SD v ai lawyer 2025 Crim 129
SD v ai_lawyer [2025] Crim 129
| Date of judgment | 5th October 2025 |
| Judge | Chief Judge Benbookworm |
| Charges |
(Articles 13a and 51.2.4 of the Criminal Code 2020) |
| Verdict | Guilty |
| Sentence | Permanent ban |
| Applicable persuasive precedent |
|
JUDGMENT by Chief Judge Benbookworm
Introduction
[1] The State brings a charge of Prohibition of Association with Proscribed Organization, combined with the inchoate charge of Hoax. The prosecution brings this on the basis of the accused using an alleged TIDE bot called “Reporter” to mark a user as a possible threat.
[2] Despite precedent regarding the “reasonable person” standard, the prosecution cited the Attorney General as the individual referenced in Article 13a§1.1:
“The reasonable person, in this case, shall be a legal expert correctly interpreting the statutes within this document.”
This ignores SD v Extraditz [2025] Crim 40 [6], ppatpat and brandmal, ex parte thesigmasquad (Appellant) v State of SimDemocracy (Respondent) [2025] SDSC 13 [18.2], and other cases that the reasonable person refers to a hypothetical average SimDemocracy user. This law does not create a wholly new reasonable person test allowing the designation of an individual reasonable person, merely shapes the sample from which the average is pulling from to be limited to legal experts instead of all SimDemocracy users.
Repeated delays
[3] This case was riddled with delays, the vast majority of which were either caused by the prosecution, or by substitutions in defense counsel. This escalated to the Deputy Attorney General (DAG) assigned as prosecutor being held in contempt twice, and the Attorney General (AG) being held in contempt as well. The principles of Nighteye (Appellant) v LordDeadlyOwl (Respondent) [2020] SDSC 5 (Nighteye hereafter) only go so far; in [13] the Supreme Court notes it was the first occurrence. There comes a time where [12] applies: when the party repeatedly fails to meet deadlines, to the extent of being held in contempt. For the benefit of any appellate review of the procedural failings of this case, the court reports the factual occurrences underlying the findings of contempt.
[4] After the court opened the trial, the prosecution did not respond within 24 hours, but when prompted again said an opening statement would be submitted soon. Another day later with no response, the court requested that the AG appoint a new prosecutor, or the case would be dismissed. A few hours later, the DAG provided the opening statement. This delay of over 48 hours was merely strike one.
[5] One of the defense co-counsel left the server, but the opening statement was nevertheless submitted within 48 hours. The prosecution was instructed to present evidence and main argumentation. After 24 hours, the court ordered the prosecution to respond with an estimated time of completion within 12 hours; in recognition of both the prosecution’s activity in server and precedent in Nighteye. Exhibits 1 and 2 were presented shortly after.
[6] A day later, the defense responded they would submit cross-examination the next day, but withdrew representation upon realizing their time conflicts with real life matters; it took many days to find a replacement public defender able to respond in time. If only the prosecution had recognized the same issues on their end so early on. The public defender provided cross examination, and a day later, the defense’s main argument. Despite over a week elapsing, the prosecution never indicated that they in fact had not presented all of their evidence.
[7] Under the principles of leniency outlined by Nighteye, the court permitted the prosecution to present the rest of the evidence. This came in pieces but was not finished quickly, despite the prosecuting DAG saying it would be finished “tomorrow” on more than one occasion. The AG was politely requested (but specifically not ordered) to appoint additional/replacement representation. This proceeded for an entire week. The repeated delays had become unacceptable.
[8] On account of Reference re Prosecutorial Inactivity [2025] SDSC 25 voiding the Speedy Courts Act 2024, the court opted not to dismiss the case. However, the Courtroom Procedures Act 2025 Article 14§2 provides that noncompliance with a court order may be prosecuted under contempt of court. The inherent power of the court regarding contempt is codified in Article 21.1.1§2 of the Criminal Code 2020, allowing coercive detainment of a person until they comply with a court order. The court therefore directed that the prosecuting DAG be held in contempt of court until the main arguments had been presented in full. The AG was also directed to speedily provide alternative representation.
- [8.1] In recognition of the DAG’s various important duties to maintaining national security, the detainment was narrowly tailored to permit access needed to complete other duties. In consultation with the President, the DAG was arrested, as their roles gave the permissions needed for their duties without permitting them to speak in general channels.
