In re Fair Use of Alternate Accounts Act 2025 2026 SDSC 1
In re Fair Use of Alternate Accounts Act 2025 [2026] SDSC 1
| Date of judgment | 3rd March 2026 |
| Justices |
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| Held |
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| Ruling | 5-0 |
| Applicable precedent |
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MAJORITY OPINION by Justice Ivy Cactus
(with Chief Justice Ed, Justice TheLittleSparty, Justice Britz and Justice Terak agreeing)
Introduction
[1] The petitioner, attorney Tripodplayz, on behalf of their client pizzaeater1222 (hereafter known as “pizzaeater”), seeks review of the Fair Use of Alternate Accounts Act 2025 (hereafter known as the FUA3), alleging that it unconstitutionally violates the right to Liberty and Security of the Person (Article 22 of the Constitution), by allowing the state to ban his client on the balance of probabilities rather than on the beyond a reasonable doubt standard.
[2] This case was heard in full, receiving the petition and subsequent argumentation from the petitioner, a rebuttal by the State as represented by Delulu, and two amicus briefs from former Chief Justice Alexa and Voice of Democracy Justice, Bete.
Summary of the Petition
[3] The petitioner opens by clarifying they do not believe the State lapsed in its duties or otherwise illegally carried out the ban of pizzaeater, but instead that the statutory basis for the State’s actions was unconstitutional.
[4] Their argument is as follows: the Constitution requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt for someone to be sanctioned for committing a crime, the FUA3 allows such on the preponderance of the evidence, and thus it is unconstitutional. They go on to state that there are perfectly valid reasons for the FUA3 to be structured as it is, but that the burden placed on the state must be higher.
[5] They conclude by asking that the court strike down the removal of pizzaeater.
Summary of the Response
[6] The State makes an extensive response, focused mainly on a supposed proportionality of the standard of proof used to declare alts to the lower burden the FUA3 imposes.
[7] They start by outlining that the classification of an account as an alternate account is not a criminal prosecution but an administrative action. For this, they turn to the ever-controversial In re Candidacy of Alien Users in the 2nd Parliamentary Election [2020] SDSC 19, in which Chief Justice TheMainCharacter declares that “alternate accounts of a person are an extension of said person.” Thus, in the State’s opinion, declaration of alt account status is a mere civil action, and thus subject to a lower burden of proof.
[8] They go on to cite US Supreme Court precedent that states that restrictions of liberty following civil proceedings can be subject to a lower burden of proof, when the aim of the restrictions is not punitive. The respondent does not make it explicit here, but an example of such an action in SimDemocracy law would be holding someone in contempt coercively until they respond to a subpoena.
[9] The respondent continues that the petitioner incorrectly states that the Constitution requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt for conviction, and that said standard instead lies with the Criminal Code. The Right to a Fair Hearing, instead, merely states that “Every person charged with a criminal offense shall be presumed innocent until proven guilty,” with no nods towards a specific standard of proof.
[10] They then outline a whole host of scenarios where not being able to declare an account as an alternative account puts SimDemocracy at risk. The main one being the possibility of casting multiple votes in an election. To this, they believe that the preponderance of the evidence is a perfectly valid standard. They believe that with all of that considered, a lower burden of proof is all but totally necessary.
Summary of Alexa’s Amicus Brief
[11] Alexa opens her amicus by going over Article 22 of the Constitution, which outlines every legal way for someone to be deprived of their liberty. She takes a systematic approach, going one by one over every section and describing why the FUA3 does not meet the outlined standard. Most of these are self-evident. The one worth mentioning is 22§2.1, which outlines that someone can be deprived of their liberty on the order of a competent court. Importantly, Alexa points out, the ban of a supposed alternate account is not conducted on court order, but instead occurs by later administrative action downstream of a prior court order. She argues that such a court order must be direct.
[12] Alexa goes on to point out that Article 23a of the Criminal Code faces the same problem, using some quite contrived and unnecessary argumentation about what constitutes a “competent court.”
[13] She goes on to ask the court to overturn In re Candidacy due to it relying on a now-repealed section of the Criminal Code.
