In re PISS 2§1 2026 SDCR 28
In re Article 2 §1 of the Planning Infiltration Super Safely Act 2025 [2026] SDCR 28
| Date of judgment | 25th March 2026 |
| Judge(s) |
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| Held |
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| Ruling | 3-0 |
| Applicable precedent |
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MAJORITY OPINION by Judge Matt Cheney
(with Chief Judge Brandmal, and Judge NotCommunist366 agreeing aside from [15])
Introduction
[1] Petitioner AtTheEdge (“Petitioner”) brings this Judicial Review of the Planning Infiltration Super Safely Act 2025 (“PISS Act”), specifically Article 2 §1 of the legislation. Petitioner alleges that prohibiting minors from participating in infiltration operations is unconstitutional, does not abide the precedent found in Dominax273 (Appellant) v State of SimDemocracy (Respondent) [2025] SDCR 1, and violates Discord ToS by using age (a protected characteristic) to determine who may or may not participate in a specific function of the server.
[2] The Court of Review takes this Judicial Review to decide whether or not the PISS Act of 2025 violates the Constitution.
Summary of Arguments
[3] The Petitioner begins their argument by asserting that the age of a user in SimDemocracy would be considered personal data as defined in Article 19 §3 of the [Constitution]], which states in §3, “Personal data shall include information which can identify a person’s real life identity directly, information which can make a person’s real life identity identifiable and information that can lead to indirect identification of a person’s real life identity in combination with other information.”
[4] The Petitioner then argues that no user should be required to reveal personal data in order to participate in a function of the PolSim.
[5] Next the Petitioner cites Dominax273 (Appellant) v State of SimDemocracy (Respondent) [2025] SDCR 1, specifically [32] which states that “No defense in law may rely on unverifiable characteristics…”.
- [5.1] They argue that this precedent should apply more broadly than it has been so far, which would imply that any personal data being divulged, whether self identified or not, would be illegal and unconstitutional.
[6] They then argue that by barring individuals from participating in infiltrations based on age, the State has violated Article 17 of the Constitution, the right to Equality Before the Law. The gist of this argument is that if certain users have the ability to participate in a function of the server that others do not, specifically based on age, those being told they cannot participate are not equal before the law.
[7] The Petitioner then wraps up their arguments by citing Discord ToS and arguing that above a constitutional issue, the PISS Act of 2025 violates ToS for discriminating against a group of people at all. The citation states “As part of our goal to promote acceptance and inclusivity, we prohibit hate speech, discrimination, and prejudice”.
- [7.1] The Petitioner does also recognize that it could be justifiable to prevent minors from participating in infiltrations only when such participation presents a “justifiable reason” that there is more danger than an average infiltration operation.
Discussion on Arguments
[8] Starting with the argument on Article 19, we must re-examine the definition of personal data set forth by the Constitution. Can a user's age (along with other information that may be found on the reasonable person's profile) be used to identify a person's real life identity? The Court does not believe that is the case as just knowing whether a user is an adult or a minor is not enough information to realistically identify who they are in real life. Asking for an exact birthdate may make this argument stronger, but even that would still be extremely difficult to use to identify a specific user as a specific person in the real world.
- [8.1] In Reference re Financial Privacy and Classification of Taubot [2025] SDCR 9 Judge Confused specifies that in order to receive the protections of Article 19 §2, the information must fit the definition found in §3, while also being vitally tied to a user. In [23] he writes “Article 19 §3 states that personal data “shall include” information which can identify a person’s real life identity - directly or indirectly. It is the opinion of this court that the phrase “shall include” indicates that the criteria for classifying personal data in the Constitution is illustrative and not exhaustive.” Then in [25], “It is the opinion of this Court that any piece of data that is vitally tied to a subject which is protected under the test laid down in para. [18] is also entitled to the protections of Article 19 §2.”
[9] The next question before the Court is about forcing users to give information they might deem to be too personal to share with the government in order to participate in a specific function of the server. Reference re Financial Privacy and Classification of Taubot [2025] SDCR 9 sets the test for the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in [18]-[18.2] and as such we will apply it here.
- [9.1] The first limb of the test is fatal, as we must ask if not allowing someone to participate in infiltration operations significantly and adversely affect users ability to freely and fully participate in SimDemocracy. We find that upon analyzing the current landscape of the DoJ, no roles exist specifically for infiltration, so there is no specific job that is unavailable for a user unwilling to submit their age. We also recognize that the act of infiltration is an extremely small percentage of what occurs in the server, the intent behind the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy test is to see if essential functions to the experience for specific users are being affected by the State, and in this instance they simply do not.
- [9.1.1] We would like to clarify a piece of the test we applied above, specifically regarding the phrase “freely and fully participate”. Reading this at face value one might assume that any barrier for any job in the server would cause that restriction, however that is not the intent of the wording. It should be noted that when referring to free and full participation and applying this test, it is simply talking about core functions of the server like voting, running for office, or joining a party.
- [9.2] We similarly find that the second limb of this test, when applied to the PISS Act of 2025, fails. The distinction between minors and adults for infiltration ops exists for the sole reason of protecting minors from the inherent dangers of an infiltration. The State has an explicit responsibility given to us by the ToS to ensure that minors do not come into contact with NSFW content, doxxing, harassment, or any other number of possibilities when engaged in infiltration. The test specifically states that the insurance of our existence on the Discord platform is a valid and constitutional reason to intervene on specific users rights.
[10] The citation of Dominax273 (Appellant) v SD (Respondent) [2025] SDCR 1 looks like it would apply on the surface, however the authors of that judgement made it very clear that it only applied to self identification as a form of evidence in court. The Petitioner cites the section themselves, “No defense in law may rely on unverifiable characteristics…”. The Petitioner has an incredibly broad view of how this precedent should apply that the Court simply rejects.
