SD v seminoisprobablysemino 2025 Crim 130
SD v seminoisprobablysemino [2025] Crim 130
| Date of judgment | 12th October 2025 |
| Judge | Chief Judge Benbookworm |
| Charges |
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| Verdict | Not guilty on all counts |
| Sentence | N/A |
| Applicable persuasive precedent |
|
JUDGMENT by Chief Judge Benbookworm
Introduction
[1] The State brings serious allegations against seminoisprobablysemino (Discord User ID: 1374103826184802374), including several that have never been charged before.
Procedural issues
Opening statements
[2] At the beginning of trial, the prosecuting Deputy Attorney General (DAG) was ordered to acknowledge receipt of instructions within 24 hours (which happened within minutes) and to present the charges within 48 hours (or ask for an extension). Having taken notice of contempt findings in other cases and sensing a high workload, after about 41 hours the court directed the prosecutor to: “Appoint additional counsel, if necessary”. The prosecutor acknowledged receipt of this instruction.
[3] Additional counsel was not appointed. After 55 hours, the prosecutor apologized for not realizing the deadline, and was warned that not many hours were left before a total of 72 hours would elapse from the order. It took a total of 68 hours for the prosecution to present the charges.
- [3.1] The defense provided their opening statements within 12 hours, having wisely made use of two lawyers.
Main argumentation
[4] The prosecution was issued an order to respond within 12-24 hours. It was acknowledged. After about 20 hours, the prosecutor informed the court that representation would likely change. After the total 24 hours had elapsed, the court ordered the Attorney General to provide alternate representation within another 24 hours, either as a replacement or in addition to existing counsel. Nearing that deadline, the court again reminded the Attorney General, who responded promptly this time by appointing a different prosecutor.
[5] The new prosecutor was given a deadline, asked for an extension, and was granted one. They were slightly late in their presentation, but the court extended leniency on account of the prosecutor being a newly minted lawyer brand new to being a junior state attorney, and a degree of confusion over proper procedure and decorum. The defense quickly responded with cross-examination.
[6] The defense was ordered to produce main argumentation, and requested a full 48 hours, which was granted, and defense counsel did so.
Terms of Service Violations
First charge of Terms of Service Violation
[7] In the first charge for violating the Terms of Service, the prosecution alleges violation of Discord’s Suicide and Self-Harm Policy. A user was discussing their struggles with suicidal ideation and attempts, to which another user expressed gladness that they hadn’t gone through with such. The accused responded, “yk im not so sure”. The prosecution argues that such risks influencing vulnerable users, and that even brief comments making light of self-harm are a breach that normalizes it.
[8] The defense cites that previous convictions like SD v changebac [2025] Crim 24, SD v wall.b [2025] Crim 46, and SD v bedshaped. [2025] Crim 89 only covered much more definitive statements than made here: each made unequivocal calls and gave instructions for another user(s) to kill themselves.
- [8.1] The court also takes notes of the dismissal of charges in SD v usernameselected [2025] Crim 73 (acknowledging that this was under the March 2024 Discord policies, not the most recent version from August 2025), where the defendant had said “i hope you die”.
[9] The court turns directly to the text of the relevant Discord Community Guidelines; selections are quoted here:
“Suicide and Self-Harm Risk… We do not allow the coordination or the graphic depiction of self-harm or of suicide.”
…
“Self-Harm Encouragement and Promotion… it is important that these discussions do not promote, glorify, or normalize self-harm behaviors… For example, you may not post, share, or engage in: * Offering or sharing methods or advice on how to engage in an act of self-harm * Normalizing or encouraging self-harming behaviors * Discouraging individuals from seeking treatment for self-harming behaviors * Sharing self-harm material in order to trigger a self-harm response in someone else”
[10] The charged conduct is insufficient to prove a violation of the Terms of Service. While the accused was certainly rude, they are not guilty of the first charge of TOS violation.
Second charge of Terms of Service Violation
[11] In the second count of Terms of Service violation, the prosecution alleges violation of Discord’s Hateful Conduct Policy:
“Hate Symbols and Imagery Hate symbols or imagery are also not allowed on Discord. This policy extends to all images uploaded or shared on Discord, including those shared in profiles, channels, servers, and Apps. Hate symbols include acronyms, numbers, phrases, logos, flags, gestures or any other symbols used to promote or incite hatred, threats, discrimination, or violence against other people based on protected characteristics. Symbols that represent supremacy of one group over another are also disallowed.”
