Writ of Prohibition - Lucas v Department of Justice 2025 SDIC 8
Writ of Prohibition - Lucas v Department of Justice [2025] SDIC 8
| Date of judgment | 16th August 2025 |
| Judge | Judge ppatpat |
| Writ | Prohibition |
| Verdict | Denied |
| Result | |
| Applicable persuasive precedent |
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This matter has been repealed, voided, or is otherwise out of date
JUDGMENT by Judge ppatpat
Introduction
[1] On or about August 16, 2025, this Court received a petition from Senator Lucas seeking a writ of prohibition under Article 10 §4 of the Constitution, challenging the constitutionality of Article 43 Subdivision 1 of the Criminal Code, which requires citizens to declare their alternate accounts to a central registry within 72 hours or face criminal sanction.
[2] The petitioner argues that this legal obligation amounts to "compulsory labour" in contravention of Article 26 of the Constitution, which forbids slavery and servitude in all forms, including being compelled to perform compulsory labour.
[3] The petition for a writ was to all judges, made in the discord channel “#court-case-request”.
[4] This Court accepts jurisdiction under Article 10 §4 of the Constitution, which empowers any citizen to petition inferior court judges for relief where constitutional rights are alleged to have been violated.
Factual and Legal Framework
[5] The provision under challenge — Article 43 Subdivision 1 of the Criminal Code 2020— imposes a duty on users to disclose the existence of alternate accounts. The penalty for non-compliance includes a mute or ban of no less than one (1) week.
[6] The relevant constitutional provision, Article 26, guarantees that:
“No person shall be held in slavery or servitude... No person shall be compelled to perform compulsory labor.”
[7] At issue is the meaning of "compulsory labour" in a constitutional sense. The petitioner contends that the mandatory registration of alternate accounts, under threat of penalty, constitutes unlawful forced labour.
[8] The Constitution does not define “compulsory labour.” However, in interpreting a term so fundamental to liberty, the Court must be guided by its common legal meaning — as informed by constitutional traditions and international norms, including those recognised under Article 4 of the European Convention on Human Rights and ILO Convention No. 29.
[9] These sources consistently distinguish between true compulsory labour, which is coercive, exploitative, and degrading, and ordinary civic obligations imposed by law for the common good. The latter includes requirements such as tax compliance, jury service, and — as in this case — regulatory disclosures to maintain institutional integrity.
[10] The duty to declare alternate accounts is a narrow, administrative obligation. It does not compel the expenditure of labour or services in any meaningful legal sense. It imposes no physical, prolonged, or exploitative task, but rather a one-time declaration to support the fair operation of a digital community.
[11] The threat of a mute or ban, while certainly a penalty, does not transform the obligation into forced labour. That which is brief, reasonable, and proportionate in both purpose and burden cannot be equated with the injustices Article 26 was meant to prevent.
[12] Rights guaranteed by the Constitution must be interpreted in a way that preserves their essential character. But they must also be read in harmony with the responsibilities of participating in society. A Constitution that protects liberty does not disable the State from maintaining order. The law in question, while mandatory, does not offend the dignity or autonomy of the individual.
Verdict
[13] The petition asks this Court to declare that an administrative reporting requirement constitutes involuntary servitude. But the Constitution is not so brittle, nor its protections so easily triggered. Constitutional rights are strongest when they are well-defined; they become weaker when stretched to cover what they were never meant to reach.
[14] Therefore, the Court finds that Article 43 Subdivision 1 of the Criminal Code does not impose "compulsory labour" within the meaning of Article 26 of the Constitution. The burden imposed is minimal, the aim legitimate, and the means proportionate.
[15] The petition for a writ of prohibition is hereby denied. Prosecutions under Article 43 Subdivision 1 may proceed in accordance with the law. It is so ordered.