Ref re Election Timings 2025 SDCR 35
Summary Decision - Reference re Election Timings [2025] SDCR 35
| Date of judgment | 25th December 2025 (as measured by Eastern Standard Time (EST)) |
| Judge(s) |
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| Held | Elections (whether Senatorial, Presidential, Gubernatorial, etc) are to go live between 12 PM UTC and 11:59 PM (or 23:59) UTC on Saturdays, and elections can be posted more than 48 hours after a Call for Candidates closes. |
| Ruling | 3-0 |
| Applicable precedent |
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MAJORITY OPINION by Judge Muggy
(With Judge Thyme agreeing in full and Judge Ferris agreeing except [12])
Introduction
[1] This case stems from an inquiry posed by former President Birdish on how the Constitution presumably contradicts itself when covering election timings, with the contradictory sections being §5 and §7 of Part 9 of the Constitution.
[2] The petitioner also brings up Article 3, §1.3, and Article 5, §7.3, and the Court deems these as not very contradictory to the sections the petitioner emphasizes, but still opts to answer the petitioner’s hypothetical.
[3] Given that this case was handled in summary, is a reference case and the petitioner has since left SimDemocracy, the court invited no oral argumentation.
On joining §5 and §7
[4] It has been observed previously that there are several ways in which a court can take when resolving constitutional contradictions. Whether it be authorial intent, as observed in In re Replacement of KingRed31 [2020] SDSC 21, having the more specific section take precedence, such as in In re Article 4 s5 of the Executive Act 2023 [2025] SDSC 9, and conjoining the two sections into one process, such as in Reference re Vice Presidential Confirmation [2025] SDSC 35.
[5] Given that we have so many ways to resolve contradictions, this court will not aim to reinvent the wheel, and instead, simply apply interpretations seen in In re Article 4 s5 of the Executive Act 2023 [2025] SDSC 9 and Reference re Vice Presidential Confirmation [2025] SDSC 35.
[6] To use the doctrine established in In re Article 4 s5, though, we must first decide which section is more specific, and why it’s more specific in the first place.
- [6.1] As §5 covers specifically elections, and §7 more broadly dictates the timings of which public votes are able to be put up, we can soundly conclude that §5 is the more specific section, as it has a narrower scope.
- [6.2] While this may be the case, though, §5 does not completely override the text of §7, because it simply deals with a subset of events otherwise covered by §7.
Determining the Timing of Elections
[7] We must now see to it that neither is completely irrelevant or completely overrides the other, and to do this, we must see to it that they work harmoniously with each other to definitively decide the timeframe as to when elections can “go live”.
- [7.1] As §5 stipulates, voting for elections must begin on a Saturday as measured by GMT, and for the purposes of this verdict, UTC.
- [7.2] This timeframe works in tandem with §7, which stipulates that public votes can only be put up between 12 PM UTC on Saturdays and 2 AM UTC on Sundays.
- [7.3] These timeframes present clear overlap, as both stipulate that elections can go live, or must go live, on a Saturday.
[8] This Court, taking into account that §5 and §7 present clear overlap when dealing with the same topic at varying levels, and thus can work harmoniously, interpret that elections can reasonably only be open to voting/go live between 12 PM UTC and 11:59 UTC
On Calls for Candidates
[9] It will now be the aim of the Court to fit Calls for Candidates (hereafter CFC singular , or CFCs plural) into the electoral process, as to answer to the hypotheticals the petitioner poses, being:
- “Further, if a CFC was posted on a Monday and concluded on a Tuesday, that would mean that the election would have to be posted on Thursday according to Art. 3 §1.3 and Art. 5 §7”
- “And if a CFC is posted early, am I allowed to post an election early per the relevant sections in Articles 3 and 5, or is that prohibited by the relevant sections in Part 9”
[10] To start, we must look at the plain text of both Article 3, §1.3, and Article 5, §7.3, which state:
- “There shall be a 48-hour period between the conclusion of the Call for Candidates and the start of the election”
[11] These sections of the Constitution unambiguously mandate that there must be a 48-hour period between CFCs, there’s no question about that. The real question is whether the period between a CFC and its relevant election has to be 48 hours.
