Ppatpat (Appellant) v Electoral Commission (Respondent) 2026 SDCR 17
Appeal of the Decision to dismiss with prejudice in Ppatpat v Electoral Commission [2025] Civ 39 [2026] SDCR 17
| Date of judgment | 18 February 2026 |
| Judge |
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| Held |
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| Ruling | 3-0 |
| Applicable precedent |
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MAJORITY OPINION by Judge mypenjustbroke
(with Chief Judge Tech Support and Judge Ferris agreeing)
Introduction
[1] Appellant Ppatpat brings this appeal after a dismissal with prejudice in [2025] Civ 39, where the inferior court applied Art. 9a §3(b) of the Courtroom Procedures Act 2025.
[2] Appellant asserts that the Inferior Court clearly erred in its dismissal through a misuse of CPA Art. 9a §3(b) and seeks both reversal of the dismissal and remand to the Inferior Court for retrial.
Factual and Procedural Background
[3] After the 156th Presidential Election, Appellant brought suit against multiple parties after evidence arose that such election was 'fixed' by Electoral Commissioner Birdish152 (hereinafter 'EC Birdish') in favor of former President Matt Cheney. Appellant brought suit against both the State of SimDemocracy and EC Birdish. See generally Ppatpat v SD [2025] Civ 38; see also Ppatpat v Birdish152 [2025] Civ 38. In each suit, the State and its actor, EC Birdish, were found to be liable for Breach of Civil Rights.
[4] In [2025] Civ 39, Appellant brought suit against the Electoral Commission for the same cause as [2025] Civ 38 under a vicarious liability theory. The action was dismissed with prejudice by Judge Benbookworm under CPA Art. 9a § 3(b). In justification, the court found Appellant’s “attempt to distinguish between suing the state as a whole and suing the EC [to be] hollow ... redundantly suing both the state and a sub-unit of the state in separate cases is wholly unacceptable.” Ppatpat v Electoral Commission, [2025] Civ 39, ¶1.
Issues Before the Court
[5] This is an issue of first impression in the Court of Review. We are tasked, first, with finding whether the inferior court erred in its application of CPA Art. 9a § 3(b). Next, we are required, as a matter of law, to determine whether the Electoral Commission is eligible to be included within the State of SimDemocracy upon suit. Finally, we are impelled, upon judicial notice of the Inferior Court’s reasoning for dismissal, to rule upon whether—as a matter of law—a dismissal for adjudication of a matter already decided is justified.
Standard of Review
[6] The Court of Review takes Appellant’s appeal as a review of whether the Inferior Court’s use of CPA Art. 9a §3(b) was clearly erroneous, based upon the case’s preceding facts. Upon the issues of adjudication of a matter already decided and the legal status of the Electoral Commission relative to the State of SimDemocracy being necessarily impelled towards this Court, we review both de novo.
Inferior Court’s Use of CPA Art. 9a §3(b)
[7] This matter materially constitutes a dispute upon the facts preceding this case. Before we may rule upon the Inferior Court’s application of the concerned statute, we must first look to the statute itself. In relevant part, CPA Art. 9a §3(b) mandates that:
- §3. A Judge shall dismiss a case with prejudice – . . .
- (b) If the case, or a case with similar charges or facts has been brought and dismissed without prejudice more than twice;
Upon a textual reading of this section, the test of whether a judge must use such a grant of power relies upon the following elements:
- [7.1] a case with similar charges,
- [7.2] has been brought, and
- [7.3] dismissed more than twice.
[8] Indeed, this is not a discretionary tool at a judge’s disposal; rather, the use of 'shall' in the overhanging §3 creates a mandate upon the judiciary to dismiss a cause with prejudice if, and only if - in the context of subsection (b) - “the case, or a case with similar charges or facts has been brought and dismissed without prejudice more than” two times. Id. We must, then, examine this case’s predecessors, both within and adjacent to its citation numbers, to see if the action reaches this viable ceiling.
- [8.1] The original cause of action occurred in the throes of the 156th Presidential Election—where EC Birdish rigged such election and later confessed to doing so in private messages. See generally EX 35/2025. On December 27, 2025, Appellant filed his first Civil Complaint against the Electoral Commission, EC Birdish, and the State. The following day, trial commenced under Ppatpat v Birdish152 et al. [2025] Civ 38. On December 29, Appellant filed a second Civil Complaint against the EC for different torts. On December 30, the EC was found summarily liable in [2025] Civ 38. Later that same day, however, Judge hmquestionable declared a mistrial as to the Electoral Commission after having already entered judgment against it. Still on December 30, Appellant refiled the case against the Electoral Commission. The next day, December 31, Appellant prevailed upon summary judgment in [2025] Civ 38.
