Ref re Treaty of Nolandia 2025 SDSC 16
Reference re Treaty of Nolandia [2025] SDSC 16
| Date of judgment | 24th August 2025 |
| Justices |
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| Held | The proposed amendment to the constitution of New Anders does not violate the Treaty of Nolandia. |
| Ruling | 5-0 |
| Applicable precedent |
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MAJORITY OPINION by Justice Syndicality
(with Chief Justice TheLittleSparty, Justice Ivy Cactus, Justice Britz, and Justice Ed agreeing)
Introduction
[1] Citizen hmquestionable, serving as Acting President at the time of their petition, has submitted a request for a reference case regarding the Treaty of Nolandia (hereafter known as the Treaty) between the State of SimDemocracy and the Federal Republic of New Anders, in light of events transpiring in New Anders that have the possibility of conflicting with the terms of said treaty.
[2] The then-Acting President (hereafter known as the Petitioner) asks two questions of the Court: (1) where, between the courts of SimDemocracy and the courts of New Anders, should issues relating to the Treaty of Nolandia be litigated; and, if the Court decides that SimDemocracy courts have jurisdiction over Treaty affairs, (2) whether certain recent events in New Anders violate the terms of the Treaty.
[3] As this is a reference case, no response was heard by the Court in relation to it.
Summary of Arguments
[4] The Petitioner lays out an argument as to why the courts of SimDemocracy, and specifically the Supreme Court of SimDemocracy, are a proper venue to litigate issues regarding the Treaty of Nolandia and treaties in general. In short, the Petitioner claims that the Treaty is legislation due to having been signed by the President and ratified by the Senate, and since the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over questions regarding legislation, as well as the unique power to issue legally binding advisory opinions to questions like the one at hand, the Court is uniquely suited to address the questions posed by the Petitioner.
[5] The Petitioner then discusses a recent amendment to the New Anders constitution shortening presidential term lengths from six (6) months to four (4) weeks. In particular, the Treaty requires that a previous president, Razili, be returned to office after their prior resignation and stay there until the “natural expiration” of their term. The Petitioner claims that the new amendment violates the terms of the Treaty, as there is no explicit provision in the amendment guaranteeing Razili to serve until the end of a term, whether it be a six-month term or a four-week term.
[6] The Court also acknowledges its receipt of an amicus brief for this case from Judge ppatpat.
Do SimDemocracy courts have jurisdiction over Treaty matters?
[7] The Court agrees with the Petitioner’s reasoning, and finds that SimDemocracy’s courts have jurisdiction over Treaty matters. Reference re Treaties [2021] SDSC 4, which the Petitioner cites in making their case, states that treaties ratified by the legislature (now the Senate, at the time of that case the Parliament) in addition to the executive have the full force of law within SimDemocracy, which is more power than a treaty ratified only the executive would hold.
[8] Furthermore, as the Supreme Court has the sole authority within SimDemocracy to review legislation (Article 11, §3.1) and provide advisory opinions regarding legislation (Article 11, §3.3), it is solely within the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction (within SimDemocracy, at least) to answer questions arising from the Treaty.
- [8.1] It should be noted that one need not justify the Treaty, or any treaty, as legislation in order to find that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction on question regarding it. The Constitution in Article 11, §3.1 gives the Supreme Court a wide mandate to review government actions that may not necessarily be legislation, while §3.3 of the same article places no restrictions on the kinds of subjects for which the Court may issue advisory opinions. Thus, the Supreme Court is the natural venue to litigate questions relating to treaties, regardless of whether such litigation is in the form of a judicial review or a reference case, and regardless of whether or not such treaties qualify as legislation under the criteria set by Reference re Treaties.
- [8.2] It should also be noted that this decision should not be construed as implying that the Supreme Court of SimDemocracy is the only place in which issues arising from specifically the Treaty of Nolandia may be litigated. Indeed, the Constitution of New Anders (at the time this case was accepted) places virtually no restrictions on the types of cases that its Supreme Court can accept. Since the Treaty itself has no provisions on how legal issues arising from it are to be adjudicated, we may conclude that the Supreme Courts of SimDemocracy and New Anders are legally sound and appropriate places to litigate Treaty issues.
- [8.2.1] It’s certainly possible that one could launch simultaneous cases regarding the same Treaty issue in both Supreme Courts, and the two Supreme Courts could issue different rulings. It is, at the moment, unclear what would happen in such a scenario. The absence of any guidance on this from the Treaty should be regarded as an oversight on the part of the Treaty’s framers.
