In re EO 154-01 2025 SDCR 24
In re EO 154-01 [2025] SDCR 24
| Date of judgment | 21 November 2025 |
| Judges |
|
| Held | The challenged provision of the executive order is constitutional only when it is meaningless, and unconstitutional whenever it has operative effect. |
| Applicable precedent |
|
MAJORITY OPINION by Judge ppatpat
(with Judge brandmal and Ferris agreeing)
Introduction
[1] This is a petition brought by Lucas (“the Petitioner”) seeking judicial review of Executive Order 154-01 Department of the Interior (“EO 154-01”). The Petitioner challenges §3.1 of the Order as exceeding the President’s executive authority and therefore being unconstitutional, unlawful, and of no effect.
[2] The petition is framed narrowly. It identifies EO 154-01 §3.1 as granting the “Governor-General” authority “to develop interim or permanent governments in colonial regions when they lack governments” and contends that this power intrudes on the constitutional role of the Senate and of colonial charters under Article 14 of the Constitution.
[3] The Petitioner notes that the following colonies are governed by charters or Acts passed by the Senate: Clash of Clans, NationStates, Minecraft, and the Bicamel Republic. In each case, the Senate has legislated a charter framework pursuant to Article 14. The Petitioner argues that even if the governments of these colonies fall vacant, replacement must occur through charter mechanisms, not by unilateral executive creation of new governments.
[4] Petitioner relies expressly on In re EO 143-04 [2025] SDSC 24, which held that an executive order exceeding the lawful authority granted to the Executive is unconstitutional and void.[24] He asks this Court to declare EO 154-01 §3.1 to be such an order and to strike it down.
[5] The State, through the then Attorney-General, accepts that this Court has jurisdiction to review EO 154-01, but submits that §3.1 is a valid exercise of executive authority. In summary, the State argues that:
- [5.1] EO 154-01 §3.1 is temporary and remedial, triggered only when “a region has no government”.
- [5.2] The Governor-General acts as an executive steward to preserve continuity and restore lawful local governance.
- [5.3] The Order is subordinate to charters and does not purport to revoke or override them.
- [5.4] Under In re EO 143-04, executive orders are lawful so long as they are “reasonably incidental to the administration of existing law”, and EO 154-01 satisfies that test.
[6] The Petitioner, in rebuttal, disputes that characterization. He maintains that the text of §3.1 empowers the Executive to create governments in autonomous colonial territories—whether labelled “interim” or “permanent”—and that temporary violations are still violations; no constitutional principle of “continuity” can justify executive legislation for autonomous colonies.
Considerations
[7] The challenged provision reads “If a region has no government then the Governor-General, with Presidential approval, may establish an interim government, develop a permanent local government, and maintain control until stability and local governance is restored.”. The key phrase in §3.1 is its condition: “If a region has no government…”.
[8] Since the Executive Order earlier said that it could apply to any regions designated by the President, we shall analyse all the possible regions in SimDem they can apply to.
[9] Article 12 of the Constitution defines a “territory” as “a platform where members of SimDemocracy communicate or interact with each other in an organized way.”
[10] Article 13 of the Constitution defines core territories as territories “that have their democratic-continuity guaranteed by constitutionally defined Supervisors.” All provisions of the Constitution apply “in full capacity” in core territories.
[11] In core territories the Constitution never allows a situation where there is no government at all. The Constitution applies fully. Therefore, for core territories, the Executive Order is meaningless. Somebody, either the Supervisor, or the President in the absence of one, will always be the last line of governance.
[12] Next, Article 14 of the Constitution permits SimDemocracy to maintain “colonies” which are territories other than the core territories. Under §3, the Senate may grant colonies autonomy of governance, including the ability to create their own laws, police themselves, operate their own courts, and edit or nullify Senate statutes.
[13] For non-autonomous colonies that are under SimDem’s direct control, the Executive Order is meaningless. These territories are governed by the same institutions that govern the rest of SimDemocracy: the Senate as primary legislature, the President and Cabinet as primary executive, and the Courts as judicial branch.
