Writ of Habeas Corpus - Mythrows 2026 SDIC 2
Writ of Habeas Corpus - Mythrows [2026] SDIC 2
| Date of judgment | 13th April 2026 |
| Judge | Judge Benbookworm |
| Writ | Habeas Corpus |
| Verdict | Denied |
| Result | |
| Applicable persuasive precedent |
|
JUDGEMENT by Judge Benbookworm
Introduction
[1] Mythrows was arrested for probable cause of first degree harassment. The warrant was requested by the Deputy Attorney General (DAG) and issued by myself. The petitioner raised the issue that the requesting DAG did not lawfully qualify as a 'police officer', and thus a writ of habeas corpus ought to be granted.
Considerations
[2] To support their position, the petitioner quoted the Criminal Procedure Code 2025, (also CPC), A8b §1, "A police officer may request an arrest warrant from a Judge, which shall be granted...",<ref name="Arr w warrant">Criminal Procedure Code 2025 A8b §1</ref> and that the DAG did not meet the definition under the CPC A2 §1.2, "A 'police officer' is any person designated by the SDBI Director as a police officer, or who is employed to serve as an officer of the SDBI, or who is a law enforcement officer."<ref name="int"></ref>
[3] This means that a person requesting an arrest warrant (using the CPC A2 and A8b) must be one or more of the following:
- 1. Designated by the SDBI Director as a police officer
- 2. Employed to serve as an officer of the SDBI
- 3. Is a law enforcement officer
[4] As the DAG was given the SDBI role after the warrant (and not by the SDBI Director), the petitioner is correct that the first condition was not met at the time of the application for an arrest warrant.
[5] The second condition indicates that more than just the SDBI Director can hire someone to the SDBI. This coincides with Article 7 of the Constitution, which allows members of the executive to issue orders and delegate powers.<ref>Constitution A7</ref> Thus, someone may potentially be employed by the SDBI by anyone with authority higher authority than the Director or anyone with power delegated by the Director. The Attorney General has delegated much of their power to their Deputy, and is certainly a higher authority than the Director. However, it is unclear whether the DAG had acted on this authority prior to the arrest warrant.
[6] Thus, the court turns to the third available definition of police officer: a law enforcement officer. The petitioner argues that In re Penalties and Tickets Act [2025] SDSC 17, (also In re PTA), limits the definition of law enforcement officer to SDBI officers.
- [6.1] However the Supreme Court (presumably the petitioner is referencing [15]) was defining what may count as a competent authority in various contexts.<ref name="PTA"></ref> As the SDBI is defined in statutory not consitutional law, it is clear that the Supreme Court was interpreting statutory language, which the legislature can redefine. Indeed, the CPC was passed after the issuance of In re PTA, and its definitions would thus eclipse it.
[7] The court is bound by In re Article 30 of the Civil Code 2025 [2025] SDCR 2 and canons of statutory interpretation.<ref>In re Article 30 of the Civil Code 2025 [2025] SDCR 2. See in particular [30.2].</ref> In asking the court to interpret 'law enforcement officer' to solely include SDBI officers would be to render the third definition under the CPC A8b as surplusage.
[8] Black's Law Dictionary, 5th pocket edition, includes the following definition of 'law enforcement' (emphasis added), "Police officers and other members of the executive branch of government charged with carrying out and enforcing the criminal law."<ref>Law Enforcement Definition, Black’s Pocket Edition (5th ed. 2016)</ref>
[9] It is manifest that the Deputy Attorney General is a member of the executive tasked with enforcing criminal law, and thus meets the third definition of "police officer" under the CPC.
Verdict
[10] The arrest warrant was lawfully requested, and the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied.