In re Touch Grass Act Art 2 S7 2026 SDCR 42
In Re Touch Grass Act Art. 2, s7, [2026] SDCR 42
| Date of judgment | 16th April 2026 |
| Judge(s) |
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| Held | Article 2, § 7, et seq. of the Touch Grass Act is constitutional. |
| Ruling | 3-0 |
| Applicable precedent |
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MAJORITY OPINION by Judge Mypenjustbroke
(with Judge Zepz367 agreeing, and Judge Notcommunist366 agreeing and writing a separate concurrence)
Introduction and Jurisdiction
[1] This matter comes before us as a judicial review of Art. 2, § 7 of the Touch Grass Act (hereinafter the “TGA”). Petitioner halfcat_ (“Petitioner”) asks us to hold the concerned section and its underlying provisions as unconstitutional, as he alleged it to conflict with Article 26 of the SimDemocracy Constitution. Because this comes as an examination to the validity of a law arising under the State of SimDemocracy, this Court holds proper jurisdiction to perform this analysis and make the following determination. Judiciary Act 2025 Art. 3, § 3.
[2] It is important to note that, upon examination from this Court, we notice that the concerned section is entirely a product of an amendment passed on 9 April, 2026, named the Compassionate Return Act. While we understand that our ruling will only focus on the amended statute, we find it wise to note that this decision is necessarily a decision upon the aforementioned amending act. Additionally, as a matter of policy, we hold ourselves only to the analysis of Article 26 and the concerned section.
Issue and Standard of Review
[3] Petitioner brings one patent issue before this court: whether TGA Article 2, § 7, violates Article 26 of the Constitution of SimDemocracy. In judicial review of this concerned section, we review such de novo.
Argument and Statutory Dispute
[4] Petitioner contends that Article 7, § 2, of the TGA conflicts with, and thus violates, Article 26 of the Constitution. The concerned section states the following:
§7. If a crime is committed, or a message is sent on the server, that directly and negatively affects a person currently on a Self-Exclusion Order, that person has the right to end their leave early and return to SimDemocracy immediately.
- §7.1. To exercise this right, the person, or their designated contact acting on their behalf, only needs to notify the SDBI that they wish to return to address the situation.
- §7.2. This provision allows the person to return even if their order was marked as "irrevocable." The SDBI must restore their access and roles as soon as they are notified.
Touch Grass Act Art. 2, § 7, et seq. The Touch Grass Act was made in order to guarantee that a person who wished to voluntarily exclude themself from SimDemocracy, based upon terms of their choosing, would have the government-sponsored means to do so. The Compassionate Return Act, in amending the TGA, looked to allow for the invalidation of the “irrevocable” term in an Irrevocable Self-Exclusion Order in a certain set of circumstances.
[5] To this section, the Petitioner notes that “[t]he Constitution clearly states that a person may not return before [a] time[,] which has been specified as irrevocable[,] has elapsed[.]” Specifically, Petitioner quotes the following subsection of the Constitution as part of the violated Article:
S.D. Const. Art. 26, § 1.2. A facial reading of the Petitioner’s citation conflicts with the Petitioner’s claim that the whole of the article is violated. We must take the whole of the article into account, then, in our analysis.
Discussion on Article 26
[6] Article 26, generally, maintains a constitutional right to exclusion for any person who wishes to utilize it. In such, we understand this article as an endorsement of the fundamental right to free movement and association—to which the negative implication permits the inference that one has a similar right to the free barring of themself from movement and association in certain fora. It may be held as a complementary measure, then, to the concurrence’s understanding of this article concerning rights of liberty. However, it must—like all constitutional amendments and provisions—be held separate and qualified in and of itself, unless recognized explicitly otherwise by its text.
[7] To wit, in both proper and whole examination of the article, we find that § 1.4 provides curious interest for our purpose. The section, in relevant part, reads that “[a] person removed from SimDemocracy under such an order may not be compelled to return, unless strictly necessary[.]” S.D. Const. Art. 26, § 1.4 (emphasis added). When the Senate—and, by ratification, the people— includes an exempting provision within a Constitutional provision, we must—barring explicit Senatorial Intent, presume that it did so intentionally. Thus, we take this exemption at face value, that the Senate both intended to include it and, as to the ambit of the exemption, anticipated that such conditions subsequent would likely arise.