[14] In an autonomous colony, the charter itself is the continuing legal act that constitutes the colonial government, by defining its structure and powers. There are two types of autonomous colonies. Firstly, autonomous colonies which depend on SimDem for execution of laws. The arguments in [13] of this opinion apply squarely to them. The second type are autonomous colonies who are self responsible for the execution of laws.
[15] For autonomous colonies who are self responsible for execution of laws, the question becomes more complicated.
[16] The power to create or fundamentally alter an autonomous colony’s structure of government resides jointly in the colony itself (through its membership), and the Senate (through charter approval and the entrenched power of revocation by two-thirds majority). Nowhere does Article 14 of the Constitution give the President or any executive official authority to design or redesign colonial structures of government.
[17] The Executive does hold “primary authority over the organization and management of the core territories,” but that clause is expressly confined to core territories. There is no matching provision granting the President primary authority over the organization and management of colonial governments. Where the Constitution wished to give the President special powers to preserve stability in specific territorial contexts—such as emergency powers “in relation to the core territories” in Article 32—it said so explicitly. Designing colonial governments is therefore not an “operation or function of the executive branch” in the sense used in In re EO 143-04. It is an Article 14 function belonging to charters and the Senate.
[18] In In re War and Peace Act, the Supreme Court held that the Senate may not unilaterally “take initiative” in foreign affairs—such as by declaring war on its own—because that would be “cannibalizing the President’s constitutional authority.”[29]–[30] The Senate may legislate checks, but cannot itself become the actor conducting foreign affairs. The same principle applies in reverse. Article 14 gives the Senate and colonial members a constitutional role in establishing and entrenching colonial governmental structures. If the Executive uses an order to “establish an interim government” and “develop a permanent local government” in an autonomous colony, it is taking initiative in a field the Constitution assigns elsewhere—namely, to charters approved by the Senate and colony.
[19] Therefore, for autonomous colonies who are self responsible for execution of laws, EO 154-01 §3.1 amounts to the Executive cannibalizing the charter/Senate function under Article 14, just as surely as the Senate would cannibalize the President’s foreign affairs power if it purported to declare war on its own initiative.
[16] For the above reasons, for Core Territories, non-autonomous colonies, and for autonomous colonies who are not self-responsible for executing laws, the Court finds that it is not possible for them to have no government while SimDemocracy itself continues to function as a constitutional state. For autonomous colonies who are self responsible for execution of laws, EO 154-01 §3.1 is a direct act of cannibalization in unilaterally amending the Charter by changing the governance structure of a colony, even in an emergency. Unless a Charter makes clear the Executive of SimDemocracy is to intervene in an emergency, they may not.
[17] It may be tempting to suggest that §3.1 is meant to address the hypothetical scenario where SimDemocracy as a whole collapses—no President, no Senate, no Courts, no Supervisors. But if the SimDem state itself has failed, then there is no President to give “Presidential approval,” no functioning executive chain of command, and no meaningful “Governor-General” office. In that scenario, §3.1 cannot operate at all: the very actors it relies on no longer exist.
Verdict
[18] For the reasons above, the court now holds that where Executive Order 154-01 §3.1 is constitutional it is meaningless, and that where it has meaning, it is unconstitutional.
CONCURRING OPINION by Judge ppatpat
[A1] I write separately to address three major issues. Firstly, the fact that this court, and the Supreme Court have been persistently receiving meritless arguments from either the respondents, or the appellant/petitioners of cases recently. Secondly, the fact that interpretation is continually under attack, not just by advocates, but also from within the judiciary. Thirdly, the mess that is colonies and how laws interact with them.
On appellate advocacy and the judiciary
[A2] When conducting an appellate case, you’re really trying to engage in a conversation with the Judges/Justices. You probably know the case better than us (at least, you should). The vast majority of our time should be spent on deciding which arguments hold stronger weight, and for what reasons.
[A3] Unfortunately, there has been a consistent pattern of appellant advocates often making things up, to the point where even us, the Judges ourselves, cannot follow their train of thought. The judiciary interprets the law. We are anchored in the text given, that is the fundamental check on our branch. When making any legal claim before us it is paramount to always draw connection to the source of the legal claim, specifically, what text you are drawing authority from.
