SD v fortnitewfortnitew 2025 Crim 131

SD v fortnitewfortnitew [2025] Crim 131

Date of judgment	21st September 2025
Judge	Judge Hmquestionable
Charges	1 charge of Hoax to Doxx (Article 13a, 55a of the Criminal Code 2020)
Verdict	Guilty
Sentence	Permanent ban
Applicable persuasive precedent

JUDGMENT by Judge Hmquestionable

Introduction

[1] The Accused, fortnitewfortnitew (ID 1343719291333116016) pleaded not guilty to a charge of Hoax to Doxx. The charge reads:

§1 of Article 55a outlines that all required for the crime of doxxing to occur is the disclosure of personal data without any lawful basis. In this case it would be revealing 3 letters of Nolan's last name and the exact number of characters of his last name (Exhibit A and Exhibit C). Further this would fall under §2 of Article 55a which is aggravated doxxing, This is because the goal was clearly to scare Nolan into thinking that his full last name was doxxed in the general chat of SimDemocracy and would fall under the requirement of malicious intent the requirements for harassment as outlined in §3 of Article 55a would be met by the intention of trying to scare Nolan about the personal information being doxxed. Further when the Defendant was called out on the behaviour they showed no remorse, nor attempted to delete the information which is further proof of the malicious intent of the action.
However after unspoiling the message it reveals that it was not a full doxxing (Exhibit B) But was in fact a hoax. The requirements for the criminal act of Hoax can be found in  §1 of Article 13a which states that all that is required for a hoax to have occurred  is simply acting maliciously in a way that would convince any reasonable person that a criminal offence had been committed. The requirement that a reasonable person is a legal expert is also met as the SDBI Muggy believed the action to be a crime and so §1.1 is fulfilled (Exhibit D and Exhibit F)

[2] At the conclusion of the trial, I convicted the Accused of the charge and sentenced them to a permanent ban. I now set out my reasoning below.

The Charge

[3] Article 55a of the Criminal Code 2020 reads:

§2. A person commits the offence of aggravated doxxing if they disclose personal data without lawful basis and with malicious intent.”

Article 13a of the Criminal Code 2020 reads:

Ҥ1. A person shall be considered to engage in hoax when they act intentionally and maliciously or in a grossly negligent way such that they lead the reasonable person to believe they have genuinely committed a criminal offense under this document.
 §1.1. The reasonable person, in this case, shall be a legal expert correctly interpreting the statutes within this document.”

[4] Throughout the course of the trial, the Prosecution frequently referred to the charge as “Hoax to Doxx [...] that would fall under [...] aggravated doxxing”. This caused a great deal of confusion in court, as the Defense Attorney was of the incorrect perception that the charge was “Hoax to Doxx” and not “Hoax to Aggravated Doxxing”. At the end of the trial, the Defense applied to me for the charge to be dismissed under Article 9, §6. of the Courtroom Procedures Act 2025, which reads:

§6. An accused who has been materially misled by an error or omission in a charge shall have the charge dismissed.
 §6.1. An error or omission in a charge shall be ordered to be rectified by the Judge before the continuation of a pre-trial. (emphasis added)

[5] After considering the application, I decided not to dismiss the charge. This is because this section is intended to be applied at the start of the trial, and not after a verdict has been applied. Additionally, no error has actually been made in the charge, as it does satisfy the requirements of the Courtroom Procedures Act 2025.

[6] However, I wish to record my grave concern with this manner of writing charges, as it has the strong possibility of confusing the defendant, especially if they do not have legal representation. Such unclear charging may compromise on due process and the right to a fair hearing afforded to all defendants. Instead, all the provisions of the law against which the accused is charged should be stated together to avoid miscommunication.

Case of the Prosecution

[7] The Prosecution provided two pieces of documentary evidence, as well as the testimony of the alleged victim of the aggravated doxxing, nolan0027 (“the victim”).

[8] Additionally, the Prosecution repeatedly attempted to introduce evidence of “reasonable people” to satisfy the requirements of Article 13a, §1. of the Criminal Code 2020 (that they lead the reasonable person to believe…). It is well-established that a reasonable person is a fictional construct in the mind of the court of the average SimDemocracy user (see ppatpat and brandmal, ex parte thesigmasquad (Appellant) v State of SimDemocracy (Respondent) [2025] SDSC 13 at [18]). It is difficult to gauge the response of the average SimDemocracy user based on different members of the public, who each have their own biases and prejudices which make them distinct from an average SimDemocracy user. For instance, all the evidence I ordered to be excluded contained messages by State Attorneys, who could have a bias towards the state and its case. Therefore, I ordered the additional exhibits to be excluded.