[14] Finally, she makes a philosophical argument that declaring somebody an alternative account strips them of their personhood and therefore their rights. She posits that the balance of probabilities is not a high enough standard to deprive somebody of their rights, regardless of whether said right is the right to liberty and security or not.
Summary of Bete’s Amicus Brief
[15] Bete’s amicus is formulated mostly as a response to and a rebuttal of Alexa’s, although they agree in eventual conclusion.
[16] He starts by asserting that Alexa’s argumentation in relation to Article 22 is ultimately correct, but imprecise. In his view, the core of the State’s argument is not that the actions laid out in FUA3 constitute a fulfillment of any specific mode of due process, but that said process has already been met and the enforcement action merely removes an extension of the same person (thus, the due process standard from Article 22 has already been met).
[17] Bete then turns to what he sees as the actual issue at play, the lowering of the burden of proof. He outlines that, “The mine run of criminal cases in SimDemocracy has taken for granted the beyond-a-reasonable doubt standard, which is established by the Criminal Code and backed up by a constitutional bodyguard,” and that as such the court must take a strong presumption towards said standard. As he points out, the Criminal Code leaves no room for doubt in its phrasing. He supports this view with several passages from [[Tie (Appellant) v SD (Respondent) 2025 SDCR 37|Tie (Appellant) v SD (Respondent) [2025] SDCR 37, in which the Court of Review outlined a very strict sense of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. Due to this strong presumption, he believes that the Senate must write very specifically to overrule the broad passage, something he believes occurs in Article 23a and not in the FUA3 itself.
[18] He continues that the state’s claim that there is no associated criminal action, and that the action of the FUA3 is merely civil and administrative, is flimsy at best. As he points out, for FUA3’s “consequential-moderation provision” (FUA3 3§1) to be constitutional, there must be an associated criminal conviction. As such, "to effectuate the deprivation of liberty, a criminal judgment of the crime as to the alternate account is required, i.e., proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the alternate account holder is the same as the main account holder.”
[19] He then goes on to explain that, should the claim instead be that the provision creates a new criminal standard with a lower burden or proof, it would mean that the Senate also created a new judicial authority with the ability to declare someone an alternative account “out of thin air,” something he is skeptical is consistent with separation of powers.
[20] He concludes with a plea that the court either declare FUA3 Article 3 unconstitutional or declare that it is constitutional, but limited to only cases where it meets the higher burden of proof.
The Ambit of the Fair Use of Alternate Accounts Act 2025
[21] There are multiple conflicting views of what the main purpose of the FUA3 is, sometimes presented at different times by the same party. To get to the core of the issues at hand, it must first be distinguished what the FUA3 is doing, how it is doing it, and when.
[22] Above all there is the fact that the FUA3 allows courts to declare “an account owned or operated by a person on any platform on which SimDemocracy is located, which is not the account they most commonly use on that platform of SimDemocracy,” as an alternate account by declaration of the account owner themselves or if a competent authority (which the subsequent provisions make clear to be a judge of the inferior courts believes that, on the balance of probabilities, the account is an alternate account.
[23] There is then the following “consequential-moderation” provision, where if an account is registered as an alternate account of a person who has had their liberty duly deprived, the alternate account may also have said liberty deprived.
[24] Now, the law itself does not make this clear, but this registry is also used by the Registry Commission to declare somebody ineligible to vote, as described in the Voter Registry Act 2025. This deprivation is the crux of the respondent’s argument in [10]. This will be referred to as “electoral loss of personhood.”
[25] With this in mind, the court will not rule out that other unrelated civil effects are possible and probable from being put on the alt account registry. Due to this, it will make a third category known as “civil loss of personhood.”
[26] As the court sees it, these three actions are unrelated and must be adjudicated separately (lest the three be wrongly conflated, and the unconstitutionality of one incorrectly rub off on the others, or vice versa). Thus, they will be addressed separately.
[27] Underlying all of this is the fundamental truth that what the FUA3 does is deprive somebody of their civil standing, right to vote, and security as a person. While it may be true that the justification for doing this is that they are an alternate account, and as such not a unique person (as outlined in In re Candidacy of Alien Users in the 2nd Parliamentary Election [2020] SDSC 19), to go in using that analysis is a classic case of begging the question. The court must always take the side of those who had their liberty deprived; one can not justify that deprivation as requiring a lower standard due to the eventual conclusion of proceedings, if such conclusions required a lowering of standards to begin with. In effect it does not matter if two accounts are legally the same person, as the State still needs to prove such, as governed by the specific standards of proof for any given context where they are asserting it, not as a separate conclusion divorced from the proceeding in question.
