SD v Flashing Lights 2025 Crim 105
SD v Flashing Lights [2025] Crim 105
| Date of judgment | 27th July 2025 |
| Judge | Judge ppatpat |
| Charges | 1 charge of Doxxing (Article 55a of the Criminal Code 2020) |
| Verdict | Guilty of 1 charge of Doxxing (Article 55a of the Criminal Code 2020) |
| Sentence | Permanent ban |
| Applicable persuasive precedent |
|
JUDGMENT by Judge ppatpat
Introduction
[1] The State of SimDemocracy has charged the defendant, Flashing Lights, with one count of Aggravated Doxxing, in violation of Article 55a of the Criminal Code 2020.
[2] The State requested the punishment of a permanent ban.
[3] The Defendant pleaded not guilty, asserting that the information disclosed was already publicly available and therefore consent was implicitly granted or, alternatively, that the Defendant's conduct should be mitigated.
[4] The Prosecution submitted that the conduct amounts to aggravated doxxing under Article 55a §2, and requested a permanent ban pursuant to Article 55a §7.
Summary of Argumentation and Facts
[5] The Prosecution presented multiple pieces of evidence demonstrating the Defendant's malicious disclosure of personal data:
- [5.1] A screenshot of the Defendant's display name, clearly indicating intent to disclose Flor’s real-life name, coupled with hateful language.
- [5.2] Screenshot of Defendant explicitly disclosing the real names of victims, redacted for protection, accompanied by derogatory slurs.
- [5.3] Affidavits by MedMouse confirming non-consent to disclosure of his personal information.
[6] The Prosecution outlined Article 55a of the Criminal Code:
- [6.1] §2: Aggravated doxxing involves disclosure of personal data without lawful basis and with malicious intent.
- [6.2] §3: Malicious intent includes intent to cause harassment or real-life consequences.
- [6.3] §4: Presumption of malicious intent exists when personal data is disclosed without lawful basis.
[7] The Prosecution further cited Article 19 of the Constitution guaranteeing the right to privacy, emphasizing explicit consent is required for disclosure.
[8] Witness testimony by MedMouse and Flor confirmed that neither party consented nor intentionally made their names public within SimDemocracy. MedMouse acknowledged a connection from his Discord to Reddit to Instagram, where his name was visible, but maintained the disclosure was accidental and did not imply consent for further distribution.
[9] The Defence contested Exhibit 1, arguing it was unclear whether the victim's name was already public, and questioned the relevance of Exhibits 3 and 4 due to the inclusion of witness testimony.
[10] Defence further contended implied consent existed due to public availability of information online, arguing private individuals should not be restricted from discussing publicly accessible personal information.
[11] Regarding Flor, Defence argued mitigation on the basis Flor knowingly interacted with known doxxers, claiming partial responsibility.
Considerations
[12] The Defence argues that no unlawful "disclosure" occurred because the personal data was already publicly accessible elsewhere online. However, the Court rejects this narrow interpretation. In the context of Article 55a, “disclosure” encompasses not only the original unveiling of private data but also any republication or re-dissemination of personal data without lawful authority. The legal and social harm targeted by the doxxing offence lies not in whether the data was initially secret, but in the act of unauthorised publicisation and targeting of personal data, especially where it is done with malice. Doxxing, as a statutory offence, criminalises the act of taking information—regardless of how it was obtained or whether it could be found through obscure means—and actively using it to harm or harass, which includes drawing attention to personal data in hostile or defamatory contexts. While the Court is mindful of concerns that such an interpretation could chill legitimate discourse, it must emphasize that freedom of expression is a qualified, not absolute, right. As held in In re Restraining Order Act [2019] SDSC 1, the freedom of expression is a qualified right, subject to limitation where it infringes on other fundamental rights, in this case, the right to privacy protected under Article 19. Where expression takes the form of malicious publication of personal data—especially that which targets private individuals—it exceeds the protections afforded by our Constitution, which solely protect a citizen’s rights to freely express their political and religious beliefs. The Court accordingly finds that the term "disclosure" must include re-publication by unauthorised actors, and the malicious re-exposure of personal information—regardless of prior discoverability—is squarely within the conduct proscribed by the Criminal Code.
[13] Furthermore, the Court must carefully interpret Article 19 §2 of the Constitution, which provides:
- "Only public bodies and organizations prescribed by law may collect, retain, process, and disclose personal data with the specific and unambiguous informed consent of the individual."
Article 19 §2 explicitly restricts the collection, retention, processing, and disclosure of personal data exclusively to public bodies and organizations that are explicitly authorized by statute. By employing the word "only," this explicitly limits who may handle personal data, intentionally excluding all actors who fall outside this narrowly defined group. Consequently, private individuals—who are neither public bodies nor entities explicitly empowered by legislation—are constitutionally denied lawful authority to disclose personal data, irrespective of whether consent is obtained. Even if a private person claims they have received consent, Article 19 §2 offers them no lawful basis or authority because such constitutional permission is not extended to them; the Constitution does not grant nor imply a generalized right for private citizens to disseminate personal data. The Court finds unequivocally that private persons have no constitutional authorization whatsoever to disclose personal data publicly, regardless of consent, unless explicitly permitted under separate, clearly stated statutory authority. The defendant, being a private individual who lacked any statutory authorization, acted entirely without lawful basis by disclosing the personal data of the victims.
[14] Given the explicit interpretation of Article 19 §2 above, the Court must firmly reject the Defence’s argument of implied consent due to discoverability of personal information online. Even if the personal information was inadvertently or indirectly accessible through linked social media accounts, this does not alter or diminish the strict constitutional limitations on who may lawfully disclose that information. For consent to have any legal meaning in the context of public disclosure, it must be explicit, informed, and unambiguous. The Court notes that victims explicitly denied ever granting such consent.
[15] Furthermore, in this case, the Defendant’s malicious intent is not only presumed by law (as discussed above) but is abundantly confirmed by explicit evidence presented to the Court. The Defendant utilized hateful and derogatory language, including slurs specifically targeted at the victims, clearly demonstrating a malicious and harmful intent beyond any statutory presumption. This evidence provides independent confirmation of Defendant’s intention to harm, harass, and intimidate the victims.
Verdict
[16] The Court thus finds that all statutory elements required to establish Aggravated Doxxing under Article 55a of the Criminal Code 2020 have been unequivocally met.
[17] The Defendant, is hereby found guilty of Aggravated Doxxing under Article 55a of the Criminal Code 2020.
[18] The Court afforded both parties the opportunity to present mitigating or aggravating factors in accordance with the framework set out in the Courtroom Procedures Act 2025. Neither party introduced additional evidence or witnesses at the mitigation stage. The Defence’s earlier submissions—that the victims’ data was publicly accessible and that one victim interacted with known doxxers—do not amount to valid mitigation in law. The Court finds these arguments insufficient to diminish the gravity of the Defendant’s conduct. In accordance with the precedent set in SD v Yt7iju [2025] Crim 102, the defendant is sentenced to a permanent ban. It is so ordered.
Postscript
[19] The court would like to give a shoutout to Literal, Palmer, Ed, and NF19 for their exemplary work as attorneys on this case.
Citations
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