[8.1] The Prosecution also attempted to argue that the victim’s past history of being doxxed caused the victim to believe that they had been doxxed. I presume that they intended to argue that the victim is a “reasonable person”. Apart from what I have mentioned in [8], the “reasonable person” in hoax cases is also a legal expert who correctly interprets the statute. The victim is not a legal expert. A number of arguments of this nature were also attempted by the Prosecution, including attempting to frame members of the SDBI as “reasonable people”. I put little weight on these submissions, for the same reasons as mentioned above.

[9] I find it highly important to dissuade parties from attempting to admit evidence of this nature, as it is not relevant to the ultimate determination of whether an average SimDemocracy user would believe in a certain matter. It is also not proper to list an actual person as a substitute of a reasonable person, as the Prosecution has done in the charge (to wit, “The requirement that a reasonable person is a legal expert is also met as the SDBI [Director] Muggy believed the action to be a crime and so §1.1 is fulfilled”), for the reasons I have stated above. It would be ridiculous for the court to convict someone because a police officer believed that they committed the crime.

[10] The first two pieces of documentary evidence establish that the Defendant sent a message, as a reply to the victim, containing the word “hogpens”. The letters “o” and “pen” were hidden behind a spoiler, causing the message to read “h*g***s” (“the message”). This was not contested by the Defense.

[11] The Prosecution then called the victim to testify.

[12] The victim testified that the text “h*g***s” contained the three letters of his last name. He also testified that the letters were in the exact spots of his real last name. He also testified that he had been previously doxxed, and that this experience caused him to be more worried that he had been doxxed, upon seeing the message. The victim also testified that the Defendant had not previously interacted with him directly. These answers were not contested by the Defense.

[13] On cross, the victim additionally testified that, should a more well-known member of the community have sent the message, he would have been “more surprised”.

[14] The Prosecution then submitted that, as the victim had left the server, there was sufficient evidence to believe that “the Defendant ha[d] dox[x]ed him”. They also submitted that, as the Defendant had never interacted with the victim prior to this incident, the Defendant’s message was a “clear targeted message” and would be relevant for determining intent. I shall be disregarding the first portion of this submission, as no evidence was admitted that the victim had left the server.

[15] Finally, the Prosecution concluded that they had “proven actus reus of Hoax, mens reus as well as the reasonable person standard”.

Case of the Defense

[16] The case of the Defense was that doxxing can only occur when personally identifiable information is released, and that the Prosecution was attempting to substitute the victim as the reasonable person, which is not permitted. They also rebut the Prosecution’s submission about the victim leaving the server. They then attempt to submit Discord’s definition of personally identifiable information. Finally, they also make points about how it is impossible to identify someone based off a small number of characters of a person’s name.

[17] The Defense also submits that the Prosecution is attempting to argue that the mens rea element of hoax may be rebuttably presumed, due to their submission asking the court to draw inferences from the Defendant’s past lack of interaction with the Defendant.

[18] Finally, the Defense argues that the law is intended to protect members of the public from unjustifiable apprehension, which is a “far higher bar”.

[19] There are a number of issues with these submissions. Firstly, as I have stated in [3], doxxing is the unlawful disclosure of personal data, and not personally identifiable information. There is a distinction here. Personally Identifiable Information is information which a person may be identified through, and is different from personal data, which is simply a person’s private data. I shall address this matter in more detail later on. Additionally, Discord’s definition of personally identifiable information is not relevant to this case as the charge is made under the Criminal Code 2020, and not the Discord Terms of Service. SimDemocracy exists on multiple platforms, and it is not proper to adopt a definition from one of the many platforms which SimDemocracy happens to be on for the purposes of proving a crime. Secondly, the Defense’s reference to “unjustifiable apprehension” is not based on the law. As I have also stated in [3], a hoax occurs when a person acts “intentionally and maliciously or in a grossly negligent way” that causes the reasonable person to believe “that they have genuinely committed a criminal offense”.

[20] I shall note that I will be disregarding the submissions about the victim leaving the server for the same reasons as in [14].

Issues to be determined

[21] The Criminal Code 2020 requires the following elements to be proved for aggravated doxxing –

(a) Disclosure of personal data without lawful basis; and,

(b) Disclosure with malicious intent

When (a) is proved, (b) is presumed.

[22] As the Prosecution has charged the defendant under Article 13a, the Prosecution does not need to prove that the elements in aggravated doxxing occurred. Rather, the Prosecution has to prove that a reasonable person, who is also a legal expert who correctly interprets the statute, would believe that a criminal offence had occurred.