Does the amendment to the constitution of New Anders violate the Treaty?
[9] With the question of jurisdiction answered, we now turn to the substantive question of whether the amendment to the constitution of New Anders shortening the length of presidential terms from six months to four weeks violates the terms of the Treaty of Nolandia.
[10] With regard to the issue of “natural expiration,” the Court finds that an amendment changing the length of presidential terms amounts to changing the definition of the “natural expiration” of the presidential term. That is to say, whereas presidential terms “naturally” expired after six months at the time of the Treaty’s signing, under the new amendment they would do so after four weeks. Thus, the Court finds that the Treaty is not violated simply by shortening the length of the presidential term.
[11] Where things get messy, however, is when we bring New Anders president Razili into the picture. According to the terms of the treaty, President Razili must be able to serve until the “natural expiration” of their presidential term. And unfortunately, as the Petitioner states, there are no additional provisions of the amendment to the New Anders constitution handling the transition between the two presidential term lengths, should the amendment pass referendum. That is to say, there is nothing in the amendment specifically stating when President Razili’s term is to “naturally” expire. So, should the amendment pass, when does President Razili’s term expire?
[12] With no further information, the Court is forced to look towards the only answer that makes sense: if the amendment passes, the previous presidential term is to expire immediately, and new elections are to be held to determine who will be the President of New Anders for a shortened, four-week term. But is this a “natural” expiration?
[13] Consider, for example, some alternate universe where the amendment includes a provision saying that the current presidential term, with Razili as President, is to end the weekend after the date one week following the passage of the amendment, and where this modified amendment passes. This is the constitutionally mandated end of the term. Just as the amendment changes the definition of the “natural expiration” of presidential terms following its passage, so, too, does it change the same definition for the ongoing term at the time of its passage. Thus, President Razili’s term would “naturally” expire at the date specified in the amendment, and the amendment does not run afoul of the Treaty.
[14] One may now see the parallels to the case at hand. Instead of an explicit provision saying that President Razili’s term expires at some specified date in the future, we have an implicit provision saying that President Razili’s term expires immediately. Once again, the amendment changes the definition of the “natural expiration” of the presidential term ongoing at the time of its passage, should it pass. How, then, could we say that President Razili’s term doesn’t expire “naturally” under these terms? This Court thus finds that the expiration of President Razili’s term is “natural,” and does not violate the terms of the Treaty.
Conclusion
[15] On the issue of whether the courts of SimDemocracy have jurisdiction to answer questions relating to the Treaty of Nolandia, the Court finds that the Supreme Court, alone among the courts of SimDemocracy, has this jurisdiction.
[16] On the issue of whether the proposed amendment to the constitution of New Anders, which would shorten the length of presidential terms from six (6) months to four (4) weeks, would make President Razili’s term expire “unnaturally” in the eyes of the Treaty, the Court finds that it does not, given that their term is to expire immediately upon the passage of the amendment, should it pass.
Verdict
[17] The proposed amendment to the constitution of New Anders shortening the length of presidential terms does not violate the Treaty of Nolandia.
Post-Script
[18] The Court notes that the objective of treaties between virtual states is more founded in roleplay than in being proper legal agreements. While this does make the experience more fun for those involved, it impairs the legal weight of such documents, and as discussed in [8.2.1], this lack of attention to detail could lead to oversights, and it can overall make the work of this Court—interpreting these documents—more difficult. The Court thus kindly requests that treaties be drafted with more legal care in the future.
CONCURRING OPINION by Chief Justice TheLittleSparty
[19] While I hold the same broad opinions as my colleague, and support the verdict derived herein, I do wish to clarify my minor disagreement regarding the jurisdiction of SimDemocracy’s Supreme Court in regards to “international” diplomacy, in particular regarding sections [8.2] and [8.2.1]. It is my belief, unlike the good Justice Syndicality, that the only qualified venue to litigate treaties in which the State of SimDemocracy is a signatory, ought to be the Supreme Court of SimDemocracy. No other court exists which is formally recognized by the Constitution of SimDemocracy as being on par with or higher than the highest court of SimDemocracy. If, for example, the Constitution claimed the Supreme Court to be the highest court in SimDemocracy, grounds might exist for recognition of a higher court outside of SimDemocracy, for example possibly taking the form of an ‘international’ tribunal of some sort. This is however impossible, as the particular framing of our Constitution is abundantly clear in establishing the Supreme Court as the definitive, final, and highest court in which all questions of law must be settled, as no provision whatsoever exists for another venue to settle questions of such nature.
Citations
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