[11] The test for Equality Before the Law is a three limb test established in In re Article 4 §2 of the Government Proceedings Act [2025] SDCR 13 that we will now apply to the PISS Act of 2025. The first limb of the test simply asks if a dichotomy was created by the law applied, which it most certainly does. There is now a class of adults and a class of minors, each of which will be handled differently under the PISS Act.
- [11.1] The second limb of the test simply asks if the dichotomy created is based on a protected characteristic, which by looking to the constitution we see clearly is, so the second limb is also fulfilled. We would also like to note that even though the standard created is based on a protected characteristic, infringement on the right to Equality Before the Law is still possible under Art. 29, if under high scrutiny and most likely only to protect members of that protected characteristic. The Constitution is rarely absolute in its protection and reading Art. 19 as to not allow for any distinction based on protected characteristics would render such protections impossible, which would defeat the very purpose of that Article. Any deference to quasi-absolute Rights under In re Appendix s1.7 of the Constitution' 2020 SDSC 3 is more accurately situated in the third limb.
- [11.2] The third limb is a more complicated question than the first two. Is the standard applied by the law reasonable given its intent? As this answer ties into the next argument the Petitioner made, we will expand upon that in [12].
[12] Yes, the Discord ToS takes a stance against discrimination of any kind, however Discord also makes it quite clear that the safety and protection of minors is a priority (as seen in Discord Child Safety Policy Explainer). We also must take into account the fact that if minors are put into harm's way due to a decision made by SimDemocracy leadership we are at risk of being deplatformed (see [10.2]). The third limb of the Equality Before the Law Test is where it fails. Although the Court deferred to this step in [11.1] such deference now proves ineffectual in this specific case. Under the established doctrine of ToS Supremacy, even a quasi-absolute Right, if one was indeed to construct distinction because of a protected characteristic as such, cannot prevail over the Terms of Service. This does not mean that the State can yell “Protection of minors” and the Right to Equality goes out the window. The Court has and will evaluate in the future whether such protection is indeed needed and the means to achieve it are proportionate. On proportionality there already exists relevant precedent (as elaborated under [13]) and the Court will now expand on necessity.
- [12.1] The Petitioner argues that only specific infiltration operations carry a weighted risk of NSFW content, the chance for doxxing, or other retaliations. This argument is unpersuasive as there is nobody who can assure anyone else of what they will encounter when infiltrating an exterior entity. In order for the State to say there is a danger or a risk, that danger or risk would have to inflict itself on a participant. At the same time the State can obviously not police or enforce our own regulations on outside entities, so there is no guarantee of the same protections afforded to users in SimDemocracy.
Discussion on Presumption of Age
[13] While the petitioner's arguments remain unconvincing, this Court does not have to solely rely on the argumentation provided to it, as mentioned in [5] of Motion for Recusal of Judge ppatpat [2026] SDCR 14. Upon reviewing the entirety of the legislation petitioned, this panel came across one issue we could not justify, nor receive additional argumentation as the State declined to participate and the Petitioner left SimDemocracy shortly after we begun deliberations. Paragraph 28 of [2025] SDCR 1 states “This court shall not establish a jurisprudence that requires or even permits fact-finders to infer race from patterns of speech, name choice, emoji use, or secondhand character references. To do so would invite stereotyping, misattribution, and judicial bias, all under the guise of identity assessment”.
- [13.1] The definition of the word “presumed”, as provided by The Law Dictionary, is “An inference as to the existence of one fact, from the existence of some other fact, founded on a previous experience of their connexion.”. The current language of Article 2 §1 of the PISS Act of 2025 would force the State to infer based on the aforementioned properties in [28] of SDCR 1. In shorthand, a presumption made about protected characteristics is illegal, so the use of the word “presumed” in Article 2 §1 of the PISS Act is what makes this section of the law illegal.
Verdict
[14] Article 2 §1 of the PISS Act is deemed unconstitutional.
Dicta
[15] We have decided to give the Senate the answer to the test, rather than wait to see what they do to remedy the situation. Precedent from In Re NSFW Discord Channels [2020] SDSC 16 makes it clear that self-declaration of age is a viable means of determining if someone is or is not a minor. That would mean that the State asking a user if they are over or under 18 is the State fulfilling its duty to protect minors given to it by Discord ToS. Pass an amendment clarifying that the State must fulfill that obligation before a user is allowed to participate in an infiltration, and the intent of the original wording will be preserved, most likely, without legal consequence.
CONCURRING OPINION by Judge NotCommunist366
[A1] I agree with most of the verdict, but this section under review raises key issues in regards to equal opportunity within SimDemocracy.
[A2] First, I want to cite a specific section from Dominax273 (Appellant) v SD (Respondent) [2025] SDCR 1. “[30] Political simulations are founded on the idea that individuals may fully participate in public life—debate, govern, and adjudicate—without disclosing their real-world identity.”
- [A2.1] To this point I absolutely agree, and I think this applies here. I believe that, on SimDemocracy, there is an implied right to equal opportunity. That no one, no matter what protected characteristics you have, should be denied a job based solely on protected characteristics.
[A3] This principle conflicts with the idea of blocking a group from doing certain actions based on unverifiable characteristics.
[A4] While I understand the concern with defending minors from NSFW content, the same can be said for the reclaimed slurs defense, in that both rely on the verification of unverifiable characteristics.
- [A5.1] As a side note, both are included in the discord terms of service, and both are almost completely unenforceable in the circumstances mentioned above.
[A6] Thus, in the failed pursuit of defending minors, the state has trampled equal opportunity.
[A7] Luckily, however, in this case, where the state is effectively playing a guessing game on who is a minor and who is not, the court has found itself on the right side.
[A8] Thus, I concur.