- [8.2] On January 1, 2026, pretrial for Civ 39 began in forum court. Two of the three complaints consolidated under Civ 39 were the refiled EC claim from the voided mistrial and the second Civil Complaint filed on December 29. On January 11, in SD (Appellant) v ppatpat (Respondent) [2026] SDCR 1, we declared the mistrial void, dismissed the action “without prejudice, as to claims duplicative of or derivative from [2025] Civ 38 against the Electoral Commission,” and remanded the matter back to the Inferior Court. SD (Appellant) v ppatpat (Respondent) [2026] SDCR 1 [24], [25]. Claims against defendant EC Birdish personally were allowed to continue. See id. As a consequence of that ruling, the refiled portion of [2025] Civ 39, which existed only because of the now-voided mistrial, was also dismissed.
[9] In total, four claims were filed. On February 4, Judge Ben dismissed all remaining cases against the EC on the ground that they had been dismissed more than twice. However, at most, before that dismissal, the matter—including those “duplicative or derivative” claims—had been dismissed a total of once. See id. The Inferior Court provided precedential rationalization in its dismissal of this claim with prejudice in Notcommunist366 v SDIOA [2025] Civ 14. We are not convinced by this rationalization, as the cited case is distinguished in both fact and law.
[10] We conclude that the Inferior Court clearly erred in its use of CPA Art. 9a §3(b). This conclusion includes deference to that Court’s findings of duplicative and derivative claims, and we agree with the Inferior Court’s finding that the Appellant’s “attempt to distinguish between suing the state as a whole and suing the EC is hollow”. Ppatpat v Electoral Commission [2025] Civ 39, Dismissal ¶1. We, thus, treat this matter—along with matters where the material claims are either “duplicative of or derivative from” preceding suits—as claims all deriving from a single underlying event. SD (Appellant) v Ppatpat (Respondent) [2026] SDCR 1.
The Nature of the Electoral Commission Relative to the State
[11] The Electoral Commission is a constitutionally provided governmental body operating under the authority of the Supervisor of Elections. The Constitution provides that the Supervisor of Elections "is to guarantee SimDemocracy's democratic continuity by administering its elections and referendums," and §3.2 specifies that this function is carried out "in conjunction with an Electoral Commission." S.D. Const. Art. 15, §3. The Electoral Commission’s members step into the Supervisor's role when that office is vacant. S.D. Const. Art. 15, §9.1. Additionally, the Supervisor themself is appointed through quintessentially governmental or state-sponsored mechanisms: they are chosen by the President, confirmed by a two-thirds majority in the Senate, and approved by a two-thirds majority in a public referendum. S.D. Const. Art. 15, §5. The Senate's oversight power extends to "governmental bodies and individuals" and "any other part of the government of SimDemocracy that the Senate deems fit." S.D. Const. Art. 4, §1. The EC falls squarely within this language.
[12] This is further founded by the legislative history of our Constitution. The Constitutional Codification of Independent Agencies Act necessarily places the Electoral Commission and its subordinate Commissioners, whether principal or deputy, as state servants. While the Constitution mandates the Senate “shall reserve the ability to create agencies that are independent of the executive’s authority[,]” such agencies are all still state servants. S.D. Const. Art. 4 § 1. For example, a suit against the Senate of SimDemocracy would innately be a suit against the State of SimDemocracy, just as one would be if the defendant were the Department of Treasury.
[13] In determining whether the EC's actions are treated as acts of the State, case law additionally reveals that the EC’s action are subject to direct judicial review rather than as the conduct of a private party. In In re Removal of Votes in the 2nd Parliamentary Election, the Supreme Court reviewed the EC's decision to remove votes and ordered the results recalculated, exercising the same supervisory jurisdiction it applies to other organs of government. [2020] SDSC 18, [21]–[23]. Similarly, in In re 9th Parliamentary Election, the Court ordered "the Election Commissioner or other competent person" to restore improperly removed votes, treating the EC as a state actor bound by constitutional constraints. [2021] SDSC 3, [30]. In neither case did the Court treat the EC as an entity distinct from the State for jurisdictional purposes.
[14] The proper styling of claims arising from the Electoral Commission’s or an Electoral Commissioner’s conduct is therefore against the State of SimDemocracy. This is consistent with Strix v State of SimDemocracy, in which claims for breach of police accountability and civil rights, wrongs committed by individual government actors in the course of their official duties, were brought against the State as the responsible party. [2024] Civ 1. The Electoral Commission, as a constitutionally established body exercising delegated governmental authority over elections, occupies the same position. Its officers act on behalf of the State, its authority derives from the Constitution, and its decisions carry the force of state action.
[15] In accordance with prior discussion, the Electoral Commissioner, in their official capacity, is not only properly included within 'the State' for purposes of civil suit, but also all cases including the Electoral Commission and the State of SimDemocracy regarding this underlying event must be counted as duplicative claims.
Is a dismissal for adjudication of a matter already decided justified?
[16] We must now focus our analysis toward the final issue at law: whether a dismissal of a matter, by reason of it having already been decided, is justified.
