In re Quad Parole Hearing 2026 SDCR 37
Question of Law—Quad Parole Hearing [2026] SDCR 37
| Date of judgment | 12 April 2026 |
| Justices |
|
| Held |
|
| Ruling | 3-0 |
| Applicable precedent |
|
MAJORITY OPINION by Judge Mypenjustbroke
(with Chief Judge Matty agreeing, and Judge Notcommunist366 concurring)
[1] The complexities of contract law which apply within the realm of plea agreements between the Executive and a defendant are, indeed, binding and valid law. That being said, the inherent question need not resort to that otherwise-defined doctrine that guides the private law, but the correct question is whether the charge, itself, is one of two things: First Degree Harassment or Second Degree Harassment. The answer to the validity of the plea deal is a foregone conclusion, as the defendant agreed to it even knowing this defect, and so is the parole hearing therein. But the prior question governs the resolution of the Inferior Court’s current impasse.
[2] To this aptly-whittled, straightforward question, we receive an uncharacteristically alike answer. This is found in the Doctrine of Lenity. This doctrine does not hold itself at issue with the Concurrence’s operative rule in contra proferentum, yet it explains the answer much easier and with many fewer points of complexity. In text, we see the doctrine read so that, “when a law is unclear or ambiguous, the court should apply it in the way that is most favorable to the defendant, or to construe the statute against the state.” Rule of Lenity, Legal Information Institute. With this, we provide foundation for our decision. To wit, the Doctrine places a weight upon the before-evenly-weighted scales in favor of the less-severe charge. In this case, that is Second Degree Harassment.
Verdict
[3] The degree of harassment that Quad pled guilty to is second degree harassment, and the parole hearing is legally valid.
CONCURRING OPINION by Judge NotCommunist366
[A1] I wrote an entire opinion on the actual validity of the plea deal in regards to contract law on SimDemocracy. The majority thought it prudent to throw it all away in favor of focusing on the rule of lenity only, and just presume the validity of the plea deal. This court should not have completely ignored the actual legal validity of the plea deal itself, and given it some form of thought. So to give clarity to said issue, I will simply post the interpretation that I applied here below.
Introduction
[A2] A question of law has been posed regarding how a plea deal and criminal should be interpreted for the purposes of a parole hearing, as the plea deal and criminal complaint did not specify which degree of harassment was pled guilty to, and the degree of harassment determines if an applicant is able to seek parole.
[A3] The court today is tasked with determining what degree of harassment the applicant pled guilty to, and if the plea deal is legally valid.
Is the plea deal legally valid?
[A4] The first key question in this case is if the contract in the plea deal was legally valid.
[A5] In re Granola ex parte Inthewasteland (Appellant) v State of SimDemocracy (Respondent) 2025 SDSC 36 wrote that plea deals are contracts that may not be reneged upon by the state. Thus, contract law within Simdemocracy and common law ought to be applicable to plea deals, and the court will look at if the plea deal offered to Quad was legally valid.
[A6] First, we will look at civil code provisions on if they were violated with the plea deal offered to the applicant in this case to determine if simdemocracy law was violated in this plea deal.
[A7] We see that the contract between the parties did not require any party to engage in illegal activity, did not deceive either party into signing the contract, neither party was under duress or undue influence, the contract was possible to fulfil, both parties seemingly understood the terms of the contract, and there was an exchange of value between both parties. Thus, under article 11 of the civil code, the plea deal was legally permissible.
[A7.1] The only part that was questionable in regards to the above criterion is that both parties understood key terms of the contract. Both parties understood what statute was being pled guilty to, both parties understood the length of the sentence, and the rest of the plea deal. Minor errors that do not affect the finding of guilt do not need a retrial, see Ivy Cactus, ex parte Dick head68 (Appellant) v State of SimDemocracy (Respondent) 2020 SDSC 9.
Was there a fundamental mistake in the nature or terms of the contract?
[A8] The final question within the civil code is found in Article 12, which says that consent is invalid if obtained through a “...fundamental mistake about the nature or terms of the contract.”
