SD v tywearingatie 2025 Crim 104
SD v Tywearingatie [2025] Crim 104
| Date of judgment | 13th August 2025 |
| Judge | Judge Ivy Cactus |
| Charges |
|
| Verdict | Guilty of three counts of Vote Buying, not guilty of other charges |
| Sentence |
With the two (2) week ban served concurrently with the consecutive three (3) and five (5) week bans for a total of eight (8) weeks. |
| Applicable persuasive precedent |
|
JUDGMENT by Justice Ivy Cactus
Introduction
[1] The State of SimDemocracy is charging defendant Tywearingatie (herein “Tie”) with four (4) charges of Vote Buying under Article 41 of the Criminal Code, as well as a single count of Claiming Election Fraud under Article 38 of the Criminal Code, for a series of actions taken by the defendant over the course of five (5) days from the 8th to the 12th of July.
- [1.1] It should be noted that the state originally brought not a charge under Article 38, but instead under Article 13a, inchoate to Article 41 (Vote Buying Hoax). This will be discussed further in a later section.
[2] The state requested an eighteen (18) week ban, along with a ten (10) month ban from holding public office. These numbers changed several times throughout the proceedings and should be taken with a grain of salt.
[3] This case was pursued privately by citizen “Muggy”, with the permission of the Attorney General.
On the Charges and Motions to Dismiss
[4] At the beginning of pre-trial, directly following the presentation of charges, the defendant made a motion to dismiss 3 charges of Vote Buying and one charge of hoax vote buying for lack of evidence. This motion was further complicated by the fact that such motions to dismiss are positioned within the Courtroom Procedures Act as occurring before evidence is entered.
[5] In line with Writ of Habeas Corpus - Mythrows [2025] SDIC 4 and SD v Tracy Walker [2025] Crim 107, the court looked simply for probable cause that a crime occurred and that the defendant may be responsible for the crime.
[6] At this point in trial, it was not yet time for the prosecution to enter evidence, and as such, there was no evidence to support the charges that the defense moved to dismiss. The court, however, allowed the prosecution to preliminarily enter evidence to support probable cause (to be re-entered under closer scrutiny once the charges progressed into pre-trial proper). With this evidence on hand, the court was able to find probable cause for all three (3) of the Vote Buying charges under scrutiny.
[7] On the final charge, Hoax Vote Buying, the court found that there was a much more applicable charge under Article 38 of the Criminal Code, Claiming Election Fraud. The court, therefore, invoked Article 3, Section 3 of the Criminal Code to declare mistrial and allow the prosecution to refile under the more applicable charge. Once this was done, Article 3, Section 4 of the Criminal Code was used to recombine the charges into a single trial.
Evidentiary Motions
[8] The defense, during pre-trial, entered an affidavit by citizen fatoldchops, in which the witness described that they never received an offer to sell their vote to the defendant. The prosecution made a series of objections against it, centered around the fact that the affidavit was in conflict with the entered screenshots.
[9] The defense countered, and the court accepted, that objections such as Lack of Foundation and Lack of Context do not apply to a witness simply lying. It is the job of the court to weigh how much trust it puts into a witness and their testimony; just because something is entered into evidence does not mean the court needs to accept its conclusions in their entirety. The court, instead, invited the parties to call fatoldchops as a witness in trial proper so they could be further questioned.
[10] During trial, midway through the prosecution’s presentation of evidence, the defense made a motion to recess on the basis of new information. The court applied the same test that was established in SD v Notcommunist366, Creative, & Acool [2025] Crim 103 [6], meaning that "new" evidence can not simply be evidence that a party could reasonably be expected to have entered but did not do until midway through trial; whether it be because the evidence was inaccessible, had not yet occurred, or otherwise.
[11] The defense did not argue that they fulfilled this test, but instead made a plea to “justice.” The court disagrees, entering evidence in pre-trial is a tool used to uphold the Right to a Fair Hearing, not to prevent it. Therefore, the motion was overruled, and the defense was not allowed to enter the evidence in question.