[A4] We depend on the parties to frame the issues candidly and with precision. That cooperation is undermined when arguments are offered with no grounding in text, precedent, or even coherent principle. The law does not advance, and the parties are not well served, when a submission bears more resemblance to “Random Bullshit Go!!!” than to legal reasoning.
- [A4.1] The discipline that the law imposes is what gives advocacy meaning. When counsel begins from the text, they participate in a common conversation that transcends the immediate controversy. The opposite approach, starting with a desired outcome and then scavenging for words to justify it, erodes the very legitimacy of judicial review.
[A5] Additionally, stop giving policy arguments in a court of law. Telling me an unconstitutional action is “temporary and remedial” does nothing to alleviate it of its unconstitutionality, especially when the allegation that the action is “temporary and remedial” is not based in any of its text.
[A6] We understand your duty to advocate zealously for your client. At the same time, argue dispassionately to avoid seeming like a lunatic. Have some common sense.
[A7] If something is legitimately indefensible, I fail to see how anyone can claim you breached your duty to advocate zealously. If a statutory law passed to place our population into slavery, I don’t think the Attorney General waiving response or saying “This is unconstitutional and we agree with the petitioner” is a failure on their part.
[A8] Every right has to be wielded responsibly. The right to petition for redress of grievances, and the right for judicial review do not convey a general right for lunacy to be entertained, or legitimised in the courts.
[A9] Additionally, one would hope that the Executive would consult their chief legal advisor (the Attorney General) before taking actions that are legally questionable. If you’re not gonna be the one who defends your actions in court, at least ask the one who will be whether they think it's defendable.
[A10] To a lesser extent, such should also be considered by Senators. Consult somebody as to the constitutionality of legislation, if you are not yourself a bar member. At the very least, it should not be prima facie unconstitutional.
[A11] During deliberations for this case and throughout the last few months, I have found myself increasingly concerned with the positions my colleagues, and new incoming members of the judiciary seem to take with regard to analysis.
[A12] Text seems to be less of an anchor, and more of a suggestion for some of us. I reject such a view. Quit legislating from the bench. Perverting statutes to fit your worldview brings disdain upon our branch.
- [A12.1] Proper interpretation is more like tending to a tree than wandering a forest. Think of it like a bonsai plant. The text is the root system. It is fixed in a particular place, drawing nourishment from the soil of ratification, history, and structure. From those roots, real branches grow different, sometimes competing readings that still trace back, logically and honestly, to the same trunk. Judges may disagree about which branch best reflects the Constitution’s design, but they are at least climbing the same tree.
- [A12.2] When we depart from the text, we are no longer choosing among branches of one living tree. We are simply picking up whatever fallen sticks happen to suit our purposes. Those sticks may look like branches, and they may mimic the shape of interpretation. But they are disconnected from the roots. They carry none of the organic constraint that comes from being nourished by the actual words that were adopted, by the people and institutions that gave them force.
- [A12.3] A judge anchored in the text asks: “Which of these branches can I actually trace back down the trunk, into the roots of the enacted words?” A judge unmoored from the text asks a different question: “Which stick best fits the outcome I want?” Both may hold something that looks like law in their hands. Only one is still attached to the living constitutional order they swore to uphold.
- [A12.4] In the short term, that may feel empowering to judges inclined to “do justice” as they see it. In the long term, it hollows out the tree. A jurisprudence that no longer cares where its branches come from should not be surprised when the public ceases to believe the tree is alive at all.
[A13] Neither can text that grants us license to recognise and find implied rights and authority be construed to be a blank cheque. It should be wielded with care, and only as a last resort.
[A14] This is likely to be one of my last decisions on an appellate court. When taking on this role, I was prescient of the fact that I cannot remain on this Court forever, and when I did step down, that those to come would not necessarily share the same discretion in interpretation and analysis. I regret that such may be exactly the reality that has come to fruition, and it is one in which I fear greatly for the legitimacy of the judiciary.