- [8.2] It still took more than 24 hours to finally finish the evidence presentation and main arguments. In between each morsel of a submission from the prosecution, the public defender was good at providing cross examination
[9] The defense likewise had some delays but responded within 48 hours. The initial questioning of the witness went smoothly. The court then ordered a response within 24 hours from the prosecution if any other questions were going to be posed, or else to present closing arguments. About 24 hours later, the court requested that the AG designate alternate representation. The DAG promptly responded that their questioning was done, and that they had a closing statement.
[10] This was false. After waiting 48 hours from ordering closing arguments and 24 hours from the (latest) request to appoint another prosecutor, the court summarily found both the AG and the DAG in contempt of court. Since this was the second time the DAG was found in contempt, a punitive detainment of 48 hours minimum was ordered. If a full submission was not completed in that time, the DAG was to remain detained for up to seven days.
- [10.1] The punitive sentence was permissible under Article 21.1.2 of the Criminal Code 2020. Pay particular attention to §1(b) regarding nonparticipation.
[11] The AG responded promptly and requested the court reconsider the finding of their own contempt. According to the AG, it appears that "please designate" does not constitute a court order, and that the polite phrasing not including magic words was insufficient to constitute a court order. However, previous messages were much more direct in their instruction to the AG. On account of the most recent instructions to the AG were less explicit, no punitive minimum sentence was issued, but the AG was still to be detained until closing arguments were submitted or seven days elapsed (whichever was sooner).
- [11.1] The AG also tried to argue they were not party to the case. This flies in the face of In re TheReak Contempt of Court [2023] SDSC 2 [4], which was written by the AG during a previous stint as Justice.
- [11.2] The AG appointed themself as replacement counsel, and promptly produced the closing arguments. After which, the defense responded promptly.
Relevant law
[12] On account of the defense pointing out in opening statements that the prosecution would be unable to show intent, the prosecution began to hang their hat on concealment showing intention. Concealment shows the opposite of a hoax, as the accused was not trying to lead others to believe that had committed a crime, but trying to hide it. Luckily for the prosecution, Article 13a of the Criminal Code 2020 in part reads:
“§4. It shall be sufficient to convict under this article for the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused either committed the charge in question or committed a hoax of the charge.”
The importance of §4 was also highlighted by the judge in SD v fortnitewfortnitew [2025] Crim 131 [38], and is persuasive here. Any failure to prove the inchoate hoax part does not invalidate guilt if the underlying crime is proved.
- [12.1] Despite the court directing the parties to consider the implications of SD v Peppa [2025] Crim 86, it appears that the parties only partially did so. The defense did indicate they read enough to recognize the required levels of proof. The prosecution at least noticed [23.1] enough to charge Hoax. Doing more research on case law will serve attorneys well.
- [12.2] Hoax is an inchoate charge that (in effect) signifies that the accused either committed the crime or convincingly faked doing so. It can perhaps be seen as a hedge against "But I didn't really mean to, I was just faking it!". While the crime is defined in the law, it is helpful to consider where that word came from before it was selected.
[13] The crime of Prohibition of Association with Proscribed Organization comes from Article 51.2.4 of the Criminal Code 2020, which reads in part:
“§1. A person who associates with a Proscribed Organization, or any of its members, commits an offence.”
[14] The court made frequent reference to SD v _xxxiii4 [2025] Crim 121 in evaluating this case, but in particular [56] holds a relevant definition for “association”:
“I hold that association includes not merely overt allegiance or explicit support, but also material acts of cooperation, facilitation, or access that would not be available absent some form of established contact with the organization or its members.”
Considerations
[15] It is not contested that the accused sent a command for an external application called “Reporter” to mark a user as a potential threat:
“/mark user:(username) tier:1 reason:Unknown polsim possible threat”
It is likewise uncontested that TIDE constitutes a Proscribed Organization, pursuant to legislation, executive orders, SDIOA reports, and precedent.
[16] At issue in this case is whether the command, concealment, and identity of the app are sufficient to constitute association with a Proscribed Organization (the concealment was addressed in [12] and is not dispositive).
[17] The command and “Reporter” make it clear that the accused is adding to a record of threats against something. Is the threatened entity a Proscribed Organization? Is it TIDE?