- [11.1] It should be noted that had the defense argued that the evidence being found on a different server made it so the parties could not have been reasonably expected to have known of it, the court would have been rather likely to accept such an argument. The defense, though, did not do so and, because the court is not allowed to front its own arguments (Nighteye (Appellant) v LordDeadlyOwl (Respondent) [2020] SDSC 5), the court was unable to posit that the evidence passed the test given out in SD v Notcommunist366, Creative, & Acool [2025] Crim 103.
Expert Testimony, and Procedural Notes on the Hmquestionable Questioning
[12] The parties brought several witnesses, both expert and evidentiary, to support their cases. This testimony was perhaps not the most professionally conducted in SimDemocracy history, but some technical and procedural points may be worth consideration in future proceedings, and the court will therefore endeavor to isolate the worthwhile decisions here and explain them.
[13] Secretary of Voter Registration Hmquestionable was called to the stand to testify on his experience in the DVR and how sharing SUITs prejudices the electoral system. When he was questioned, though, the defense brought objections under “calling for a conclusion”, which forbids witnesses from answering questions that ask for their opinion rather than fact.
[14] This situation may seem straightforward, the law does forbid witnesses from answering questions of their opinion. This is complicated, though, by the fact that Hmquestionable was an “expert” witness. Expert witnesses are allowed to take the stand “[w]hen the Court finds it likely that assistance would be derived from an opinion on a point of specialized knowledge.” Expert witnesses are, clearly, supposed to testify on their opinions in court.
- [14.1] The court, later, allowed the prosecution to object to a question by the defense asking if the expert witness believed the actions to be criminal on the basis that the expert is incompetent to answer such a question. This restriction, that witnesses may only give their opinions on matters they are appropriately knowledgeable about, serves as a reasonable restriction on the ability of experts to answer questions of opinion. It should be noted that because competent courts, following a full and fair trial, are the only ones capable of deciding a person guilty, every witness would be incompetent to answer such a question.
[15] The court, reluctantly, interpreted this section to only make sense if expert witnesses are an exception to the general rule of calling for a conclusion, and therefore overruled the objection and allowed the witness to continue with their testimony. It would be ideal if the Senate remedied this conflict in the law more clearly.
[16] Later on in Hmquestionable’s testimony, the defense objected to a question because of its supposed ambiguity, meaning it was not “clear or precise enough for the witness to properly answer.” The prosecution voluntarily clarified, but the court was unlikely to accept the motion even if it had not been altered. Expert witnesses, as experts on their topic, are supposed to have a broad knowledge of their topic, and, therefore, the burden for a question being too ambiguous for them is much higher than for normal non-expert witnesses.
[17] It was also ruled, on the same question, that a question being broken into two parts, one broad one, and then further clarification on the exact nature of the question, does not constitute an out-of-order “compound” question. For a question to be “multiple questions asked together”, as is required for it to be compound, there needs to actually be multiple things being asked — a broad question and clarification does not rise to this level. Courts should be reluctant to throw out questions that could be remedied by turning a question mark into a comma.
Contempt of Court, and The Questioning of Birdish
[18] The next witness called was eye-witness (or should it be “screen-witness”) Birdish. This witness was severely disruptive; the court will endeavor to isolate useful procedural notes out of their testimony before diving into the contempt of court they were subject to.
[19] At one point during their testimony, it was noted by the witness that they did not actually remember the topic they were being questioned on and were instead doing investigative work to figure out what the answer was. The court directed them to stop doing so and instead answer as best as they could off their memory, and to simply say they do not recall if that was truly the case. It is not the duty of a witness to play detective; it is their duty to report their genuine belief on the questions asked of them.
[20] Later on, the witness was reminded that they were under oath (as all witnesses are as soon as they begin speaking in court, as outlined under Article 19§2(a) of the Criminal Code), to which they replied, “Oh shit really?” The court, given their ignorance, allowed them to retract previous false statements, which they proceeded to do.
[21] Due to the previously discussed event, as well as the repeated disruptive comments (speaking out of turn, insulting the judge, making sexual comments towards the judge, etc.), the defendant was found in contempt. A witness asserting themselves out of their mandate, making unrelated comments, and badgering the court prejudices the application of justice — lawyers talk in court, witnesses speak when spoken to. Any actions taken outside of that, especially disruptive or belligerent comments, constitute contempt of court.