[28] It should be noted that there is an alternate process in law via which an account can be placed on the alt registry, on request. While this certainly seems ripe for abuse, the State has assured the court of a two-factor authentication-like process that is used, in practice, in which both the main account and the alt itself have to agree to said placement. Given this, it seems unlikely that someone mistakenly gets placed there unforcefully (and, even if they do, they have no one but themselves to blame). The court will, therefore, hone in on the forceful placement onto the alt registry.
- [28.1] Understandably, for some, the State’s assurance on following proper procedures may not be convincing enough. Thankfully, declaration of alternate accounts is done under penalty of perjury, and also has its own section of the criminal code (Article 4, Subdivision 2).
On Civil Loss of Personhood
[29] Due to it flying mostly under the radar for the parties, as well as being the simplest, civil loss of personhood will be examined first.
[30] This certainly seems rather clear-cut. The standard for civil proceedings is the balance of probabilities; there is no reason that such a standard shouldn’t or couldn’t be applied to proceedings that consider the use of an alternate account. If somebody can prove on the balance of probabilities that somebody is an alternate account, then, for civil purposes, they are. This is a fact of SimDemocracy’s legal tradition stretching all the way back to Mobilfan v Dick_head68 [2020] Civ 3, and is altogether Constitutional.
[31] It should be noted, of course, that placement on the alt registry can not be the end-all be-all for court’s deciding if an account actually is an alt, as that would be deciding an open question in a courtroom based off a prior proceeding where the defendant may or may not have had input. However, in vague terms as to not overfit the inferior courts in future circumstances, it should certainly be a compelling piece of evidence to that effect.
On Electoral Loss of Personhood
[32] As it has received less scrutiny by those who made submissions, the court will open by examining the Constitutionality of electoral loss of personhood.
- [32.1] For reference, the sections pertaining to this in argumentation were [10] and [14].
[33] The question at play here seems to be whether someone can be deprived of their Constitutional rights, specifically that to vote, on the balance of probabilities. The State makes extensive argumentation that this is proportional, and even necessary, while former Chief Justice Alexa says that it is far too low a burden to deprive somebody of their fundamental personhood.
[34] That being said, it is wrong to strike this as a broad loss of personhood; what is approached is a trade-off, where the State must balance the right of the given person to vote with society’s right to free and fair elections. Thankfully, by rephrasing the question in this manner, the court now has extensive electoral precedent to fall back upon. These all deal with removing votes or groups of votes from single elections, which is fundamentally the same restriction (removing a person’s vote, although the person is unknown), as the one being done when somebody is removed from or refused registration for the Voter Registry.
- [34.1] In this specific instance, “society’s right” is being used to refer to a positive right given to the people as a whole, emergent from each person’s “right to express their opinion and participate in the political process through voting in free and fair elections.” The court will often assign positive rights, rights that place an obligation of action on the State, as belonging to society as a whole. Whether society can hold rights, independent of the individuals that make it up, is an open question currently being adjudicated in Question of Law - In re 4th Parliamentary Election 2020 SDSC 23 [2026] SDSC 4.
[35] So, the question, then, is when the state is able to restrict somebody’s exercise of their rights, specifically in this case, the right to vote. It would seem that there is very clear precedent on the issue. Cases such as In re 4th Parliamentary Election [2020] SDSC 23 and In re 9th Parliamentary Election [2021] SDSC 3 have placed the very clear burden of “clear and convincing” evidence for the executive to pass in order to remove votes.
[36] The justification for such a standard has, in the past, come down to “the State should have to pass a higher bar than more likely than not to deprive somebody of the right to vote, but it should be noted that there are points in the past where this bar was lower, specifically In re 39th Presidential Election [2020] SDSC 11 sets that burden at the balance of probabilities. This points to a more detailed analysis being necessary.
