In re Penalties and Tickets Act 2025 SDSC 17
In re Penalties and Tickets Act [2025] SDSC 17
| Date | 6th July 2025 |
| Justices |
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| Held |
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| Ruling | 3-0 |
| Applicable precedent |
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MAJORITY OPINION by Justice Ivy Cactus
(with Chief Justice TheLittleSparty and Justice Syndicality agreeing)
Introduction
[1] The petitioner is seeking a review and striking of the Penalties and Tickets Act (hereafter referred to as the PTA), which allows the SDBI to summarily issue minor punishments for minor offenses, on the grounds that it violates due process — among other asserted Bill of Rights violations.
Summary of the Petition
[2] The petitioner begins by outlining the legal basis for the PTA, specifically Section 2.2 of Article 22 within the Bill of Rights, which reads, “The lawful fine or muting after issuance of a lawful ticket or penalty notice by a competent authority which summarily sanctions a person for a minor criminal offense.” They then turn and claim that this section conflicts with Article 21 of the Constitution, the Right to a Fair Hearing, is in direct conflict with this article because of multiple provisions within it, chiefly section 1 which reads, “Every person shall be entitled to a fair hearing by a competent court in accordance with law.” The Right to a Fair Hearing, they in essence argue, is quasi-absolute and can not be reduced by other rights. Therefore Article 22 Section 2.2, and the PTA built upon it, must be unconstitutional.
[3] They then turn to In re Appeal of Summary Ban – “mc uighilin” (u/Panzzrr) [2025] SDSC 2 <ref name = "Appeal_Summary_Ban_Panzzrr">In re Appeal of Summary Ban - "mc uighilin" (Panzzrr) 2025 SDSC 2</ref> and cite its conclusion that allowing different persons to be punished under various sections for the same action is an equal protections violation.
[4] The petitioner goes on to argue that the choice to accept a ticket or not is not a true decision and is instead “coerced” under threat of heavier sanction should they decline. This, they posit, is a “constitutional booby trap” designed not to grant due process but to “weaponize” it.
[5] They conclude by arguing that singular sections, such as Section 2.2, must be narrowly construed within the Constitution’s general frameworks. They take this to mean that tickets must be confirmed by a judge and subject to post-sanction review. In the absence of these adjustments, they say, the Ticket Act must be struck down.
Summary of the Response
[6] The state begins by clarifying the relationship between Article 21 and Article 22 Section 2.2, referencing In re Article 4 s5 of the Executive Act 2023 [2025] SDSC 9 [32] <ref name = "Executive_Act">In re Article 4 s5 of the Executive Act 2023 2025 SDSC 9</ref>, which states, “when the Constitution conflicts with itself, as a general rule, the more specific section should be taken as an exception to the broader one.” Section 2.2, they claim, should be taken as not a violation of the right to a fair hearing but a more specific exception to it.
[7] They then argue that the changes recommended by the petitioner in [5] would render Section 2.2, and the PTA along with it, completely moot — removing an important tool for both law enforcement, in that it greatly reduces their workload, and the general populace in that it removes a way for them to escape heavier punishment, long pre-trial detainment, and a stressful trial process.
[8] The state then rebuts the petitioner’s points in [3], arguing that both Section 2.2 which is “minor criminal offenses.” The criminal scheduling system that the PTA introduced to the Criminal Code, they argue, is enough to guarantee that this requirement is fulfilled. They also provided a copy of the SDBI’s ticketing protocols, which are extremely extensive and outline when and how the SDBI should choose to ticket versus arrest.
[9] They conclude by responding to the points raised in [4]. Rejecting a ticket, they say, is merely invoking one’s right to a fair hearing. They posit that invoking one’s rights can not be argued to be a “booby trap”. Indeed Section 2.2 includes a subsection which reads “The issuing of such a ticket or penalty notice may be refused by the person, in which case charges may be brought against them.” The defendant’s argument that such a trial is unconstitutional, the states says, is therefore absurd.
The ambit of Article 21, the Ambit of Article 22, and Interactions Therein
[10] The first thing that is necessary to address is where and when Article 21 of the Constitution, the Right to a Fair Hearing applies, and where Article 22 does instead. For this, a little history lesson is in order. SimDemocracy, under its original Constitution, had a Bill of Rights very similar to that of America, on equal footing to the rest of the Constitution. Within it, as one can read extensively about in In re Ticket Act [2020] SDSC 1 <ref name = "Ticket_Act"> In re Ticket Act 2020 SDSC 1 </ref>, there was a “Right to a Fair Trial” which included the line “no one may be punished without their guilt being proven in a court in a fair trial.” This led to the overturning of the original Ticket Act, as the Constitution simply did not allow punishment without trial. When the new Bill of Rights was written shortly after, and somewhat in response to that ruling, the Right to a Fair Trial was split into two separate rights: The Right to a Fair Hearing and Liberty and Security of the Person.