[17] In arguments for Ppatpat v. Electoral Commission, then-Attorney General Terak noted for the State that “[b]ringing a claim against the [Electoral Commission] is just bringing a case against the state. This is . . . double jeopardy.” [2025] Civ 39. Indeed, both the common law and this Court would agree if this series of cases were of a criminal nature. See, e.g., Writ of Habeas Corpus - vro no 2025 SDIC 21, [9] (“double jeopardy forbids a second trial or punishment for the same offense on the same facts”). However, a strict reading of both double jeopardy jurisprudence and Art. 9 of the Judiciary Act only necessitates this enforcement of right in criminal matters.
[18] Respondent noted in argumentation that “the decision to dismiss was fundamentally correct under the court’s inherent power to manage its docket and prevent frivolous/duplicative litigation.” Respondent Argumentation, [2026] SDCR 17. We agree with this. However, in our “best professional judgment”, no doctrine exists for the management of this duplicative litigation, except the Courtroom Procedures Act 2025. S.D. Const. Art. 10 § 3.1.
[19] There exists, then, a distinct policy need for this court to examine the justiciability of a civil defense to matters already decided. A common law doctrine, called res judicata, is widely recognized in countries such as England and the United States. Res judicata doctrine - translating to “the matter has been decided” - acts as an affirmative defense where “(1) the previous action involved an adjudication on the merits; (2) the previous action involved the plaintiffs or those in privity with them; (3) the claims asserted in the subsequent action were, or could have been, raised in the prior action.” Soules v. Connecticut, Dep't of Emergency Servs. & Pub. Prot., 882 F.3d 52, 55 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting Monahan v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Corr., 214 F.3d 275, 285 (2d Cir. 2000); see generally Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c)(1)). In essence, only the first action to arise from an underlying event may be whole; all others are hollow and crumble at the slightest inquiry.
[20] Res judicata is one principle that we recognize and give effect to, as we believe, in our “best professional judgment”, that the gap that exists in our civil claim preclusion doctrine has a tangible, real effect in this case. S.D. Const. Art. 10 § 3.1. In consequence, we absorb res judicata’s preclusory test, as stated earlier in Soules, 882 F.3d at 55. When squaring this with existing doctrines and laws, this principle is not in conflict with any - even CPA Art. 9a §3(b), as that statute provides a mandatory ceiling of a case’s viability rather than a floor to dismissal. See supra, [8].
[21] Courts must rigorously apply those tests prudently developed in common law. As such, we will now apply the res judicata preclusory test to this matter.
- [21.1] First, as stated supra, the previous action(s) resulted in an adjudication on the merits. See Ppatpat v Birdish152 [2025] Civ 38; see also SD (Appellant) v Ppatpat (Respondent) [2026] SDCR 1 (now-Appellant’s duplicative and derivative claims against the State dismissed without prejudice on the merits).
- [21.2] Second, the event underlying this case also underlaid two other actions, where each of the actions’ defendants had privity with each other—in that EC Birdish acted for the Electoral Commission, and the Electoral Commission acted for the State of SimDemocracy. See supra, [8]; see generally Ppatpat v Birdish152 [2025] Civ 38; see generally Ppatpat v SD [2025] Civ 38.
- [21.3] Finally, the claims asserted in this action were, or could have been, raised in the prior action. Compare Ppatpat v Birdish et al. [2025] Civ 38 with SD (Appellant) v Ppatpat (Respondent) [2026] SDCR 1.
[22] In whole, the procedural history and current claims meet the res judicata test. In argumentation, Appellant noted that “[t]he underlying event is the rigging of the elections. However, a single action can have multiple underlying tortious claims.” Argumentation, Appellant's response to Question 1, [2026] SDCR 17. Appellant also noted that, in Fitzgerald v Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246, 255–58 (2009), “the Court held that overlapping statutory and constitutional claims can coexist[.]” Additional Argumentation, Appellant, [2026] SDCR 17. We certainly agree with both assertions; however, they do not affect our holding. Our opinion survives this potential rebuff simply because the alternative is straightforward: to avoid claims upon duplicative underlying facts, one must bring all of those identified claims in one action. If judgment and relief have been provided upon a claim, then later claims arising from that disposed claim’s underlying facts are precluded.
Conclusion and Propriety of Remand
[23] Appellant seeks that this Court remand this matter back to the Inferior Court for proceedings consistent with this opinion, but we find such to be inappropriate in the context of our res judicata discussion. See supra [16]–[22]. Most remands have been ordered under the fictional necessity that the fact-finder, or the otherwise lower court, ameliorate their reversible error. No amelioration is needed here.
[24] We see no reason to reverse the decision of the Inferior Court in [2025] Civ 39 because there is no reversible error. In kind, we shall commit none of the same with an undue remand.
Judgment
[25] In finality, we find that the Inferior Court clearly erred in its application of CPA Art. 9a §3(b); however, after analysis of this case’s qualification as res judicata with the duplicative claims against the EC and the State, we hold this to be a harmless error at law. If the Appellant wanted to pursue a vicarious liability action, then they may; however, they may not impose additional suits in order to do so. All claims for a cause of action must be brought in one suit.
[26] The Inferior Court’s dismissal of Ppatpat v Electoral Commission [2025] Civ 39 with prejudice is affirmed.
[27] It is so ordered.