[37] For this, the court must look towards the justification used in In re 4th Parliamentary Election [2020] SDSC 23 to raise the standard. Specifically, [9]-[13] set out that changes such as the new citizenship system, making the use of alternate accounts harder, and parliamentary voting, making rigging harder to spot, should raise the burden for the state.
[38] At first inspection, it would seem that neither of these is in place currently, and as such, no longer applies. However, the standards set out in Article 3§1 of the Voter Registry Act 2025 certainly act similarly to the prior citizenship system, and the politically charged environment of current SimDemocracy does not imply less voting for separate blocs together.
[39] Underlying all of this is the fact that the current action, permanently removing an account’s ability to vote, is much stronger than simply removing a single vote. Due to this, it is unclear how the lower standard can be applicable without being wildly disproportionate. That would lead to a major inconsistency in the court’s precedent. So, it is now necessary to examine why the court applies standards of evidence and get to the bottom of how these cases should be treated in the future.
- [39.1] In their response, the State points towards the possibility of appeal to make the measure seem more proportionate. It should be noted that being able to appeal does not mean much if the standard for the appeal is the same as the original standard.
[40] For one, permissible infringement is inherently the balancing of one set of rights against another set of rights, or a law that sits above those rights (such as the Terms of Service). Protecting people’s rights should also be the strong inclination of any court, but there come times when, to protect the vast majority of people’s rights, some infringement of others’ rights is necessary.
[41] A good framework to go about this would mirror the court’s test laid out for equality before the law jurisprudence (although it's important to note that such jurisprudence does not regard permissible infringement, but instead outlines when something constitutes an equality of the law violation and when it does not, with possible permissible infringement on top of that). Thus, the test is as follows:
- [41.1] First, the reason for the infringement must be examined (i.e., is there a problem threatening other people’s rights, the rights of society as a whole, or SimDemocracy’s continued existence on the platform on which the infringement occurred). The infringement can not be permissible unless it protects one of those three listed, or else it's just infringement for no purpose (see: In re Appendix s1.7 of the Constitution [2020] SDSC 3 and In re Article 56, s4 of the Criminal Code [2020] SDSC 12).
- [41.2] Next, it must be determined if the solution actually solves the problem at hand. The infringement can not be permissible if it does not actually protect any of the three categories listed above, and there is no further analysis required if it does not. While the specifics of this need not be fleshed out, in general terms, this item should be examined against empirical results when possible, but obviously must be speculative at times. In the case of speculative applications, it is likely best to handle it with some reasonability or rational basis test, but there is no need to give specific directions at this time.
- [41.3] Then, it must be seen whether there is an equally or more viable approach that has a much lessened infringement on rights. To give an example, it would not be permissible to force somebody into slavery as an SDBI officer in order to protect the right to childhood. That's a valid goal, and maybe not so bad an infringement (subjectively), but it's not permissible to do it when you could just as well get a volunteer to do it (or pay the one being forced to), etc. As these questions can very quickly become political, it is best for courts to defer heavily to the State in ambiguous cases, though the specifics of said scenario need not be laid out explicitly at this time.
- [41.4] Finally, the severity of the infringement must be weighed against the supposed problem at hand. It is no use allowing a permissible infringement if doing so causes more people’s rights to be violated, or leads to far more egregious violations of rights. One such example of a policy that fails this test would be muting everyone in order to prevent terms of service violations. That is, in abstract, a reasonable problem, and a workable solution, but it comes down far too strongly and ends up doing more harm to freedom of speech protections than its protection of terms of service compliance offers.
- [41.5] With this list, it can be seen why the court switched from a preponderance of the evidence to clear and convincing evidence being necessary to remove votes from an election; with the heightened election security, removing votes at such a low burden became disproportionate to the threat of fraud.
[42] This framework might strike some as overzealous by the court, allowing itself quite a bit of discretion. What must be understood is that this framework is about when the court should go against prevailing trends and allow a right to be violated— the default in such cases, by most estimations, should be the presumption that such violations are not allowed. This test, in contrast, puts quite a bit of that discretion in the hands of the executive and legislature. The court is, essentially, trying to strike a balance between protection of rights and not hand-cuffing the State at the whims of the courts instead of elected officials. With that intent in mind, remember that the “free and lawful exercise of [one’s] rights shall never be infringed by the state” unless such infringement is specifically protecting rights or SimDemocracy’s existence. If an infringement is too extensive, or unnecessary, then such an infringement is not “for” the purposes of protecting other rights, it is superfluous and additional to said goal.
