SD v Loger 2026 Crim 8
SD v loger [2026] Crim 8
| Date of judgment | 22nd March 2026 |
| Judge | Judge Mypenjustbroke |
| Charges | 1 charge of False Report (Article 22a of the Criminal Code 2020) |
| Verdict | Guilty |
| Sentence | 8 hour mute |
| Applicable persuasive precedent |
|
JUDGMENT by Judge Mypenjustbroke
Introduction
[1] This criminal matter comes upon complaint by the Department of Justice, represented by Lunette, against Loger. The principal and only complaint is one of Making a False Report in violation of Criminal Code 2020 Article 22a.
[2] To quote renowned judicial reformist Nf19_, the defense made an “illustrious” and “honourable” defense of Loger (hereinafter “Defendant”). This Court does not try to imitate this Palmer-like defense in its judgment. Instead, we aim to make this verdict as mundane and soul-crushing as possible while remaining “manifestly” justiciable.
Generalized Rules
[3] A person’s speech is widely protected if it is deemed political, with few exceptions. See SD v. g470_, [2025] Crim 113; see also S.D. Const. Art. 18, § 3.1 (exceptions to political speech include the malevolent and intentional infliction of emotional distress or undue apprehension, determined by an objective standard). For a defendant to perform the actus reus required for a conviction under Article 22a of the Criminal Code 2020, they must (1) file a report to or mass summon the SDBI or other legal authorities; (2) in any way; and (3) the summoning is manifestly without legal merit. See id. “Manifestly” means “plainly” or “obviously[.]” Manifestly, Merriam-Webster (last visited March 22nd, 2026).
[4] In determining culpability, or the mens rea, the statute requires that a defendant “knew or should have known” the claim was manifestly without legal merit. Criminal Code 2020 Art. 22a, § 3. This is quintessentially a negligence standard. See Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(d) (Am. L. Inst. 1962). In addition to the facts, we are mandated to consider whether Defendant has legal training or certification in SimDemocracy.
Statement of Facts
[5] The State admitted one piece of evidence. This evidence, labeled by this court as Exhibit A, showed Defendant stating, “Three strikes amendment is cringe I can't ping @SDBI anymore.” Exhibit A, SD v. Loger, [2026] Crim 8 (Inferior Court, March 6, 2026). The defense did not contest this evidence. In fact, the defense conceded in its closing statement that “yes, he used the SDBI ping[.]” Defense Closing Statement, SD v. Loger, [2026] Crim 8 (Inferior Court, March 21, 2026). Because of the State’s concession of this ping, we find at this stage that the first and second elements of the charge’s actus reus requirement are satisfied. The only remaining elements for the prosecution to prove are the “manifestly without legal merit” and mens rea requirements. See supra, [3]–[4].
[6] Defense admitted one piece of evidence. This evidence, labeled by this court as Exhibit B, was an affidavit from Defendant. This affidavit swore that the Defendant pinged the SDBI as “a means of political protest to state my dissatisfaction with the three strikes amendment.” Exhibit B, SD v. Loger, [2026] Crim 8 (Inferior Court, March 12, 2026). “Affidavits inherently hold less weight” than other evidences or testimony, “as the person writing the affidavit did not have to come into Court and be cross-examined by the opposing party[.]” SD v. dragoncrxst., [2025] Crim 138, [8]. That being said, affidavits do provide a valuable insight as to the subjective mens rea of the defendant in cases that, without such, would essentially function as strict liability.
Discussion
[7] The State’s principal argument is that political protest does not satisfy a legal merit. Moreover, the State argued that Defendant’s admission of intent to protest “demonstrates that the ping was not used for its intended reporting purpose, but instead knowingly misused[.]” Prosecution Argumentation, SD v. Loger, [2026] Crim 8 (Inferior Court, March 16, 2026). The misuse that the State alleged, at the risk of rote repetition, is the summoning with manifestly no legal merit.