[22.1] The Prosecution must also prove that the defense acted in a grossly negligent way, or intentionally and maliciously, to cause the reasonable person to have this belief.

[23] Additionally, if the Prosecution can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that either a hoax of the crime or the actual crime was committed, the Defendant must be found guilty.

Did the Defendant commit a hoax to aggravated doxxing?

[24] It is undisputed that the defendant sent the message. The Court now has to determine if that message would cause a reasonable person to have a genuine belief that a crime occurred.

[25] In making this determination, the reasonable person must be a legal expert who correctly interprets the statute of doxxing.

[26] The reasonable person has regard to the context introduced to this Court. This includes the testimony and other evidence submitted to the court, and more specifically, the evidence given by the victim about the contents of their name.

[27] What constitutes personal data? Recent case law, including SD v Flashing Lights [2025] Crim 105 and SD v 1377267195838599260 [2025] SDIC 7, establishes that things within the realm of personal data include names and residential addresses. A name is indisputably personal data. It stands to reason that parts of a name also constitute personal data as well, depending on the degree of specificity of the portion of the name released.

[28] Personal data must also be personalized and identifiable to the relevant person, or it would not be personal.

[28.1] For instance, let us consider the example of a person named “the reasonable person”, who has a Discord username of “something else”. A different person, in conversation with another, states “That would be reasonable.”. This does not constitute doxxing, as there is completely no reference to the “something else” Discord account.

[29] It is therefore a balancing act when determining whether something is personal information that lacks something that personalizes or completes the data. Does the text contain anything to personalize the data? Even if it does not, does the text contain something sufficiently specific that it allows for a sufficiently inquisitive person to discern and complete it?

[30] Factors which the reasonable person would have regard to include –

(a) The uncontested statement by the victim that the message included parts of the victim’s name, in the correct positions of the text; and,

(b) The uncontested fact that the message was sent by the defendant as a reply to the victim.

[31] These factors are sufficient for a reasonable person to have a genuine belief that the crime of doxxing had occurred. A message containing part of the victim’s name, as well as the character spaces between the letters of the name, as well as the Discord identity of the victim, is sufficient for a victim’s actual name to be fully disclosed through inference by an inquisitive person.

[32] We go now to the mens rea element of aggravated doxxing. The rebuttable presumption of aggravated doxxing only applies when a person is found to have committed the release of personal data in question. The reasonable person who is a legal expert would rightly understand that a person is innocent until proven guilty in a court of law (see Art. 21 of the Constitution). Therefore, the reasonable person would not apply the presumption, and would instead look to evidence that there was a malicious intention on the part of the person.

[33] To prove intent, the prosecution submitted that this was the only time that the defendant had interacted with the victim. This is not contested. The Prosecution then asked the Court to make the inference that the message was targeted at the victim.

[34] Would a reasonable person make this inference? The facts in this matter include the completely unrelated message as a reply to the text “Why are all the tide alts using this”, the fact that this was the first interaction between the defendant and the fact that parts of the victim’s name were included in the message. These are facts sufficiently probative of a malicious intent, and I find that the reasonable person would have a genuine belief that the messages were malicious.

[35] We now come to the second mens rea element of the charge: Whether the defendant acted in a “intentionally and maliciously or in a grossly negligent way” so as to cause a reasonable person to believe that they had committed aggravated doxxing.

Did the Defendant satisfy the mens rea element of Hoax?

[36] Hoax requires that a person satisfy a mens rea element before a conviction may be made. This is to prevent persons who are not intending to mislead others or the police into believing that they have committed the crime, from being convicted.

[37] To answer the question, the court is of the opinion that the defendant did not act in an intentional and malicious way, or a grossly negligent way, to cause a person to believe that the message contained a doxx. This is because both of these requirements involve the reasonable person being tricked into believing that a crime had occurred, when it actually had not.

Decision on the charge

[38] However, the Criminal Code 2020 states that “§4. It shall be sufficient to convict under this article for the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused either committed the charge in question or committed a hoax of the charge.”. The elements of the charge of doxxing are fulfilled, as the release of the information through the message was not contested, and as I have determined that the information constitutes personal data for the same reasons as listed in [27-30]. Aggravated doxxing is also proven, as the defense did not attempt to rebut the statutory presumption of malicious intent.

[39] Therefore, the defendant is found guilty of hoax to aggravated doxxing.

Sentencing

[40] The only sentence available for aggravated doxxing is a permanent ban. The defense did not attempt to draw on any of the partial or total defenses available for hoax crimes, and did not submit any mitigating factors. I thus sentenced the defendant to a permanent ban.