[43] So, electoral loss of personhood must be examined through this lens:
- [43.1] First, is there a legitimate reason to remove the ability to vote from alternate accounts? The court thinks certainly, an alternate account is not a separate person, and allowing them to vote allows a single person to vote twice or more. Alternate accounts have been used often in SimDemocracy’s history to rig elections, an action that brazenly violates society’s right to a free and fair election. The State is more than justified in wanting to curtail this action.
- [43.2] Next, is this solution effective? Certainly, removing the ability of suspected alternate accounts to vote gets the job done; there is no better way to approach this than simply removing the ability of discovered alternate accounts to vote.
- [43.3] Then, is the solution necessary? This point can get somewhat dicey. There may very well be better solutions to the problem, but the solution provided by the State is not immediately and obviously suboptimal or unnecessarily restrictive in reaching its goal. As such, the court will defer to the State and grant them this point.
- [43.4] Finally, is the solution proportional to the problem? This is where issues arise. The right to a free and fair election is certainly threatened by a single vote, which can have a major impact on a result, but the possibility of a single illegal vote is not, generally, of tremendous concern. So, then, is a solution where people are permanently disenfranchised on the balance of probabilities prior to a hearing proportional to the issue of a single alt voting? Surely not, even with a strong presumption towards it being so. In general, curtailing individual rights for the good of society should be seen with a higher level of scrutiny than vice versa, say.
- [43.5] It would seem that, under this reasoning, the clear and convincing evidentiary standard may be a high enough bar, doing more to protect individual rights while also allowing for alternate accounts to be filtered. This would also be more in line with historical interpretations of the individual right to vote, with society’s right to a free and fair election. That is not to say that there aren’t alternative solutions, indeed there is more than one can count (it's possible, for example, that allowing the person a defense before removing their right to vote may also work). Such issues are for the future legislators of SimDemocracy to decide.
[44] Article 4, Section 3 of the Voter Registry Act 2025 is unconstitutional in its current form, and may not be used as the basis for removing somebody from the voter registry until it is redone with a higher standard of evidence, at least that of clear and convincing.
On Consequential Moderation
[45] With the understanding that prior discussion may have killed suspense, the court will now go on to examine the constitutionality of the consequential moderation provision.
[46] For one, the court would like to first get out of the way that proportionality truly does not come into play here. As the court stated in In re Appendix s1.7 of the Constitution [2020] SDSC 3, “the right to liberty and security of the person (Article 27)[,] Section 2 states explicitly that no one is to be deprived of their liberty without due process of law, which itself is defined. The state can’t use the permissible infringement clause to justify deprivation of liberty outside of explicitly defined due process.” Thus, it matters not how well formulated the State’s arguments that they ought to be able to deprive liberty are, if it does not fall under a Constitutionally stated standard, it does not apply. As stated by Judge ppatpat in Writ of Habeas Corpus — Guava III [2025] SDIC 2, “The right to liberty and security is not a privilege granted by the State but a fundamental guarantee owed by the State to all within its jurisdiction… [C]onstitutional rights are not passive assurances but active protections that must be respected in all circumstances even, and especially, when they are inconvenient to those in power.”
- [46.1] This section invalidates the respondent’s arguments in [10], it does not matter what the knock on effects are of this infringement, if there is one, not being possible, because there is no permissible infringement allowed for the right to liberty and security of the person whatsoever.
[47] As stated in [27], this consequential moderation follows from what is, in the court’s opinion, a completely isolated proceeding. As it is a court proceeding, the Right to a Fair Hearing surely applies. The FUA3 allows for somebody to be summarily banned with no proceeding, following a forced registration that has no associated proceeding. As stated in In re Appeal of Summary Ban - "mc_uighilin" (Panzzrr) [2025] SDSC 2, the possibility of retroactive appeal does not constitute due process; this provision is very straightforwardly unconstitutional. It deprives a person of their liberty at a much lower standard, without the possibility of defense, due to the preconceived conclusion. The Constitution does not waver; every person charged with a criminal offense shall be innocent until proven guilty in a court of law.