[11] The purposes of these two separate Articles are clear. Article 22 guarantees the right to due process, as is stated in the plain text of the law, “No person shall be deprived of their liberty unless the following due process is observed…” with “conviction by a competent court” being merely one of the proper due process for punishment. It would be absurd, then, to say that the Right to a Fair Hearing grants a general right to trial for any and all punishment — indeed this interpretation would run directly against the plain text of the Constitution. The Right to a Fair Hearing, instead, guarantees the rights of a person in front of a competent court, be it before criminal trial, civil hearing, appellate hearing, or otherwise (this is outlined more broadly in In re Impeachment of Wolf [2020] SDSC 8 <ref name = "Impeachment_of_Wolf"></ref>[10.1], which says in general terms that the Right to a Fair Hearing only applies when someone is brought before a court of law, by their own volition or otherwise). While some of its provisions, specifically that on double jeopardy, can be abstracted to apply to all due process, its guarantee of a trial being fair does not confer the right to a trial for all punishment.
- [11.1] Section 2.2.1, which allows for tickets, to be rejected and for the case to move to trial, is therefore not a “constitutional booby trap”, it’s nonsensical to say that one being able to invoke their right to a different type of due process violates due process. Another way to think about it may be a nolo contendere plea deal, not contesting the charge in exchange for a lower sentence; this clearly does not violate the right to due process.
[12] It is unnecessary, then, to apply In re Article 4 s5 of the Executive Act 2023 [2025] SDSC 9 <ref name = "Executive_Act"></ref> at all. Article 22 Section 2.2 is not an exception to Article 21, as the two Articles do not have the same ambit. It can not be said that a process explicitly outlined as due within the Constitution is unconstitutional for violating due process, and it would be a radical piece of judicial activism to say otherwise.
Does the PTA Adhere to Article 22, Section 2.2
[13] The next consideration, then, is whether the provisions of the PTA successfully fulfills the requirements for due process outlined in Section 2.2: tickets must be issued for minor offenses by a competent authority, with the possibility to reject them and instead enter trial.
[14] First, there is the question of “minor offenses.” As the state outlined in [8], the PTA introduced a scheduling system to the criminal code, which classifies crimes into three categories. The first category contains particularly heinous crimes, the second crimes which are complex, procedurally or otherwise, and the unscheduled crimes remain simply for crimes that do not fit into either of the above categories. Only unscheduled crimes may be ticketed. These schedules, indeed, go beyond the simple call for only minor crimes to be punished but also guarantee that crimes which are not sufficiently straightforward, for the most part, may not be ticketed. The first requirement of Section 2.2 is fulfilled.
[15] The next requirement is that said ticket be issued by a “competent authority.” This term can be easy to misunderstand, given the common use of the word “competent” to mean smart or otherwise adequately prepared for the task at hand. This is not what “competent” means in the Constitution, though. “Competent authority” means, in general terms, the body that has “legal authority or jurisdiction” over the relevant area (see: In re Article 56, s4 of the Criminal Code [2020] SDSC 12 [5] <ref name = "Criminal_Code">In re Article 56, s4 of the Criminal Code 2020 SDSC 12</ref>). For judicial processes, the “competent authority”, as a general rule, is the courts (see: In re Clemency Request and Review Act [2025] SDSC 1 <ref name = "Clemency_Request_Act">In re Clemency Request and Review Act 2025 SDSC 1</ref>). This is not the case for Section 2.2, though, which allows for summary punishment. Summary punishment, indeed, is definitionally punishment that occurs prior to or absent of judicial intervention; the SDBI, as the body empowered as law enforcement within SimDemocracy, is, therefore, the competent authority for the purpose of Section 2.2 (Its of note that the Department of Justice’s leadership has been recognized as the competent authority for ensuring the executive adhere to law since at least In re NSFW Discord Channels [2020] SDSC 16 <ref name = "NSFW_Discord"> In re NSFW Discord Channels 2020 SDSC 16</ref>).
[16] The final requirement is that the ticketed person be able to reject the ticket and instead enter trial. The PTA is clear on this: it reads “[t]ickets may be refused by the person it is issued to, in which case the person must be unmuted.” This follows the wording of the Constitution almost verbatim, and this requirement is therefore fulfilled.
Does Ticketing Violate Equal Protections
[17] The final consideration, then, is whether ticketing as it currently exists violates equal protections under In re Appeal of Summary Ban – “mc uighilin” (u/Panzzrr) [2025] SDSC 2 <ref name = "Appeal_Summary_Ban_Panzzrr"></ref>. That is — does the current implementation of tickets allow such a dichotomy of options and such an uneven application that they violate equal protection under the law?
[18] To this, looking at both the scheduling system and the SDBI guidelines is all that is necessary. The scheduling system guarantees that only minor and non-complex crimes may be ticketed, and the SDBI guidelines on ticketing work to ensure that people are treated equally based on not who they are, but what they did.
[19] There is always going to be some discretion in law enforcement. Ticketing does not undermine equal protections; instead, it gives the executive an outlet for cases where social harm is marginal but existent. If the PTA was struck down the alternative would not be that cases are universally charged or universally dropped, but instead that some cases are charged or not charged on a more arbitrary basis. A middle ground with defined guidelines (and strict adherence to those guidelines) is, indeed, a tool to guarantee equal protection of the law, not a violation of it.
Verdict
[20] The Penalties and Tickets Act 2025 is constitutional and the petition is dismissed.