[18] The message and app were deleted quickly, but not quick enough to prevent the collection of screenshots of the message and generation of logs. It is curious that it was called “Reporter” rather than some variety of “Overwatch” like those brought up in SD v _xxxiii4 [2025] Crim 121 or other cases. The target was called as a witness, who testified to never having seen TIDE use a bot not named something like “Overwatch”, but also that they had been banned from the public-facing TIDE server some months ago and don’t pay close attention to their operations.
[19] The verdict thus hangs on a single evidentiary exhibit where the Quark application logged that the accused had deleted a message, but in a different format and manner than the Audit Log native to Discord. The message from Quark says that the accused deleted a message, with the entry reading in part:
Message Deleted @
"pin {issuer} has instructed Overwatch to apply advanced tracking to {target}.\n\n"
[20] The court initially turned to SD v Satitty [2025] Crim 91 [14] regarding automated moderation flags, but this does not appear to be a judgment call made but rather a report of what was deleted. That case can be considered to say (for example) that a security bot determining a user spammed is not dispositive, but that it could be combined with further evidence to indicate how many messages were sent and what the contents were, at which point a judge would make the final call. In this case, the Quark app is not saying that a user’s conduct merits moderation, but serving as a backup of what the user had deleted.
[21] Based on the evidence presented and witness testimony elicited, it is established that the Reporter app was an alias of Overwatch. The accused had use of a restricted bot operated by TIDE, followed by deletion of the message and deletion of the bot itself. Under SD v _xxxiii4 [2025] Crim 121 [71], this constitutes operational assistance and association with a Proscribed Organization.
Verdict
[22] The accused is guilty of Prohibition of Association with Proscribed Organization Hoax.
Sentencing
[23] Having completed the sentencing hearing, the court contemplates the arguments, statutory law, and precedent. The factors below are evaluated in the context of the factors in the Sentencing Act.
[24] Under Article 51.2.6§2 of the Criminal Code 2020, the permitted sentence is a mute or ban above one day.
[25] SD v _xxxiii4 [2025] Crim 121 resulted in a permanent ban, as has every other conviction related to terrorism.
[26] Spade Law Firm, ex parte State of SimDemocracy (Appellant) v Freax (Respondent) [2020] SDSC 24 notwithstanding, appeals regarding sentencing have only resulted in increased sentences, never yet decreased sentence. This includes the trio of Ppatpat, ex parte State of SimDemocracy (Appellant) v keepbloxburgsafe [2025] SDSC 21, Hackerman, ex parte State of SimDemocracy (Appellant) v Juliana [2025] SDSC 22, and ppatpat, ex parte State of SimDemocracy (Appellant) v Pretzel [2025] SDSC 23 all released on the same day. The court thus hesitates to issue a verdict too low.
[27] The prosecution argued that the many criminal cases proceeding against the convict ought to increase the sentence, and recommended a permanent ban. The court is hesitant to rely on this, as the only case to have finished resulted in an acquittal. While SD v AerospaceEnjoyer [2025] Crim 126 [14.2] establishes that the burden of proof for sentencing is lower than for conviction, this court has not been provided with enough briefing on the other cases to adequately evaluate the proper impact. More convincing is the severity of the crimes committed by TIDE.
[28] The defense recommended a ban under 6 months. They provided screenshots indicating interaction between the convict and the target/witness which included the marked target saying, “I’m TAKING you to the back of the server and SHOOTING YOU” (emphasis in the original). This happened about two weeks before the events of this crime, and the evidence does not appear to meet the statutory requirements for admissibility (whether those standards are the same for trial and for sentencing is not evaluated here).
[28.1] This appears to be an attempt to argue provocation under Article 10 of the Criminal Code 2020. Regardless of admissibility, the messages sent by the target do not meet the burden of causing a reasonable person to lose control more than the length of a presidential/senatorial term later. Nor does this consider case law on provocation such as SD v wall.b [2025] Crim 46 [17], SD v Juliana [2025] Crim 87 [22], or SD v AerospaceEnjoyer [2025] Crim 126 [15.1].
[29] The court sees no reason to depart from the prosecution's recommendations, and sentences the convict to be permanently banned. Under Article 4§6-7 of the Criminal Code 2025, the sentence is to be carried out immediately.
Citations
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