[A9] First, we see that with the nature of the contract, that being a plea deal, there was no mistake in regards to the nature of what the contract itself was. Both the defendant and state both understood they were signing a plea deal, and thus the nature of the contract was understood by all.
[A10] With the terms of the contract, this is a bit more ambiguous. While neither the defendant nor the state likely understood what degree of harassment was being charged, it is clear that the defendant understood the charge they were pleading guilty to, and the length of how long they agreed to serve under said statute. Similar to my reasoning in [A7.1], minor mistakes that do not affect the finding of guilt should not void this agreement, considering it would allow for retrial which would be unjust and unduly costly, as outlined in Ivy Cactus, ex parte Dick head68 (Appellant) v State of SimDemocracy (Respondent) 2020 SDSC 9.
- [A10.1] To allow a trial at this stage would be, in a similar vein to In re Criminal Code Article 3, Section 3 [2025] SDSC 8, harming the defendants right to be protected against double jeopardy. To remand the verdict, declare a mistrial, or hold a retrial at this stage, would be to allow the defendant to be tried again after serving 4 months of a conviction. Any potential ambiguity within this plea deal should not overturn the conviction, given the fact that the defendant and state both clearly understood the statute and punishment agreed to, especially considering that there are already common law solutions to this issue that can be implemented without harming the defendants rights.
- [A10.1.1] In this case, in a strange reversal of the conditions found in In re Criminal Code Article 3, Section 3 [2025] SDSC 8, the defendant has already been found guilty for harassment. To declare a mistrial now would be to effectively allow for double punishment on the same facts, which is explicitly protected under Right to Fair Hearing, as is said in In re Criminal Code Article 3, Section 3 [2025] SDSC 8. Double punishment on the same facts, especially if said punishment is given 4 months after the defendant began serving their sentence, is unfair to the defendant, who was under the impression that they would only need to serve 7 months, and constitutes double jeopardy. If the state makes a mistake on a plea agreement that results in the defendant serving a sentence longer than what they agreed to, the defendant should not pay the price. Rather, the defendant should be either acquitted on the charges without possibility of retrial, or the plea agreement should remain in place. Given the fact that the plea agreement is already in place, and both parties agreed to the terms therein, we are inclined to allow said plea agreement to remain standing, despite the minor procedural error.
- [A10.2] Furthermore, I would apply this case though an interpretation of the Golden Rule to come to the exact same conclusion. Looking at Ref re Election Timings [2025] SDCR 35, we find that even if the plea agreement between the defendant and state violated Article 12 of the Civil Code, there exists a clear risk of material harm if the court took a hardline textualist interpretation. The defendant would be subject to the potential of another trial for the exact same facts they were already convicted of and served 4 months serving a sentence for, thereby posing direct, material harm to the defendant's right to liberty and fair hearing. Therefore, the golden rule should be applied, and the plea agreement should remain in effect to defend the defendants rights.
[A11] So, given the fact that the mistake made in this case is relatively minor, and did not affect the finding of guilt, there should not be retrial. Thus, we should look to common law solutions, of which we have a clear solution to this issue, Contra Proferentem.
Contra Proferentem
[A12] Looking at the common law principle of Contra Proferentem, we see that any ambiguous terms must be interpreted against the drafter of the contract. In this case, the state drafted the plea deal, so the court ought to interpret the contract in favor of the defendant.
[A13] In this case, the way we will interpret against the state would be to consider the plea deal, the defendant agreeing to plead guilty to second degree harassment, rather than first degree.
- [A13.1] As is recommended in In re Granola ex parte Inthewasteland (Appellant) v State of SimDemocracy (Respondent) 2025 SDSC 36, I suggest that the state attorney who signed off on this plea deal ought to be tarred and feathered in the streets.
Post Script
[A14] A special thanks to Former Judge Thyme for proofreading this judgement. Truly one of the greatest patriots of our time.
[18] The court thanks ppatpat for his amicus brief submission to the court.