[12] The prosecution presents an isolated image of a Nazi flag with the words “Hitler Waifu” and a corresponding character. The prosecution presents that this glorifies a historically harmful ideology. The court finds that image presented in the evidence unquestionably qualifies as an impermissible use of a hate symbol. This instance does not meet Discord’s narrow exception for satire, and echoes the conduct in SD v bedshaped. [2025] Crim 89. The defense wisely did not contest this.
[13] However, the defense did contest the validity and sufficiency of the evidence. The relevant evidence was the hateful image, and a message from Carl bot in the log channel that an image sent by the accused was deleted; the file name listed was not indicative of the contents.
[14] The court turns to Article 4 of the Evidence Act, as this dispute falls squarely within the admissibility of perished evidence. The most relevant portion is quoted here:
§2. When a party wishes to admit perishable evidence after it has perished, they may admit said evidence through a witness, who may testify or provide evidence in an affidavit sworn under penalty of perjury as to the state of the evidence at a previous period of time.
Neither this nor any other part of Article 4 was met by the prosecution. If the prosecution had bothered to read the law, they would have realized that calling a single witness would have been legally sufficient to connect the dots between the log and the image.
[15] As there is no admissible evidence of the offense, the accused is not guilty of the second charge of violating the Terms of Service.
Misgendering
[16] In the charge of misgendering, the prosecution brings what appears to be the first use of Article 56b of the Criminal Code 2020. The relevant text of the Article is quoted here:
§1. A person commits the crime of misgendering if they: §1.1. Refer to a person by a name they used prior to gender transition with the intention to deny, invalidate, or mock that person’s gender identity, or §1.2. Refer to or label another person with a gender that does not match their gender identity with the intention to deny, invalidate, or mock that person’s gender identity.
[17] The prosecution presents a cutoff message from the accused saying “when i said i wouldnt coddle your cock” to which a user replied "a kid from new anders who misgendered me maliciously and then mentioned my hypothetical genitals in this way @[a trans judge present in the conversation]". Upon the tagging of the judge, the accused responded “your honor. i didn't know she was a girl. im a unisex harasser. i provide equal harassment to all genders”. The prosecution alleges this mocks a user’s hypothetical genitals and denies or mocks their gender identity.
[18] The defense was repeatedly confused by how this could meet the legal standards for the alleged crime, and that the prosecution had barely attempted to prove it either. No pronouns nor deadnames were presented, but rather someone claimed to have been misgendered on a server outside of this court’s jurisdiction. Since no element of §1.1 is present whatsoever, the defense asked for clarification from the prosecution regarding what label was being applied to meet §1.2; this was never addressed by the prosecution. The defense nevertheless argued that no false label had been applied, as users of any gender identity may possess the mentioned genitals.
[19] The court finds that the prosecution has not presented sufficient context. The prosecution is admonished to present more complete screenshots in subsequent cases. There was either no or insufficient argument presented regarding the intentionality required under statute. The accused’s immediate apology also presents reasonable doubt as to the lack of mens rea, which the prosecution made no attempt to explain away.
[20] The charged conduct is insufficient to qualify as misgendering. The accused is not guilty.
Abuse of Vulnerability
[21] This appears to be the first time that abuse of vulnerability has been litigated. The relevant portion of Article 63 is included here for reference:
§1. A person commits the crime of abuse of vulnerability if they exploit another person’s vulnerable or fragile mental state with malicious intent. §2. Malicious intent shall include, but is not limited to, having a purpose to cause the exploited person to feel apprehension, or having a purpose of personal gain. §3. A person who exploits another person’s vulnerable or fragile mental state shall be rebuttably presumed to have done so with malicious intent.
First count of abuse of vulnerability
[22] The first count of vulnerability comes from interactions in #off-my-chest between the accused and User A. The accused responded that a message from User A should be sent in #positivity, who said they posted it where they intended. The accused acknowledged this saying “ok 👍”. User A then spoke about being present at the channel’s creation, and then requested the accused to not talk to them in that channel. The accused responded to both with an image of an individual holding a microphone to a deer.
