Mythrows (Appellant) v SD (Respondent) 2026 SDCR 47

Appeal of Decisions in SD v. Mythrows, [2026] SDCR 47

Date	21st April 2026
Judges	Court of Review Judge Tech Support Court of Review Judge Mypenjustbroke Court of Review Judge Zepz367
Held	The decision to deny the motions to dismiss for lack of specificity in SD v Mythrows [2026] Crim 21, is affirmed.
Ruling	3-0
Applicable precedent	Courtroom Procedures Act 2025 Article 9, § 2.1 is best interpreted as a “well pleaded complaint” pleading standard. Pleading in the alternative is justiciable and allowed.

MAJORITY OPINION by Judge Mypenjustbroke

(With Judge Tech Support and Judge Zepz367 agreeing)

Introduction and Ambit of Interlocutory Appeal

[1] Appellant Mythrows, through their counsel, Notcommunist366, has appealed a decision of the Inferior Court in SD v. Mythrows, [2026] Crim 21, that denied the Appellant's Motion to Dismiss such case. The dispute comes from whether the State may plea multiple criteria for the satisfaction of an element of the charge alleged below—First Degree Harassment. The Appellant seeks for this Court to dismiss this case without prejudice as remedy.

Issue, Standard of Review, and Jurisdiction

[2] The issue before this Court is whether the State may, in a Criminal Complaint leading to prosecution, plead in the alternative as to the satisfaction of a criminal offense’s elements. We review this issue de novo. This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to the following statutes: Judiciary Act Art. 3, §4; Judiciary Act Art. 14; Courtroom Procedures Act 2025 Art. 30, § 1(b).

On the Issue

[3] Appellant contends that the State may not—practically—plead in the alternative for criminal prosecutions under Courtroom Procedures Act 2025 Article 9, § 2.1. This section states that “[i]f the wording of a statute creates two or more methods of fulfilling an element of a charge, the charge must individually and clearly specify which element(s) the accused is said to have fulfilled.” Id.

[4] The statute in consideration necessarily creates a conundrum to the lay-reader: does it mean that the State can only pursue one theory in its prosecution, or does it simply require that the State specify in its Criminal Complaint what elements that respective defendant satisfied to acquire criminal liability? The answer to this is necessarily the latter.

[5] Many common law jurisdictions require that complaints be “well pled,” or include claims for which the pleader is entitled to relief. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), (d)(2)–(3); see also CPR 16.4(1)(a) (the United Kingdom requires that the particulars of claim must include "a concise statement of the facts on which the claimant relies"); see also F. Cts. R., SOR/98-106, Rule 181 (Canada requires that the statement of claim must contain a "concise statement of the material facts on which the plaintiff relies," but not the evidence by which the facts are to be proved). As a common law jurisdiction, SimDemocracy follows suit, as it required nothing short of common sense for the Legislature to enact and later clarify the necessary requirements for the State to charge a defendant. In this, the law is very clear: the requirement for specificity under Art. 9, § 2.1, is a pleading standard, very similar to the common law “well pleaded complaint” rules. This determination falls squarely against the Appellant’s assertion.

Common Law and Statutory Delineation of Pleading in the Alternative

[6] Insofar as Appellant contends that this statute at all prohibits pleading in the alternative, we understand that this is not the case. Instead, pleading in the alternative—or “a form of pleading that allows a party to allege two or more claims [or theories] which are inconsistent with each other”—requires that specificity be had within each alternative theory to satisfy and establish liability. Alternative Pleading, Legal Information Institute (last reviewed 2022); see, e.g., F. Cts. R., SOR/98-106, Rule 180. An overarching theory, which may contain disjunctive elements that—when examined—may create two distinct theories, allows for the State, or any plaintiff, to take the facts together and provide a theory on what combination of the two.

[7] In another manner of analysis, each bucket of facts may, indeed, independently satisfy the standard of proof requisite to establish an element for a specific liability—whether criminal or civil. Alternative pleading simply functions as a way for plaintiffs and prosecutions to order those facts or choose them to fit their case. This is a disjunctive standard that the plaintiff must resolve in its trial—but not in its pleadings. This is in no manner controversial. What Appellant argues is controversial, though, is that the allowance for plaintiffs and prosecutions to order the established facts in different orders and see what sticks in pleading before trial. Per the reasoning supra, this contention is dysfunctional.

Specific Pleadings—On the “Or” Issue

[8] What Appellant specifically disputes is the State’s use of “or” in trying to satisfy the harassment statute’s objective purpose requirement (unreasonable or unjustifiable). To boot, Appellant argues that this is misleading. The State necessarily alleges that it thinks its evidence shows that either can be shown. This is not misleading; rather, it simply means that the State believes that it has enough evidence to satisfy either one of Article 56’s disjunctive objective purpose requirements. This will undoubtedly be more work for the Defense to rebut, but it is neither impossible to do nor unlawful to suffer. And—after all—defense counsel signed up for it. Any further analysis into the specific evidence would become an examination of unadjudicated fact not suitable for this Court.

Verdict

[9] The decision to deny motions to dismiss for lack of specificity is affirmed.