[8] The dissolution of the “irrevocable” term within an Irrevocable SEO, as discussed supra, is only afforded approbation in cases “strictly necessary[.]” S.D. Const. Art. 26, § 1.4. However, what is meant to be “strictly necessary” is missing from the record. This is because the Senate not only failed to explain its reasoning for this measure, but it also failed to do so in its debate over the Compassionate Return Act. Such omission is not a moral failing, as we must not expect the legislature to provide context to any and every policy measure it makes—and the preamble of each measure, to be sure, is helpful in these regards; however, it does make the ascertainment of intent difficult for future interpreters.
[9] What we may infer, however, is that “strictly necessary” does not include ad hoc executive actions not provided for by enabling statute. As ashes resolve to ashes—and dust to dust—legislative bars or qualifications may only be resolved or qualified by further legislative action. To boot, in corollary to the presumption of Constitutional intent discussed supra at [7], when the Senate amends a statute to include a provision that would only be allowed by a certain Constitutional provision or exception, we must assume that it did so intentionally. Thus, it is our holding that the “strictly necessary” exemption may only apply to those acts that the legislature includes to qualify the irrevocability of the order. We could make inferences as to the policy behind the statute, its qualifications, or more; however, such would exceed our necessary examination and pervert the narrow scope of this proceeding.
Verdict
[10] Because the Constitutional exemption of the irrevocability of Irrevocable Self-Exclusion Orders applies to things “strictly necessary[,]” and those things “strictly necessary” are to be found in statute, we hold that Article 2, § 7, et seq. of the Touch Grass Act operates within the aforementioned space that the exemption provides. Therefore, we hold the Touch Grass Act Article 2, § 7, to be constitutional.
CONCURRING OPINION by Judge NotCommunist366
[11] When considering the implications of the right to touch grass, I have seen that there exists a conflict with the enactment of said right to touch grass and the right to liberty. A self exclusion order indeed does not fulfil any of the requirements for infringement upon liberty that the constitution deems permissible. My colleagues have considered a self exclusion order to be a “waiver” of right to liberty, but in this opinion, I want to go over how such waivers do not apply to liberty.
Liberty & Quasi-Absolute Rights
[12] In re Appendix s1.7 of the Constitution 2020 SDSC 3 established the existence of quasi-absolute rights, rights that are “more important” than other rights in terms that they must be held to a higher standard than other rights in regards to infringement. Quasi-absolute rights must not be infringed unless the constitution explicitly grants the ability for said right to be infringed upon.
[13] I believe it to not only be true, but self-evident, that liberty is a quasi absolute right. Liberty is indeed the cornerstone of fair and just criminal justice. Without liberty, and its accompanying due process, criminal justice and justice itself would be reduced to the whims of those in power, who could punish anyone for anything that they please.
- [13.1] Furthermore, it is established in In re Granola ex parte Inthewasteland (Appellant) v State of SimDemocracy (Respondent) 2025 SDSC 36 that liberty is a natural right, the only of its kind. Furthermore, in [11], said judgement lays out in no unclear terms that liberty is "inalienable" which further proves that liberty is indeed a quasi-absolute right.
[14] Thus, liberty can’t be infringed upon unless explicitly authorized by an exception laid out in Article 22 of the constitution, or other obligations that arise from the platform which we operate upon. A quasi-absolute right would not be quasi-absolute if it did not have at least priority over other rights that arise in the Bill of Rights, such as, in this case, the right to touch grass.
Positive and Negative rights
[15] Furthermore, we must look at a rarely covered topic in the case of SimDemocracy jurisprudence. Negative and Positive rights. What we see today, is that the right to due process and the liberty that is protected by said due process is a negative right. The text in question reads as follows:
[16] The Bill of Rights places both obligations upon the state, and gives powers to the people. The powers given to the people, such as the right to fair hearing, may be waived if someone does not wish to go through a trial. But rights such as the right to liberty and right to equality before the law may not be waived, as they are restrictions upon the state, and not a power to the people. This is the key difference between positive and negative rights, and absolutely vital in my view to seeing exactly why a self exclusion order may never be binding.
[17] Even if a person would want to have their liberty deprived, due process still must be observed, because the essential restriction from right to liberty is on the state, and not a power granted to the person. Thus, any waivers attempting to give up their right to liberty would be constitutionally contradictory to what the right to liberty actually is.
[18] Negative rights, at their core, are restrictions on state action. Such rights simply may not be waived, and instead, this court ought to declare that such rights may not be waived or otherwise violated without due process. As is written in In re Article 5 of the Terrorist Connected Accounts Act [2026] SDCR 34, all actors and enforcement is beholden to due process, and all enforcement of actions such as self exclusion orders are pursuant to due process.
[19] But ultimately, because the majority reached the right conclusion, I concur.