[12] There are several factors that this Court could put into play in order to interpret these sections as denoting that there be a minimum of 48 hours between CFCs and elections, such as the basic barometer of whether or not it is reasonable for human, non-automated authority to get the timing of an election to the exact minute, applying everyone’s favorite verdict (In re Replacement of KingRed31 [2020] SDSC 21) to say that making the Supervisor of Elections get it down to the letter may lead to undesirable outcomes, or simply how the Supervisor of Elections has been interpreting the text himself over the period in which it has existed,
- [12.1] To start off, we have what is essentially pragmatism, in which the Court would like to emphasize isn’t the strongest of arguments, but has been taken into account regardless. If we were to rule that elections needed to be released exactly 48 hours proceeding a CFC closing, it would allow zero wiggle room, and doesn’t account for any unforeseen circumstances whatsoever, which is why it contributes to the argument that §1.3 and §7.3 stipulate that the period between CFCs and elections are at least 48 hours.
- [12.2] Perhaps the strongest of the arguments taken into account by this Court, “undesirable outcomes”, first seen in In re Replacement of KingRed31 [2020] SDSC 21, then elaborated upon in Ppatpat and brandmal, ex parte thesigmasquad (Appellant) v State of SimDemocracy (Respondent) [2025] SDSC 13, in which Courts should only extend legislative text when otherwise not doing so would expose a user, or users, to material risk of harm, where the original intent of the law would not have done so. The material risk of harm in this instance is the risk of violating the rights of the citizenry under Article 18, §4 of the Constitution in the case where the Supervisor of Elections is incapacitated or otherwise unavailable at the time of 48 hours elapsing, in which the citizenry’s ability to express their political beliefs would have been infringed upon, as the election they would do so in wouldn’t be put up in the appropriate amount of time. This would extend to the Supervisor of Elections being even minutes late, which while not egregious, would still be a violation of the Bill of Rights.
- [12.3] Last, and perhaps the least, is the living constitutionalism perspective of how the Supervisor of Elections has been running elections since the implementation of §1.3 and §7.3, in which on various occasions, he has interpreted the relevant sections of the Constitution to mean that the 48-hour period between CFCs is a minimum, and not a strict time requirement. So, under this argument, if it isn’t broke, don’t fix it.
[13] Given this, it is fair for this Court to interpret that instead of elections needing to be opened to the public 48 hours after the CFC on a down-to-the-minute basis, the Electoral Commission has some wiggle room, if perhaps, something like their computer crashing occurred.
Verdict
[14] Elections may only be put up between 12 PM UTC and 11:59 PM (or 23:59) UTC on Saturdays.
[15] The Constitution’s 48-hour stipulated timeframe between Calls for Candidates and elections is a minimum, not an exact time requirement.
Post-Script
[16] As a general note from the writer of this judgement, I would consider it prudent for the Senate of SimDemocracy to perhaps clear up election timings, as it feels quite odd to have only 12 hours (or 11 hours and 59 minutes) to put up an election.
PARTIAL DISSENTING OPINION by Judge Ferris
[17] While I agree with most of the majority opinion, [12] however is a misapplication of In re Kingred.
[18] In re Kingred [13] states “[...] However, in the event that interpreting a law literally leads to an undesirable outcome, one that makes little logical sense, or one that leaves the actual meaning of the law uncertain or unclear, courts should look to original intent.” [12.2] correctly identifies that an undesirable outcome is when there is a material risk of harm to users where a better written law could prevent it. And authorial intent may be used to interpret the statute in that situation.
[19] While it argues that the law would result in citizens losing their right to express political beliefs via voting due to an error by the Election Commission resulting in material harm, it fails to consider the broader case law on elections.
[20] The rights of the people would be violated if they lost their ability to vote, such as if every election they voted in would be invalidated due to an event that is almost assuredly going to happen. In In re 38th Presidential and 38th Senatorial Elections [2020] SDSC 10 [37] the court sets forth a two pronged test for whether a judicial remedy is justified. Whether the conduct is serious enough and whether the remedy is proportional. The fact is that an election being posted an hour late simply isn't serious enough to invalidate the results and hence the votes would be counted and the right to vote would be upheld. As long as the election is posted within a reasonable time past or before the deadline (±12) established by the constitution so as not to infringe upon the time granted to the next term. Additionally, the insertion of “minimum” is not related to authorial intent in any way and simply an addition by the court; Simply another instance of legislating from the bench.
[21] [12.3] is certainly the worst argument within [12]. The court is now deferring the interpretation of the statute of the Supervisor of Elections. Upholding an incorrect system should not be entertained by the judiciary and it certainly should not be taking inspiration in its verdicts from incorrect current practices and a non-member of the judiciary.
[22] [12.1] is completely detached from law and lacks any legal basis. That is simply an issue within the constitution for the senate to fix. The judiciary should always limit itself to the text unless there are exceptional circumstances, such as where the golden rule must be applied.
[23] With the rich case law on elections which could guide us here, the usage of the golden rule is extremely unwarranted and should not be used in this case.
Citations
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