[8] We understand—as the State aptly recognized—that the law does not prohibit protest, merely the misuse of regulatory and official systems. The State argued that legal merit requires a legitimate reason to summon the authority in its official capacity. Prosecution Rebuttal, SD v. Loger, [2026] Crim 8 (Inferior Court, March 20, 2026). The State also argued that a political opinion cannot transform "misuse into legitimacy." Id. We disagree with this contention in the absolute, as "[l]egal merit, generally, carries a connotation of substance over technicality." SD v Notcommunist366, Creative, & Acool, [2025] Crim 103, [15]. Political protests may summon relevant authorities, and the substance of the protest may warrant a summoning. It is the trial court's role to determine, as a matter of fact, whether such a protest required the controversial summons. For a defendant to show legal merit in their summoning of authorities for reason of protest, we find it reasonable that the substance of the protest must affect or involve those relevant authorities in their operative capacity.
[9] Defendant's affidavit maintains that the Three Strikes amendment is “arbitrary and overbearing in nature,” that it adds workload on the SDBI for offenses “deservedly ticketed instead of punished with imprisonment," and that it provides the Department of Justice “another avenue to profile and target citizens.” We accept, for the sake of argument, that these grievances are sincerely held and that the amendment, if enacted, could implicate the SDBI's operational responsibilities in some general sense. But, notably, we do not examine the subject of protest at all; rather, we take Defendant at their word, as is required for admitted evidence. A protest implicating an authority in a general, policy-oriented sense is not the same as a situation requiring the authority's operative attention. The SDBI is summoned to investigate and respond to criminal conduct—not to receive legislative or meta commentary. The same can be said of offenses that arise from one’s reporting of their own summons of the SDBI.
[10] Even crediting Defendant's characterization of the amendment, none of his stated concerns presented a situation in which the SDBI was needed to act, investigate, or intervene. The amendment was, at the time of the ping, undergoing consideration by the Senate and Vice President. The appropriate channels for such protest were legislative—through testimony, lobbying, or public discourse—not through the mass summoning of law enforcement personnel. To hold otherwise would permit any citizen to ping the SDBI whenever legislation touching upon criminal enforcement is under debate, a result that would swallow the statute whole. Thus, actus reus is established.
[11] In prior decisions, this court has ruled that “there is no mens rea for Making a False Report beyond the defendant’s legal expertise[.]” Id. at [21]. We depart from [2025] Crim 103’s decision in this regard, as the mens rea standard required for a violation of Article 22a is one of criminal negligence. See supra at [4]. We must determine, then, if Defendant knew, or should have known, that his summoning of SDBI personnel in his protest was “manifestly without legal merit.” In the context of Exhibit A, we find that the summons in controversy was not a ping of necessity but of annoyance. In this light, we look for any objective indicia that may signal intent. In what the exhibit shows, a debate occurred before the summons where various persons discussed the Three Strikes amendment. During this, Defendant interjected with the offending message. Defendant’s message did not need to ping the SDBI. That much is firmly established. Additionally, the exhibit establishes no reason by way of illegal activity for the ping. While Defendant’s affidavit swears that his intention was to summon the SDBI because he believed that the amendment overbore upon the SDBI, the message itself reads as a joke meant to provoke the SDBI, a “pushing of the envelope." Additionally, if the Defendant was so markedly concerned about the SDBI’s workload, then it fails to reason that he would like to add to that workload by summoning them for his message. Defendant is a barred attorney, and he served as a public defender before his eventual leave. He understands what the SDBI ping does. Finally, the tone within context, proverbially, seems to “poke the bear" under the pretext of protest. It is from these indiciae that we conclude that Defendant knew, or should have known, that his summons had manifestly no legal merit. Therefore, mens rea is satisfied.
Conclusion
[12] While this court understands that Defendant supposedly thought that his protest implicated summoning SDBI personnel, the objective indicia surrounding his actions cuts against his claim. We conclude that the Defendant knew or should have known that his summons would manifestly have no legal merit.
Verdict
[13] We find the Defendant, Loger, guilty of Making a False Report in violation of Criminal Code 2020 Article 22a. Upon mitigation, and noting his prior good behavior and upstanding citizenship to this community—barring this unfortunate thing—this court sentences him to a mute of 8 hours.
[14] It is so ordered.