[22] The court held a summary hearing for them to argue their case, in which they did not contest the charge but merely asked for mitigation on their sentence. Birdish argued that they were provoked by the unprofessional nature of both counsels, as well as the fact that they were not given a stern enough warning before being held in contempt. The court found the first point persuasive enough and sentenced the witness to a one-hour mute despite the content of their comments.
- [22.1] When looking at contempt charges in future scenarios, courts should carefully consider both the nature of the offense and the tone of the courtroom at the time that the statements under scrutiny were made.
Considerations on Vote Buying
[23] The extensive nature of this case leads to there being no real easy way to structure the presentation of facts and considerations. The court will choose to go over, first, the considerations necessary to reach a guilty verdict on a charge of Vote Buying under Article 41 of the Criminal Code. The court will then go over the facts of the case and elucidate how they apply to each given charge (as well as special considerations that only apply to any given charge).
[24] Vote Buying is described as “the act of offering goods and/or services to a citizen(s), including but not limited to tau, in exchange for a particular outcome in an election.” This breaks down into a simple list of three (3) things that are necessary for the prosecution to prove for the defendant to be found guilty of Vote Buying, which are: a) An offer is made, b) to exchange goods, services, or currency, c) for a certain effect on an election.
[25] There is some question as to why the article is written this way, such that it criminalizes not the actual action but the offer itself. For the purposes of this trial, it will be assumed that if a transaction happened where the transaction in b) and c) genuinely occurred, then there must have been, at least, an implicit offer for said exchange to happen.
[26] There is also some question as to what it means for someone to gain “a particular outcome in an election.” Indeed, even with an immense amount of rigging, it's impossible for someone to be 100% certain that an election will go the way they expect it to. The only reasonable way to interpret this, then, is that even one vote being bought prejudices the election in the way the buyer intends to. So, vote buying need not successfully sway the outcome of an election, but instead just allow the accused to sway it.
[27] It should be noted, as mentioned by the prosecution, that Vote Buying is a strict liability defense (see: Ad Hoc Advocates LLP, ex parte adeacentpear (Appellant) v State of Simdemocracy (Respondent) [2025] SDSC 15). That means that the defendant’s intentions, including jest, are not relevant to a finding of guilt.
On Freedom of Speech, the Charge of Vote Buying, and the Charge of Claiming Election Fraud
[28] There was some discussion throughout the trial that the Vote Buying charge may be unconstitutional because the “offer” is protected speech and unconvictable under Article 18§3 of the Constitution. The court, initially, denied this determination as ultra vires and outside of the scope of this court, looking towards SD v Dick_head68 [2019] Crim 8, where former Chief Justice Danyo writes, “my job is merely to apply the common law and precedent that has been bound on me. I do not have the authority to set, or advance the common law as a standard judge, but merely to interpret and clarify it.” Recent cases, such as SD v Mythrows [2025] Crim 51 and SD v g470_ [2025] Crim 113, among others, have found that such considerations actually are in bounds for the inferior courts. This court will, then, in line with the common persuasive precedent of this time (and to remove all doubt), endeavor to make a determination on this issue.
[29] Article 18§3 of the Constitution reads “No criminal conviction or impeachment shall be made purely on the basis of speech and the exercising of free speech, barring cases where the exercising of such free speech violates or attempts to violate the constitutional rights of other citizens.”
[30] The defense argues that buying votes does not prejudice the right to a free and fair election because it is simply an advanced form of campaigning, which always includes some level of offering something, such as a certain policy, in exchange for their vote. The prosecution counters that for an election to be “free and fair,” everybody must have an equal vote. They continue that buying a vote is not political persuasion, but individual and personal manipulation of the electoral system.
[31] This determination is rather easy. A free and fair election is one where everybody stands on an equal playing field, one where political views and candidates are able to sway the people, free of private manipulation for reasons unrelated to the election at hand. As it was put in In re Replacement of KingRed31 [2020] SDSC 21 “[f]ree and fair elections,..., are intended to reflect the will of the people,” not the will of the person who has the most tau, or is most able to use their wealth to privately manipulate the election. The mere act of offering is, of course, an attempt under Section 3.
