SD v Sunbear 2026 Crim 3
SD v Sunbear [2026] Crim 3
| Date of judgment | 17th February 2026 |
| Judge | Judge ppatpat |
| Charges | One count of Misuse of Permissions (Article 31 of the Criminal Code 2020) |
| Verdict | Guilty |
| Sentence | 7 day mute |
| Applicable persuasive precedent |
|
JUDGMENT by Judge ppatpat
Introduction
[1] The State of SimDemocracy has charged the Defendant, Sunbear99999, with one count of Misuse of Permissions under Article 31 of the Criminal Code 2020.
[2] The Prosecution alleged that the Defendant, using permissions granted through public office, pinged @everyone in a manner unrelated to official work, after a warning in #governmint-announcements, thereby causing social harm.
[3] The Defendant pleaded not guilty and defended primarily on the basis that they did not knowingly and intentionally use permissions inappropriately, because they believed—based on assurances from respected legal figures—that an @everyone ping would be acceptable.
Summary of Argumentation and Facts
[4] The Prosecution relied on three principal facts, supported by exhibits and the criminal complaint:
[5] On 1 January 2026, the Attorney General issued a notice warning that “Large scale pings… with roles not designed and designated to be pinged will be treated as abuse of permissions from here on.”
[6] Following that statement, the Defendant indicated a desire to ping everyone (the parties treated this as acknowledgement of the warning).
[7] The Defendant then posted “@everyone byler should’ve been canon [profanity]” in #governmint-announcements.
[8] The Prosecution argued that Article 31 is satisfied because the @everyone ping was an intentional use of a permission tied to office, the message was plainly unrelated to the official work for which the permission was granted, and the mass ping constituted “demonstrable social harm” by broadly inconveniencing server members.
[9] The Defence argued that Article 31 requires the Defendant to have known the use was “inappropriate”, and that the Attorney General’s wording (“from here on”) shows prior ambiguity in the community perception of Article 31, the Defendant may not have seen the warning, and in any event, the Defendant was reassured by respected legal voices that the ping would be acceptable, undermining proof of the required mens rea.
Considerations
[10] The Prosecution bears the burden of proving each element of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt. Article 31 requires proof that the Defendant knowingly and intentionally used permissions/powers, did so inappropriately, in a manner not related to the official work for which the permissions/powers are given, and that there is demonstrable social harm.
[11] I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the message was unrelated to official work. The content was plainly not an announcement connected to the Defendant’s duties as Chief Ombudsman or any governmental function. It was personal commentary.
[12] The Defence’s central point is whether the Defendant knew the use was “inappropriate”, given alleged assurances that it would be “okay” and the Attorney General’s notice arguably reflecting evolving enforcement.
[13] I reject the submission that “knowledge” in Article 31 requires knowledge of illegality. The statute does not say “unlawfully”; it says “inappropriately” and “not related to the official work”. Those are practical, role-based constraints.
[14] Even if the Defendant believed (rightly or wrongly) that they would not be prosecuted, that does not, on these facts, prevent a finding that they knowingly used an official permission in a way unrelated to official work.
[15] On the evidence before me, the Defendant had contemporaneous notice that mass pings of this kind were viewed as misuse (whether framed as enforcement, reminder, or warning), and nevertheless proceeded to ping everyone with non-official content.
[16] I find that the “inappropriate” character of the act is also self-evident from the mismatch between a government announcements channel and a mass ping about non-government, personal content. This is precisely the kind of conduct Article 31 targets: using office-tied permissions for non-office purposes.
[17] Finally, Article 31 requires “demonstrable social harm” to prosecute. A server-wide @everyone ping in a government channel, drawing users’ attention for no official reason, constitutes sufficient social harm through disruption and inconvenience. This is the specific harm pleaded by the Prosecution.
Verdict and Sentencing
[18] For the reasons above, I have to find the defendant guilty of Misuse of Permissions.
[19] Following conviction, I invited the parties to make submissions on aggravating and mitigating factors.
[20] The State, in an unorthodox move, submitted the following mitigating factors. Firstly, they bring up the defendant’s professionalism throughout proceedings. Secondly, they state that the harm was minimal, and last, that the conduct was in jest.
[21] The State also submitted the following aggravating factors. They claim the harm had a wide impact because an @everyone ping affects the entire server. They mention the preventability of the crime, and the timing, in that the ping occurred after the Attorney General’s warning. The State proposed a sentence of a mute of two weeks.
[22] The Defence disputed the relevance of the State’s aggravating factors, arguing that the number of people affected, preventability, and timing are not express statutory factors, and further submitted that the State itself accepted “little harm”. The Defence advanced the following mitigating factors. Firstly, that the defendant had no prior convictions. Secondly, that there had been no subsequent offending since the incident, and lastly, the low likelihood of repetition, characterising the conduct as a one-off New Year’s occurrence. The Defence submitted that a long sentence would not protect the community and would unnecessarily prevent participation, proposing a sentence of three days.
[23] The primary purposes of sentencing in this case are the following:
- [23.1] Deterrence (both individual and general)
- [23.2] Denunciation, to mark the community’s condemnation of using official permissions for non-official ends.
[24] The secondary purpose is retributive justice (proportionality to seriousness and culpability).
[25] I accept as mitigating that this was a single incident, with limited concrete harm, and that the Defendant has no prior convictions and no evidence of further offending since.
[26] I also accept, to a modest degree, that the conduct being framed as jest reduces the need for a harsh incapacitative sentence, though it does not excuse misuse of official permissions.
[27] As to aggravation, the court points out that this offense inherently involves abuse of trust or position, because the very permission alleged to be misused is one conferred by office, and that is an aggravating factor recognised by the Sentencing Act. Why the prosecution opted to not bring it up, and instead make up their own aggravating factors is something beyond the Court’s knowledge.
[28] I accept that the scale of disruption (pinging everyone) is relevant, not as a free-standing “numbers” test, but because sentencing principles expressly permit consideration of social harm caused, and an @everyone ping is broader in impact than a narrower communication.
[29] I place limited weight on “preventability” as an independent aggravating factor, but I do treat the timing after a public warning as relevant to culpability. It indicates the Defendant had reason to pause before acting, even if they believed informally that they would not face consequences.
[30] Taking the above factors into consideration, I sentence the Defendant to a seven (7) day long mute. It is so ordered.