Special Order Regarding Judge Muggy 2026 SDCR 20
Special Order Regarding Judge Muggy [2026] SDCR 20
| Date of judgment | 19th February 2026 |
| Judge |
Judge Brandmal |
| Held | Judge Muggy is ordered recused from SD v nein_30660 [2025] Crim 175 |
| Ruling | 1-0 |
| Applicable precedent |
|
Decision by Judge Brandmal
Introduction
[1] The matter is before the Court because Judge Ferris requested a Special Order under Art. 25 §3 CPA against the presiding Judge Muggy for her conduct in SD v nein_30660 Crim 175 and SD v IvyCactus & Syndicality [2025] Crim 169. It is of note that Judge Ferris is not a party or counsel in either case. The Court heard from Judge Muggy as a witness and Justice Ed as a respondent (counsel in one of the mentioned cases).
On the procedural admissibility
[2] There has been substantive discussion whether Judge Ferris had standing to even bring any motion or request at all. The Court, under the impression of Interlocutory Appeal of Motion Decision in dominax273, et al. v SD [2025] SDCR 11 [8 and following], shall refrain from developing a theory of standing without any grounding in law. The exact relevant text is:
“A Judge who is unable to preside over a case in a reasonably efficient manner shall recuse, and a Judge may be recused for this purpose on special order of a higher Court.”
[3] Insofar as the respondent argued, that the Court of Review lacked jurisdiction to grant such an order, they have failed to convince this Court. If the relevant section only referred to the Supreme Court it would do so (see In re Article 30 of the Civil Code [2025] SDCR 2 [30]). Additionally, The Schedule of the Judiciary Act 2025 gives this Court the power to grant orders for “any other purpose”.
[4] The mere fact that Art. 10 of the Judiciary Act 2025 exists, forces this Court to no other solution (except having applied Art. 10 §2. analogously), as the situation referred therein is a completely different one. For a Judge to 'refuse' to recuse, they must first have been asked to do so. Art. 25 §3. CPA however requires no such situation. The special order mentioned therein contains no further qualifier. Hence, in this Court's view, Art. 14 § 1.1. CPA is applicable. The order was not requested by a party. Therefore, only the Court acting suo muto remains as a possibility.
On the merits of recusal
[5] The Court will now consider the merits, acting suo muto and without considering the input of the original petitioner, as they are indeed without standing. In SD v IvyCactus & Syndicality [2025] Crim 169 Judge Muggy, during these proceedings, dismissed the case. Recusing Judge Muggy now serves no purpose and therefore the Court shall not do so.
[6] In SD v nein_30660 Crim 175 however, a party has brought a motion to dismiss on the 30th of January, with the prosecution responding in less than 24 hours. Since then, Judge Muggy has repeatedly delayed deciding on the motion. Instead they have given a preliminary result and explanations for this most unusual situation. It has been 20 days since. Judge Muggy, on the witness stand, explained to this Court the reasons for their continued inactivity. The situation they described to this Court did not appear to be very temporary in nature (meaning nothing that is resolved in a few days).
[7] All in all, Judge Muggy does not appear to be able to preside over the trial, for example by deciding motions (using Art. 25 § 1. as an indicator). This finding leaves this Court no other option but to issue a Special Order, which is done in order to ensure compliance with laws.
Verdict
[8] Judge Muggy is therefore declared unreasonably inefficient in SD v nein_30660 Crim 175 and recused by Special Order of this Court. A new Judge is to be assigned most expeditiously.
Dicta
[9] The Court also notes that Art. 25 § 1.3. is not applicable in this case, or indeed ever, as a Judge by definition cannot fall inactive under § 1., which is, at least, counter-intuitive.