[23] The prosecution alleges that the repeated interactions and being told to stop indicates malicious intent. The defense concedes that User A was in a fragile mental state, but disputes the interpretation of the accused’s conduct as not being exploitation nor as malicious.
[24] The court sought an adequate reference for the definition of “exploit”. However, most of the definitions found related to resources and finances. Synthesizing from multiple sources, it can reasonably be said that exploitation involves taking unfair advantage of someone for your own benefit or for an improper purpose.
[25] This behavior is better described as mansplaining, presumptuous, or rude, not exploitation. The accused is not guilty of the first count of abuse of vulnerability.
Second count of abuse of vulnerability
[26] The second count of abuse of vulnerability likewise arises from #off-my-chest regarding interactions with User B, who was anxious over the first day of school and not knowing where classes are. The accused offered their playlist, to which User B said to stop interacting with them, and the accused responded “awh”.
[27] The prosecution argues that this is malicious and intentional exploitation, based on repetition. The defense questions whether one additional message indicating acknowledgment counts as repeated, and asserts that the accused was actually attempting to be helpful by offering a music playlist to cope with the stress.
[28] The court wholly agrees with the defense on this charge. The accused is not guilty of the second count of abuse of vulnerability.
Child sexual harassment
[29] Without question, the charge of child sexual harassment is the most serious yet. It has not been seen since the days SD v We_are_all_Uno [2019] Crim 2. As this charge carries a mandatory minimum of a permanent ban, the defense requests the gravity of such be considered. The court cannot and will not do so; the sentence severity has no role in determinations of guilt.
[30] The evidence presented shows the accused saying “i wish [User C] would touch me … in a totally non sexual non intimate way befitting for 2 minors.” The prosecution argues that even with the disclaimer, this statement can be reasonably interpreted as sexual harassment toward a minor, that the intent and context meet the statutory elements, and that jokes of a sexual nature directed at a minor remain sexual in nature.
[31] The defense counters that the alleged victim is one of the two defense attorneys for this case, and that it was not unsolicited but rather part of an ongoing joke. No evidence was presented to support the latter.
[32] The assistance of the alleged victim is not dispositive. As the prosecution countered, post rationalization / obtaining consent after the fact would still constitute a violation.
- [32.1] The court inserts here that it would be problematic to uncritically accept this defense in cases of habitual abuse, such as in cases of domestic violence where it is not uncommon for battered victims to argue on behalf of their abusers.
[33] The court turns to the relevant statutory and law. Article 57 of the Criminal Code 2020 defines sexual harassment as:
§1. Whoever in an unsolicited manner sends or displays sexually explicit material to another person without consent, including through text, voice or other media, or acts in such a manner as to solicit or be interpreted by a reasonable person to be soliciting sexually explicit activities from another person without consent, commits the crime of sexual harassment.
When done to a user claiming to be a minor, it shall be considered as being done to a minor.
Sexually explicit
[34] The court takes notice that the definition of sexual harassment has slightly changed over time. The Criminal Code Cleanup Act changed the threshold from “sexually suggestive” to “sexually explicit”.
[35] SD v NotEmoJustDog [2025] Crim 1 uses the previous “sexually suggestive” standard, but [3] is notable in requiring that explicit acceptance is required to constitute consent. SD v Satitty [2025] Crim 91 [11-16] holds the oppositI: that the prosecution must affirmatively prove the lack of consent.
[36] As the first case litigated under the current statutory language, SD v Extraditz [2025] Crim 40 [12] defined sexually explicit as, “Content that the reasonable person would recognize as directly and unambiguously sexual.”
[37] Touching someone is suggestive, but not explicit, especially combined with the context and caveats sent by the accused. The accused is not guilty of child sexual harassment.
Closing
[38] The court again reminds the prosecution to consider the warnings and instructions from SD v Peppa [2025] Crim 86. Do more thorough investigation, gather higher quality evidence, and at least give lip service to each statutory requirement.
[39] There have now been multiple cases where the prosecution have caused excessive delays. The Department of Justice is encouraged to assign a secondary co-counsel to take over if/when the main prosecutor has other concerns arise.
[40] The accused is not guilty on all counts.