SD v tywearingatie 2025 Crim 146
SD v tywearingatie [2025] Crim 146
| Dates of judgment | 28th November 2025 |
| Judge | Judge Ferris |
| Charges |
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| Verdict |
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| Sentence | Ban of 1 month for Destruction of National Documents and 3 months for Hate Speech, to be served concurrently |
| Applicable persuasive precedent |
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JUDGMENT by Judge Ferris
Summary of Facts
[1] The defendant posted an announcement containing the r slur.
[2] The defendant issued an Executive Order setting a 5 minute slowmode for 30 minutes on #general.
[3] Then speaker Stalin’s roles, Senator and Speaker of the Senate were removed and personnel and critical bots were removed from a server.
[4] Most if not all Department of Justice employees were fired.
[5] An official channel in the Backup Server was renamed to Tieisgodfr.
Summary of Arguments
On Abuse of Discretion
[6] The prosecution asserts that at the time the EO was issued, #general had conversation about the announcement that was released slightly after, the same one mentioned in [1] and that issuing the slowmode order would benefit them by slowing down the conversation regarding their conduct down and hindering the people’s ability to speak is in detriment of public interest.
[7] The defense simply points to the lack of evidence proving private interest of participating in the aforementioned conversations.
[8] The prosecution responds with a process of elimination to show that a conversation or equivalent situation plausibly occurred.
[9] The defense dismisses the prosecution’s arguments by calling them random speculation and that they may be right or not, there is still no evidence for the alleged reason
On Destruction of National Documents
[10] The prosecution alleges that by changing the name of a channel in the backup server, the defendant intentionally defaced and hence destroyed the national document, that being the channel in question.
[11] The defense cites the ruling in Notcommunist366 v SDIOA [2025] Civ 14 and the preamble of SECRET to argue that a discord server, such as the backup server are not documents.
On Misuse of Permissions
[12] The prosecution claims that the defendant removed personnel and bots from the DoJ server, including legally mandated SDIOA staff and essential bots. As well as stating that the social harm caused is the interference in SDIOA operations as well as the lack of critical bots hindering the SDBI’s ability.
[13] The defense challenged this charge on the basis that the prosecution failed to prove the mens rea factor and that they alleged that the roles and users were affected in the DoJ server without providing any evidence showing it as such.
[14] The prosecution once more uses a process of elimination, based on the belief that the SDBI bot was not kicked out of the SimDemocracy server and hence the screenshots must be from the DoJ server. As for intent, the prosecution adds that the intent is clear from the act, hinder the DoJ and that there is no reason why legally required personnel would need to be removed.
[15] The defense points to the adversial system and states that the prosecution must prove each and every element. They then rebuke the process of elimination used to find the server the actions took place in as the DoJ server by arguing that the prosecution has established an unproven constraint on the servers the bot may be in and the setup may exist in.
On Treason
[16] The prosecution alleges that the defendant, the then president (the court takes judicial notice of this fact under Art. 13 §5(g) of the CPA) firing practically all employees of the DoJ renders the state incapable of enforcing the law and when the then Senator Stalin (the court similarly takes judicial notice of this) opened impeachment proceedings, they were wrongfully arrested and when the public was talking about the defendant’s conduct, they instituted a slowmode and these actions were an attempt to overthrow the government and constitutional-democratic order of SimDemocracy.
[17] The defense points out that a mass firing does not satisfy [9] of SD v ppatpat [2025] Crim 48 and points out that the defendant was within their rights to do so under their constitutionally granted executive authority.
[18] The prosecution affirms that hindering law enforcement not being a substantial change in the fundamental structure of governance is a laughable argument and that the Court would be making a mockery of the term "Constitutional-democratic order" if the Defense's argument is to be taken seriously.
Notes on Other Charges
[19] The charges of misuse of permissions and wrongful arrest were both charged for timing out Speaker Stalin and the prosecution elected to drop the charge of misuse of permissions.
[20] The defense motioned to dismiss the charge of wrongful arrest on the grounds of a mute not serving as detention.
[21] The court ruled that for an action to be under the statute, it must be an arrest or detention. The alleged action does not satisfy the requirements for an arrest due to the lack of access to judicial channels and the constitution states mute and detention at several instances
[22] Citing In re Article 30 of the Civil Code 2025 [2025] SDCR 2 and the reasoning in SD v LegalEagle [2025] Crim 140, the court finds that regardless of the senate's alleged inability to read, it is not within the purview of this court to be able to interpret legislation in a way not in line with statutory language, unless it falls within the exceptions granted by In re Replacement of KingRed31 [2020] SDSC 21; Which this case does not.
- [22.1] Furthermore, equating detention to muting would be exactly what is prohibited under [30] of In re Article 30 of the Civil Code 2025 [2025] SDCR 2.
[23] And hence the charge was dismissed.
Considerations
On Abuse of Discretion
[24] The criminal code lays out several requirements for the charge: 1. Maliciously and inappropriately benefit personal or private interests using granted powers; 2. The action must be in detriment of public interest.