- [47.1] As such, the respondent’s argument in [8] does not apply, the result of a hearing such as this is punitive in this context. The burden of a proceeding must be applied to all aspects of that proceeding. Remember, the State has the duty of “proving each element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt,” before securing a conviction. One such element is, obviously, that the person being accused is the person who committed the crime. As such, the full burden applies.
[48] Article 23a runs into the same issue; it allows a judge to ”upon being presented evidence that on the balance of probabilities an account is an alternate account” summarily ban somebody without a full trial. As stated in [27] and [46], this provision puts the proverbial cart before the horse, lowering the necessary standard to enact a ban based on the conclusion of said proceeding. This is simply absurd; the right to a fair hearing can not be removed because the court is satisfied it doesn’t apply, because then there is no right to a fair hearing at all. Innocent until proven guilty means innocent until proven guilty; no summary proceedings may change that, nor may any assertions by a registry which are forwarded without court proceedings.
- [48.1] This is not to say that the State’s argument in [9] is wrong, per se. The court does not see it necessary to examine whether a criminal trial, Constitutionally, must be held beyond a reasonable doubt at this time. What is certain is that the proposed identity of the accused can not be the reason for a lower standard of proof, the State’s assertions can not allow someone to be banned at a lesser standard (unless such accusations are a differentia under Article 22§2).
- [48.2] For a similar piece of reasoning, one can refer to In re Department of Voter Registration Search Warrant [2025] SDSC 6 where the court laid out that anonymity of a ballot can not be violated prior to proper basis for said violation being established. The same applies here, the State can not take the executive action to ban somebody for being an alternate account based on an assumed criminality that has not yet been established in court, to do so would be “entirely without merit, unconstitutional, and more broadly unlawful.” The State can not violate rights prior to establishing that said rights have been forfeit in a lawful, consistent way.
[49] The court is rather skeptical that such bans would be constitutional even with a full trial held on the balance of probabilities, which the prior section should make clear, but such analysis is not currently necessary.
Verdict
[50] The ban on pizzaeater was unlawful, and their account must be unbanned, if it has not been already.
[51] Article 4, Section 3 of the Voter Registry Act 2025 is unconstitutional, and hereby null, void, and of no effect.
[52] Article 3 of the Fair Use of Alternate Accounts Act 2025 is unconstitutional, and hereby null, void, and of no effect.
[53] Article 23a, Section 5 of the Criminal Code 2020 is unconstitutional, and hereby null, void, and of no effect.
[54] As before, in similar such verdicts, those who have been banned under these sections in the past, can apply for a full, fair trial (the State may do likewise, if it wants to get ahead of the situation). The court will not require the State to go through and contact these persons, as requiring such would be unreasonably burdensome (as it may not even be possible to do so). The State must also allow said persons to register to vote.
Postscript
[55] It should be noted, as explained in [28], that these sections are unconstitutional because they rely on the alternate account registry, which allows for accounts to be entered at too low a barrier. If the court could rule that these are only unconstitutional when applied to some members of the alt registry and not others, it would likely do so. Logistically, though, such a solution poses too many problems to be useful. It also encroaches somewhat on legislative authority. The court sees limited benefit in pushing the bounds of its powers for an action that might do more harm than good, and thus will leave it to the legislature.
[56] The court, though, absolutely does recognize the burden that this verdict may very well put on the executive, and the legislature as well, downstream. Thus, the effects of it will be delayed by two weeks to give the State time to create ample alternative solutions.
[57] To avoid doubt, in reference to [44], the election commission need not redo election results for whatever current electoral terms are in order when this verdict is released, as doing so would be unduly burdensome, with an extremely low probability of affecting eventual results.
[58] It should be further noted that the court did not neglect to consider difficulties in proving someone to be an alternate account of a specific person when deciding this case. Sadly, such difficulties are inherent to due process, and cannot be used to remove due process (or, can’t be used by the court, rather— the people may do as they will). Thankfully, innovations such as the hoax charge should make the prosecution of these accounts feasible, if not trivial.