[32] The considerations for Claiming Election Fraud are much more complicated, as it is far harder to see how the mere act of claiming something prejudices the right to a free and fair election. The court, though, still believes that it does. Our system is built around the ability of both the DVR and EC to isolate and effectively remove fraudulent votes (as discussed in more depth below). The mere act of having claimed to have illegally manipulated an election wastes their resources, and may even lead to legally casted votes being struck (indeed, this very same concept may apply to Article 41, as well). Remember, it is not necessary for a right to have actually been violated, but for an attempt at such to have occurred. So even if the claim does not, actually, result in a negative effect on the election, the standard under Section 3 is met.
[33] It should be noted, of course, that free speech, as a qualified right, needs to have its violations weighed against the extent of the infringement. It is marginal, indeed, whether offers to buy votes are even protected under the precedent written in In re Restraining Order Act [2019] SDSC 1. With this being the case (due to the limited expressive value), it is more reasonable for restrictions such as criminal punishment to be placed in order to protect another aspect of Freedom of Expression, the right to free and fair election. If, say, all offers of any kind were criminalized in order to prevent this situation, that would certainly be an undue burden and be unconstitutional.
[34] Every charge will, then, be allowed to continue to specific considerations.
Summary of General Facts
[35] First, it is necessary to go over some background information that applies to every charge under consideration, lest the court repeat itself at the beginning of every new charge.
[36] The most compelling source for this “general” information was expert witness and Secretary of Voter Registration Hmquestionable. Notable procedure from his testimony was discussed above; this section will instead detail the important contents of his testimony, specifically on the nature of our electoral system.
[37] The witness began by describing the “SUIT” (This supposedly stands for “SimDemocracy Identification Token”, one may think, “wait, isn’t that SDIT?” The court is similarly confused, and attempts to hold faith in the Secretary and their expertise regardless) which is the allegedly sold item at the center of this trial. They explain that it is a tool that is used to “verify and protect” voters' identities, allowing elections to occur while respecting the privacy of every voter.
- [37.1] This definition is supported by the Voter Registration Act 2024 (which will inform one that SUIT, indeed, stands for “SimDemocracy Unique Identification Token”).
[38] The witness goes on to explain that obtaining someone else’s SUIT allows one to vote in their stead, and that the DVR and EC have methods for making sure that if the same SUIT is used twice in a single election, only the actual owner of the SUIT’s vote is able to go through. This method, as they describe it, relies not only on the original owner of the SUIT owning, but also responding in the time between the election ending and the results being tabulated.
[39] This paints a pretty clear picture; obtaining someone else's SUIT, while certainly not a fool-proof or absolute method, does have the result of allowing someone to vote in place of another (especially if the person whose SUIT they are buying is relatively inactive, or does not plan on voting in any given election).
[40] This means, then, that buying a SUIT would meet the standard for aspect c), because, as discussed in [26], it allows the user to manipulate an election as they see fit (even if it does not let them singlehandedly decide the outcome of an election in its entirety). Whether this action is 100% successful (including the possibility that the vote seller may later change their mind) is immaterial in securing a conviction under Article 41.
Considerations
On the First Charge of Vote Buying
[41] The court will endeavor to review the evidence related to the first charge and argumentation therein before explaining how said facts apply to the considerations outlined above.
[42] For this charge, the prosecution brings a screenshot of the defendant posting “I will pay you 50 tau (while supplies last) to vote for the Supreme Court Expansion Amendment next election. You'll be paid out if it passes. First come first serve!” in a public announcement channel.
[43] The defense does not truly counter this, instead relying on free speech arguments that were dismissed above.
[44] As the defense does not contest the facts of this matter, and their application to the charge, and because inferior courts are purely adversarial (see: Nighteye (Appellant) v LordDeadlyOwl (Respondent) [2020] SDSC 5), the court has no choice but to find the defendant guilty on this count.
On the Second Charge of Vote Buying
[45] This charge is significantly more complex and contested than the first. The court will, again, attempt to adequately summarize the facts, arguments, and considerations here.