[25] Firstly, did the act benefit private interests ? If the prosecution’s arguments are to be taken as fact, then yes. However, arguments must be backed by evidence and the fact is that there is simply no evidence to show that the action benefitted anyone. Afterall, the prosecution must prove every element.
[26] The court agrees with the prosecution on the fact that setting a slowmode in #general is in detriment to public interest as it prevents people from conversing freely.
[27] The prosecution’s speculations to prove intent also fail due to the fact that there simply is no evidence. The court believes that a process of elimination is a completely viable method to prove an element but in cases where the options are known and limited. Which intent is not. The prosecution’s methods should have been applied before the filing of this case and during evidence collection, not when you need to prove something beyond a reasonable doubt.
On Destruction of National Documents
[28] Without a doubt, renaming a channel constitutes defacing a backup and as the prosecution cited previously, is a method of destruction as defined by the English dictionary.
[29] As for whether the server constitutes a document, the court agrees with the precedent cited by the defense, however finds that it does not apply to this case.
[30] Though a conversation inside a channel is not a document itself, the recorded version of it, stored inside a mechanism and isn't meant to be altered is definitionally a document. As well as the fact that it is mandated by the Backup Server Act 2025.
On Misuse of Permissions
[31] Reaffirming [27], the prosecution’s methods of elimination may be applied when the options are known and limited. However, the servers where the bot is present are not.
[32] Given that the prosecution has not shown whether jurisdiction exists and the legality of the presence of the bots and users and by proxy, their removal cannot be determined, the court shall not consider this further.
On Treason
[33] The court agrees with precedent on the fact that overthrowing a government would mean a substantial change in the fundamental structure of governance. In this case, the fundamental structure being the organisations and structures set forth by the constitution, such as the courts, executive and senate.
[34] Firing all of one’s own law enforcement employees, though ill-informed and morally dubious, cannot by any means constitute overthrowing a government. Though there was a substantial change, decisions on executive employment are within the purview of the president. And don't constitute a fundamental change by any metric. Since the DoJ as a whole isn't a fundamental part of SimDemocracy’s government, evidenced by its lack of presence in the constitution.
[35] The court affirms that the fundamental structures of SimDemocracy include the Senate, Executive by way of the President and the courts.
[36] Furthermore, rendering a department that is not included in the constitution, inoperable cannot by any sense of the word be considered overthrowing the constitutional democratic order of SimDemocracy. Especially when it isn't a part of the constitutional-democratic order.
[37] For something to be a part of the constitutional-democratic order of SimDemocracy, it would need to be an organisation whose creation was enshrined in the constitution or otherwise exists with close relation to the constitution. A sub-department of a department created under the Executive by the Senate is so far detached from the constitution that rendering it inoperable simply cannot satisfy the aforementioned criteria
Sentencing
On Destruction of National Documents
[38] The defense submits that the social harm and damage done to the backup server was extremely minimal and recommends a 1 day ban for rehabilitation.
[39] The prosecution submits that very few people had access to the server and only individuals within the Archives Commission and Level 4 Clearance had access and the defendant took advantage of his privileged position.
[40] In line with Article 3 of the Sentencing Act, the severity and social harm are minimal, however rehabilitative punishment does not make up the entirety of criminal sentencing. Seeing the need for general deterrence, I sentence the defendant to a ban of 1 month.
On Hate Speech
[41] The defendant pled guilty to 1 charge of hate speech.
[42] The prosecution presented the fact that the act in question was accompanied by an @everyone ping which caused it to be highly visible and going light on this crime would signal that as long as one is the president, they may get away with anything as aggravating factors.
[43] The defense argued that the defendant was in a bad mental state at the time and apologized after the fact, which the evidence shows to have been done via another person. Furthermore, the defense argues that it was used as an expression of anger rather than meant to insult a particular person. And the slur was buried in a long message which was tangentially related to the word.
[44] The defense’s submissions clearly satisfy Article 3 §1(a) and (b) of the Sentencing Act.
[45] The court unequivocally agrees that having one’s sensitive personal situation sent in a server of over a 1000 people would cause a reasonable person to lose self control. Furthermore, the message shows that the crime was directly caused due to the defendant having their personal situation released. Which falls squarely under provocation, defined in article 10 of the criminal code.
[46] The court agrees that an @everyone ping in the same message that contained the slur exponentially increases the social harm that comes with hate speech. Hence the court finds it prudent to consider it an aggravating factor.
[47] The court vehemently rejects the argument that the slur being but one word in the message serves as a mitigating factor. Considering the court has already applied the mitigating factor of provocation, the court cannot, in good conscience, take the singular usage of the slur at a time of personal crisis as a mitigating factor. The fact is that a single slur is still a slur and furthermore, it was one of the first words in the message, possibly creating more social harm.
[48] Though the defense alleges that the slur was not used to demean or humiliate others, the court reaffirms the arguments in SD v Mooklyn (Remanded) [2023] Crim 1, being the fact that though the usage of the slur is demanding and promotes hatred in and of itself.
