejects the respondent's interpretation (See [7]) of EO 143-04 to only apply to the President. The EO specifies seeing a “message”, which is a communication between one party to another. The specific order phrase cannot become a message unless another person sees it, making this interpretation flawed and thereby rejected.
On the Protection of Private Property
[10] Complying with the EO does entail purchasing ice cream, and without compensation. The State, however, is not assuming any debt or obligation to repay that expenditure. This concern is analogous to uncompensated expropriation under civil law rather than a matter of unpaid government debts. This argument is dismissed.
On the Scope of EO 143-04
[11] As the question of who the order applies to is directly relevant to assessing the petitioner’s claim of compulsory labor, the Court will assess the scope of the order. EO 143-04 directs that, “whoever sees the message must buy the President ice cream”. Taken literally, this could apply to any person who encounters the message.
[12] Article 7§3.1 of the Constitution defines executive orders as written orders from members of the executive, in this case the President, to their subordinates. Executive orders may also derive their authority from a statutory basis where legislation expressly authorizes the President to exercise other powers not limited to commanding subordinates, such as where the constitution requires Reddit and Discord Supervisors to act under executive orders while not being subordinates to the President.
[13] Where an executive order is based on statutory authority, the scope of such an order cannot exceed the powers explicitly granted by the legislation, nor can it impose duties or obligations unrelated to the purpose defined by law.
[14] In the case of EO 143-04, there is no statute from which such authority could reasonably be inferred for the order to apply to anyone outside the President’s subordinates. Consequently, the order will be assessed as an exercise of direct executive authority from the President to their subordinates.
[15] For an act to fall within general executive authority, it must bear a rational connection to the operations or functions of the executive branch. The Court will not generally define what constitutes a necessary executive function, but will determine whether a rational basis exists, that is whether it is reasonably conceivable that the order advances any executive purpose.
[16] In the context of the nature of SimDemocracy, the Court finds no rational connection between the act of compelling employees to purchase ice cream for the President and any legitimate executive function. EO 143-04 therefore exceeds the President’s constitutional authority.
On Compulsory Labour
[17] The Court will nonetheless address the question of compulsory labour given the numerous cases and arguments raised concerning this issue.
[18] Article 25, §1 prohibits compelling a person to perform forced or compulsory labour. The Court finds that purchasing ice cream does constitute labour and turns to whether the order is illegally compelling this labour.
[19] Article 7, §3 establishes that executive orders are compulsory on subordinates of the issuer. This compulsion element however is agreed to voluntarily by executive employees who accept the authority structure of Article 7 as a condition of their employment.
[20] Article 25, §2 guarantees every person the right to resign with immediate effect from any job or role. A person who can freely exit an employment relationship at any time retains control over whether to perform the duties of that role.
[21] The petitioner’s interpretation that the threat of termination constitutes compulsion would effectively render nearly all employment relationships in violation of Article 25, §1. Orders issued within the context of employment are part of the contractual agreement, and the possibility of termination enforces the terms of that voluntary relationship. The employee can always refuse the order and resign immediately under Article 25, §2.
[22] Even if the orders fall outside the scope of an employee’s duties, this still does not negate the employee’s ability to exercise the right to resign. Such circumstances may constitute a breach of contract or wrongful dismissal rather than compulsory labour.
[23] The Court finds that compulsion for labour requires deprivation of a person's ability to reasonably refuse the labour, and that the right to resign preserves that ability. EO 143-04 does not violate Article 25.
Verdict
[24] EO 143-04 exceeds the President’s constitutional authority and is struck down.
CONCURRING OPINION by Justice Ivy Cactus
[25] I write separately because, while I agree broadly with the majority, I have some finer points I would like to address in regards to slavery, specifically [17]-[23]. Specifically I think that while the majority correctly identified that the ability to resign greatly limits the ability for involuntary servitude to apply, I think they missed a level of subtlety in exploring it.
[26] While it is certainly the case that one being able to resign can alleviate Article 25, I do not think this can be absolute. Article 25, §1 uses terms such as “compelled” and “forced”, along with the more standard “compulsory”. From this we can see that slavery cannot be limited solely to when labour is forced because the person cannot physically resign (indeed if this was the case then nothing could be slavery, because one could simply turn their computer off).
[27] As such, I identify not only labour that one cannot resign from, but also labour where resignation leads to extreme and unfavorable outcomes as coerced to the extent that it rises to slavery. This could take several forms, though one that sticks out is a contract with an unconscionable penalty for resignation (the United States Supreme Court held in Bailey v. Alabama (1911) that criminalizing contractual violations constitutes forced labor, a concept that applies here). So, too, does debt slavery, where someone is compelled to work to pay off an obligation to another. Resigning leading to a “voluntary” waiving of another right would also apply. One can imagine several other avenues for something to rise to this level.
[28] No job in the executive has such terms of employment, and as such the majority correctly identified that the Executive Order does not constitute forced or involuntary labour. As such, I concur.