[46] The prosecution alleges that the defendant offered user “fatoldchops” 100 tau in exchange for submitting a vote for a specific candidate. They support this by showing the defendant transferring 100 tau to said user, the defendant stating “should be the second person”, and the user then replying “transaction complete” with a screenshot of them having voted a specific way in the election.
[47] The defense counters that the prosecution can not prove that they are the one who made the offer, with it instead being possible (and indeed, correct, as they claim) that fatoldchops reached out to the defendant and offered to vote a certain way in exchange for tau, flipping the causal relationship on its head.
[48] User fatoldchops was called to the stand by the prosecution so that they could be further questioned on their conversation with the defendant. During this questioning, the user stated “Yes he did” when asked if the defendant “offer[ed] you compensation in return for voting a certain way.” They also stated they were completely sure that they had remembered correctly. During cross-examination, though, the witness went back on this and stated simply “No.” in response to the same question.
[49] This contradiction, certainly, throws the witness's credibility into question. They made two directly contradictory statements, the first of which was detailed and against their best interests and the second of which was short and protected their interests (given that a guilty conviction for the defendant would very much implicate them, at least prima facie). The defense frames this as them answering differently between a question that asks for their “interpretation” versus one that asks if they recall an “explicit” offer. The defense also posits that such contradictions may completely invalidate the witness’ testimony, which the prosecution does not contest.
[50] So, how do these facts apply to Article 41 and the considerations outlined above?
[51] b) and c) are easy to prove: there was certainly tau exchanged for user fatoldchops voting a certain way in the election (specifically, 100 tau in exchange for voting for Zepz). These facts are not even, really, contested by the defendant.
[52] This leaves us with the consideration under a), whether an offer was made by the defendant for said transaction to occur. In [25], the court outlined that b) and c) being fulfilled constituted, at least, an “implicit” offer. The court would like to, though, expand on this in terms of this specific charge, wherein the defendant supposes that user fatoldchops actually reached out to them, offering not to exchange tau for a vote, but a vote for tau.
[53] This incredibly strict interpretation posits that one can unilaterally “offer” something. The court, though, takes judicial notice of the word “offer” as it is allowed to do under Article 13§5(g) of the Courtroom Procedures Act. Now, there are several meanings of the word “offer”: the one that the court believes best aligns with Article 41, as taken from Merriam-Webster, is “to declare one's readiness or willingness.” So, it may very well be true that the witness declared their willingness to exchange their vote for tau, but for the transaction to have actually occurred, the defendant must have, in turn, offered their tau in exchange for a vote. Indeed, any transaction, no matter who initiated it, relies on both sides offering something they have for something the other does. This means that, as explained in [25], condition a) was met.
- [53.1] Within this discussion, there was some talk of the Commerce Actualizations Act, which gives a definition of “offerer” and “offeree”. This law was repealed, which should indicate why taking the definitions of common English words from other laws (especially ones passed after the legislation in question was written) is generally ill-advised.
- [53.2] This is reflected in the testimony of fatoldchops, as portrayed by the defense. The normal English use of offer, and the one people expect, is not so strict as to who the offeree and offerer are in every scenario. It is certainly the case that one need not actually walk up and say “I AM OFFERING TO COMMIT VOTE BUYING RIGHT NOW” for said offer to have been made, although the extremely egregious example of the first charge may falsely lead readers to believe such to be the case.
- [53.3] To really hammer the point home, the witness states, after their two other statements, that he had made an offer to Zepz to vote for him for 100 tau, and when Zepz did not do so, Tie stepped in and said he’d do it. Even if you’re skeptical that there was an implicit offer, there was even, in this specific case, an explicit offer (if you take the witness's ever-shifting word as holding weight).
[54] The prosecution proved all aspects of the crime of Vote Buying, and the defense is, therefore, found guilty of the second charge.
On the Third Charge of Vote Buying
[55] It is time, then, to dive directly into, mayhaps, the most contested charge: Violation 3. Wherein the state alleges that the defendant made an even more “implicit” offer to buy the same person, fatoldchops’, SUIT. The defense, initially, did not offer a defense — before mounting an increasingly strong one as the trial progressed.