[49] Having considered the mitigating and aggravating factors, the court believes that a 50% reduction in the sentence due to a guilty plea is quite excessive and this court finds that in SD v keepbloxburgsafe [2025] Crim 28 the court rightfully notes that a guilty plea shows the bare minimum of remorse. The defendant also sent an apology via another person which does show remorse. Even so, a 50% reduction is still excessive. The court finds that given the length and clear effort put into the message, as well as going through another person in active pursuit of posting an apology in addition to the guilty plea justifies a reduction of 1 month from the original sentence.
[50] Given the intentional social harm caused via a ping, serving as an aggravating factor, outweighs provocation as a mitigating factor.
[51] The defendant is sentenced to a ban for 3 months or 90 days.
Verdict
[52] I find the defendant guilty on the charge of Destruction of National Documents and not guilty on the charges of Treason, Abuse of Discretion and Misuse of Permissions.
[53] The defendant is sentenced to a ban of 1 month for Destruction of National Documents and 3 months for Hate Speech, to be served concurrently. Following the sentence they are currently serving.
Ancillary Hearing on Motion to Dismiss Counsel
Issued by Judge Ferris on 26th October 2025.
[A1] The prosecution motioned for dismissal of counsel, referring to hmquestionable (855688553001517066) due to them being the signing judge on the arrest warrant for the defendant.
[A2] The defense alleged that the Courtroom Procedures Act 2025 (CPA) stipulates certain requirements for a motion to substitute counsel to be ruled in favour of. Which the motion does not satisfy
[A3] The question before the court exists in three parts; 1. Is signing the arrest warrant and representing the defendant a conflict of interest ? 2. Does the defense’s counsel having a conflict of interest (CoI) violate the defendant’s rights ? 3. Does the court have the ability to replace counsel who were chosen by the defendant ?
[A4] To determine CoI, the court shall refer to article 16 of the code of professional conduct for counsel by the ICC which establishes that the counsel shall represent their client to the best of their abilities and any conflict of interest may be nullified by the full and informed agreement of the client.
- [A4.1] Though the judge was named in the criminal complaint which was served to the defendant in paragraph 17 that does not satisfy the full and informed agreement of the client. However, it is important to note that documents in SimDemocracy are far simpler than those that exist in real life and basic literacy does not require a lawyer to interpret. The court finds that the defendant reasonably being expected to know about the CoI and continuing to appoint them is sufficient. As long as the indication is not obfuscated, which a ~500 word paragraph does not satisfy by any measure.
- [A4.2] The court is able to front its own arguments in an ancillary hearing, seemingly disregarding Nighteye (Appellant) v LordDeadlyOwl (Respondent) 2020 SDSC 5 due to the black letter of the law which ancillary hearings stem from. Which states
“[...]§1.2. Should the Court decide to conduct an ancillary hearing, it may require each party to make submissions and decide on the question of law, before continuing with the proceeding.”
- Given the court may require submissions, emulating an adversial system, the court also may not, which necessitates judges to front their own arguments in their rulings. There is also an argument to be made based on that if submissions are mandated then the system will be adversial. But it begs the question, why would that be ? That interpretation adds complexity and assumptions which simply have no reason to exist and recognising them is twisting the law.
[A5] Regarding the potential violation of the defendant’s rights. The right to a fair hearing stands firmly on the fact that a defendant is entitled to legal counsel, not necessarily a competent or fair one (though that does not preclude an attorney from action by the ethics committee). There is no precedent in favour of this, however there is precedent of the contrary, as seen in SD v Moved [2025] Crim 122.
- [A5.1] The prosecution raises several concerns of the use of non-record judicial knowledge and adjacent materials which though they may have merit, judges have served in several other cases without issue.
- [A5.2] The prosecution also points to the appearance of impropriety stemming from the judge signing the warrant to later advocate for the acquittal of the defendant. Though it is strange, the judge fails to see how a reasonable person would even know who to identify as biased. The advocate is obviously “biased” in favour of their client and these events have no relation to the prosecution or me. And being unable to find anyone as biased is not bias at all but in this case just strangeness.
[A6] Finally, the prosecution has argued in favour of a motion to substitute counsel over the original motion to dismiss counsel but requested a motion to dismiss counsel. But since the motion to dismiss counsel is what was raised, the court shall rule on that and the motion to substitute counsel as mentioned in the prosecution’s submission
- [A6.1] On the motion to dismiss counsel; article 5 §2 of the CPA states that the judge may accept other motions which are described and allowed by law. A motion to dismiss counsel is not described by law and the prosecution has not argued the contrary.
- [A6.2] On the motion to substitute counsel; the prosecution is raising this motion pursuant to article 5 §1(a). Subsection 1 is regarding the judge and subsection 3 is regarding the prosecution. Leading this motion to only stem from subsection 2. Subsection 2 begins with the defense substituting their own counsel, which this is not. Since the trial is in absentia, the CPA gives us a two fold test on substituting counsel (a) is there sufficient reason to do so ? (b) Is the counsel provided by the state. Evidently, (b) fails and (a) fails due to aforementioned reasoning.
[A7] The court DENIES this motion.