[56] For this, the prosecution presents a screenshot of user “fatoldchops” stating they “got a new SUIT”, to which Tie replies “What is it?” before pinging the accomplice and stating “200 tau” in reply to the Secretary of Voter Registration stating “DO NOT TELL HIM WHAT YOUR SUIT IS”. They argue that this is a clear offer to buy the SUIT, even if said offer went unspoken.
[57] The defense counters that they could have simply been giving tau to their friend in a jokey way to make it seem like the offer was made. They bring forth an affidavit by the accomplice in which they state that no such offer was made in order to support their argument.
[58] During the witness testimony, this user, again, denies that an offer was made and instead states that they believe the defendant to have simply been making a joke and that the offer was not genuinely made. For the prosecution, the witness stated, “Well technically I was aware of you trying to buy my suit.”
[59] To start with the easiest consideration, b), tau was certainly exchanged between the two parties — neither party contests that this is the case, and it is demonstrated clear as day in the evidence.
[60] Now, the biggest point of contention is whether said transaction was made in exchange for tau (consideration c). The defense posits that there is no way to say that the transaction couldn’t have simply been a friendly donation from one friend to another. The context of the conversation, though, directly goes against this. The defendant asked the accomplice for their suit, and then offered (and indeed sent) 200 tau in response to someone telling the accomplice not to share their SUIT. There is no reasonable way to view this transaction as not concerning SUITs: it would be nonsensical to completely remove the exchange from its context and then say it could’ve been for anything. It should be noted, of course, that although the witness stated “I was aware of you trying to buy my suit,” there is no real way to say that it was not central to the exchange. Whether the SUIT actually changed hands and was used is completely immaterial.
[61] So, then, the question becomes a), whether an offer was made. The court looks at the fact that this is not the first time that such an exchange has occurred between the two parties, and that it is clear that the witness was at least aware of the joke that the defendant was making. What matters for an offer is not that a third party may be immediately clear what's happening, but that both parties understand. Someone with knowledge of the history between the two, as the court as well as both parties are, would have no doubt about whether Tie’s statement of “200 tau” in reply to “do not tell him your suit” constitutes an offer to exchange said tau for said SUIT. As noted in [27], Vote Buying is, for better or for worse, a strict liability defense. It does not matter whether the defendant was joking, as making the offer was, in and of itself, a violation of Article 41.
[62] All considerations are thus met, and the defendant is, therefore, found guilty on the third charge of Vote Buying.
On the Fourth Charge of Vote Buying
[63] Thankfully, we now wade out of the tar pit of confusion and anguish that is fatoldchops and enter the land of sunshine and lollipops known as “Birdish”, the alleged offeree for the fourth charge, who the prosecution alleges was offered 100 tau in exchange for voting 5/5 for Phobos Gaming.
[64] To this end, the prosecution presents the defendant stating, “@Birdish Will pay you 100 tau to vote Phobos Gaming 5/5 as well.”
[65] The defense argues necessity, stating that Phobos Gaming was the most “based” candidate in the election, and it was necessary for them to win. They also argue that they and Birdish are the same person and, therefore, it is nonsensical to charge them with Vote Buying for offering themselves tau.
- [65.1] These arguments are interesting, to say the least. It is no wonder that the court took a moment to offer an insanity plea to the defense at the time that said arguments were made.
[66] The witness underwent extensive testimony, which, for reasons made clear in [20], the court will be disregarding, something that is not truly contested by either party.
[67] The defense, in their closing statements, pivots and argues that they are not offering 100 tau to Birdish, but instead that Birdish will also pay 100 tau to whoever they so choose. To which the prosecution counters that the following statement, “you can send me 100 tau if you vote for Phonos [sic] gaming,” makes the intention clear.
[68] Considerations b) and c) are certainly met tau in exchange for a vote; no one is truly contesting this.
[69] Consideration a), though, is more complicated. As there is no evidence presented of an actual transaction occurring, [25] does not apply. What must be dissected, then, is whether the defendant made the offer. Now, no talk of implicit offers makes sense here, because there is no surrounding context or transaction that can, as previously stated, strengthen the argument for an implicit offer. What’s left, then, is the statement “@Birdish Will pay you 100 tau to vote Phobos Gaming 5/5 as well.” As the defense arguments, this could be read as an offer to Birdish, but it could also be read as a simple statement of fact that Birdish would also commit Vote Buying. The following message, which the prosecution pointed to in order to counter the possibility, is not an offer of vote buying but the opposite, paying the defendant in exchange for someone else voting a certain way. This is also not an offer of Vote Buying under Article 41.
[70] As such, the prosecution has not met its burden to prove a) beyond a reasonable doubt. It should be noted that it's possible the “as well” above constitutes an admission that they are also offering it, but the charge specifically brought was that the defendant was offering to buy, specifically, Birdish’s vote — which has not been proven.
[71] As the prosecution has failed to meet its burden under consideration a), the defendant is declared not guilty on the fourth charge of Vote Buying.
Considerations on Claiming Election Fraud
[72] With that, it is time to finally exit the world of Vote Buying and enter the world of Claiming Election Fraud, with a whole world of different considerations and argumentation to enter.
[73] Claiming Election Fraud is defined as “claiming to have committed election fraud in a manner and context that makes it unambiguously serious.” Election fraud is, in turn, defined as “unlawfully interfering in an election by the use of alternate accounts or other methods of producing illegitimate votes which are not cast legally by citizens of SimDemocracy, in order to influence election results.”
[74] So, the test for Claiming Election Fraud is quite straightforward: one must 1) claim to have committed election fraud in 2) an unambiguously serious way.
[75] This is straightforward; what is not, though, is whether claiming to have done Vote Buying falls under this article. The defense argues that it doesn’t, as a vote cast after it was bought is still legitimate and legally cast, even if the one who bought it violated the law. The prosecution posits that saying such on another server may imply getting a non-citizen to vote.
[76] The court believes that while buying votes is certainly illegal, nowhere is it made clear that selling votes is. There is no reason, at least prima facie, that someone who sold their vote itself should have their vote struck as being invalid. If what was sold was, say, a SUIT, then a vote cast with said SUIT would be illegitimate (as expanded on by the Secretary of Voter Registration during their testimony) and therefore count as “producing illegitimate votes,” and claiming to have done so would fall under Claiming Election Fraud.
[77] The court will, then, look towards whether the prosecution can prove specifically that the SUIT, not the vote, was bought for the purposes of 1).
On the Charge of Claiming Election Fraud
[78] With that out of the way, it's time to examine the actual allegations made by the prosecution and how said allegations apply to the considerations outlined above.
[79] The prosecution brings that the defendant stated, “I paid someone to vote Thyme so it evens out anyways.” The defense does not counter that this was unambiguously serious, but instead argues that votes cast by users who have sold it are, indeed, legitimate.
[80] The defense, to this end, brings screenshots and affidavits proving that they actually paid the person to vote after the fact. Which, while they may constitute Vote Buying, do not constitute Claiming Election Fraud.
[81] As neither side contests the unambiguousness of the claim, consideration 2) is fulfilled.
[82] What remains then is consideration 1). As the defense demonstrated, the vote that they very well could have been talking about was that of user StarlightValley. Said user sold not their SUIT, but their vote itself. As discussed in [76], if this is the correct turn of events, then the vote was not illegitimate, and it can not be considered Claiming Election Fraud. The prosecution, frankly, does not bring any compelling arguments as to why it was a SUIT and not a vote sold (or as to why said vote would not be legitimate).
[83] The prosecution, by leaving the possibility that the sold vote was still legitimate, has failed to prove 1) beyond a reasonable doubt.
[84] As one of the considerations was not met, the defendant is found not guilty on the charge of Claiming Election Fraud.
Summary
[85] The defendant is found guilty on the first charge of Vote Buying.
[86] The defendant is found guilty on the second charge of Vote Buying.
[87] The defendant is found guilty on the third charge of Vote Buying.
[88] The defendant is found not guilty on the fourth charge of Vote Buying.
[89] The defendant is found not guilty on the charge of Claiming Election Fraud.
General Sentencing Considerations
[90] For sentencing, the prosecution and defense brought a number of mitigating and aggravating factors. This section will attempt to describe those factors that the prosecution and defense applied not to any specific charge, but to any number of charges.
[91] For the prosecution, they bring more screenshots of the defendant engaging in similar behavior. This includes statements made in DMs prior to the actions tried herein, as well as those made for a bar vote. The defense counters that these actions can not be considered repeated because they happened before the tried actions, and are not a reflection on the defendant’s current attitude.
[92] On this, the court sides with the defense, actions that have not been tried and proved in a court of law to be illegal, especially for a charge like Vote Buying, which is rather complex and multi-faceted, can not be considered a sign of repeated actions. The only factor repetition will have in sentencing is the multiple charges that the defendant was convicted of.
Sentencing on the First Charge
[93] The prosecution asks for a two (2) week ban, as well as a one (1) month ban from holding public office for this charge.
[94] The defense presents the mitigating factor that there is no proof that the vote buying occurred. They also demonstrate that they were the ones to originally write the criminal complaint, demonstrating that they recognize what they did as illegal.
[95] The court does not find the first persuasive; whether the vote buying actually occurred is immaterial to the crime of Vote Buying, and there is no reason to identify it as a factor in sentencing (the social harm occurs upon the offer, not the actual sale). The latter, though, does demonstrate that the defendant was aware of their actions and identified them as illegal and wrong.
[96] The court, as such, finds with the prosecution's recommendation of a statutory minimum two (2) week ban. The court, though, can not find a connection between this charge and behavior in public office — it was the action of a private citizen and not a public official — and therefore declines to add a forbiddance from holding office to the sentence.
Sentencing on the Second Charge
[97] For the second charge, the prosecution recommends a four (4) week ban, as well as a two (2) month ban from holding public office.
[98] The defense provides the mitigating factor that they just played a role in a broader case of people offering other payment for votes, and to this end, provides extensive screenshots of conversations in VoD.
[99] The court does see it fit to take note of this, but given that repeated factor (this being the second time that such Vote Buying had occurred), it does not consider it to outweigh the aggravating factor of repeated violations. As such, the court applies a three (3) week ban and reiterates its point made in [96] about declining to ban the defendant from public office.
Sentencing on the Third Charge
[100] The prosecution recommends a five (5) week ban for this charge, as well as a three (3) month ban from holding public office.
[101] As a mitigating factor, the defense brings up a similar point as [95] — that being that no such exchange actually occurred.
[102] The court, as it did in the first charge, rejects this line of reasoning.
[103] The only factor, then, is the repetition of the offense. As this is the third charge, the court doubles the time added for aggravation on the second charge, and sentences the defendant to a five (5) week ban. The court, again, rejects a ban from holding public office.
Other Sentencing Notes
[104] As the second and third charges were a repetition of the same behavior, with the same accomplice, the court sees fit to run these two sentences consecutively.
[105] The first charge, though, occurred at about the same time, for a similar purpose, and with the same exact charge. As noted in Article 5 of the Sentencing Act, these factors allow for said sentences to run concurrently.
[106] Therefore, the first charge’s sentence will run concurrently to the combined consecutive sentences of the second and third charges.
Verdict
[107] The defendant is found guilty on three charges of Vote Buying, and sentenced to an eight (8) week ban from SimDemocracy and its associated territories.
Post Script
[108] Any and all decisions of law may be appealed to the Supreme Court of SimDemocracy.
[109] The court would like to thank both counsels (Muggy and Tie), as well as most of the witnesses, for making this an exciting and heavily contested trial. It is things like this that keep the fire and excitement in the SimDemocracy legal system.
[110] Simultaneously, their extremely zealous advocacy meant that there was extensive argumentation, and it was easy to gloss over certain things. The court sincerely apologizes if it neglected to address a topic, procedural or otherwise, which it stated it would during proceedings. Hopefully, readers are able to recognize that this verdict is long enough as is. The extent of the argumentation also led to a delay in the presentation of this verdict; the court thanks counsels for their understanding.
[111] The court would also like to extend special thanks to Senator Tech Support, Discord Supervisor Hackerman, and Deputy Speaker Hmquestionable who proofread and gave feedback on this verdict during its drafting.