On colonies
[A15] I’d like to start off this second part by saying I find the very point of colonies ludicrous. The entire colonial framework has made our constitutional order ten times more complicated for a community that, on many days, struggles to muster more than a handful of active participants.
[A16] The framework in which colonies exist isn't even followed by those who created it. SimDem’s infamous penal colony of the Bicamel Republic (BCR) was never declared a territory by the Senate, and as such, could never become a colony. You have to first become a territory before you become a colony, and no such vote was ever held.
[A17] Colonies make jurisdictional issues complicated as well. Colonies, especially troublesome ones like the BCR have nullified parts of our law, like the Criminal Code 2020. This raises several issues. If you are a person in the BCR only and not on SimDem’s core territory (say because of a ban), you satisfy the Criminal Code’s requirements for jurisdiction if someone commits a crime against you. However, given the fact that the BCR themselves nullified the Criminal Code, does this really hold true? Does the nullification of the Criminal Code in a colony only mean it is null and void only for the colony’s extent? Where does the colony’s extent end, and SimDem begin? Do DMs between a person only on BCR and a person only on SimDem mean the Criminal Code is in effect?
[A18] For things like the Minecraft Server which clearly occurs on a different platform, things are much easier. For things that are necessarily complicated due to territorial overlap like the BCR, you end up with this mess.
[A19] We have no one to blame but ourselves for this, when we allowed for and legitimised a penal colony for people who wandered into SimDemocracy in January, liked, followed and watched people commit crimes, and then followed them into exile when the bans came down.
[A20] And if my criticism seems particularly targeted at only the BCR, it is because of the fact it co-exists on the same platform as SimDem. This causes our laws to conflict more than cross platform colonies, such as the Minecraft Server.
[A21] Unfortunately, the very people who got us into this mess by creating colonies, autonomy and charters, are not here now to fix the mess they made. Neither are they here to try and explain how exactly things should work.
[A22] And perhaps I am being too harsh overall on the concept of colonies, when there are those that work perfectly well when used for their intended purpose. A penal colony is not one of those.
[A23] As a final note, SimDemocracy never fails to amaze. The Executive has managed to write an order which, whenever it can be read as constitutional, does nothing at all—and whenever it is read to do anything, cannot be constitutional. Perhaps a first, in any jurisdiction that I know of at least.
[A24] For the reasons above, I concur.
CONCURRING OPINION by Judge Ferris
[B1] Elaborating on my view on the majority opinion, the ability of the executive to engage in a colony requires careful consideration.
[B2] I find it prudent to refer to Black’s Law Dictionary on what a government means as it is based on a presidential system and American common law, a lot like SimDemocracy. Hence, a Government is defined as
“An organization through which a body of people exercises political authority; the machinery by which sovereign power is expressed.
In this sense, the term refers collectively to the political organs of a country regardless of their function or level, and regardless of the subject matter they deal with”.
[B3] When a government collapses or loses functional control over a region there are several stages it must go through before the challenged clause can take effect:
- [B3.1] When the government collapses, the provision in the charter, if any, shall come into effect. When the Senate grants a colony autonomy over governance, that logically includes the remedial action to be taken when dealing with a situation within the government. Additionally, when the charter grants a government, regardless of nature, statutory control and via said provision, grants them functional control over a colony; The government satisfies the definition in [B2].
- [B3.2] If the charter does not possess a provision as described in the previous paragraph; then power falls to the people. Since regardless of the executive authority possessed by the president, they cannot overrule the Senate on the matter of autonomy in a colony and especially not when the reason cited is a presumed duty which has no link to the statutes. Once more a group of people may exercise political authority in a more direct form and satisfy the definition. Though this government might be contradictory to the charter, it is still a legitimate government which has autonomy over the matters and lands granted to it by the Senate.
- [B3.3] In the possibility that somehow, the people are unable to form a government, then the executive may take action (not to be confused with using the challenged EO) using powers granted to them by the Constitution. Though the president holds primary executive authority over the core territories, and hence their power does not extend to colonies under Article 5§4. Article 14§3 clearly states that the Senate may grant colonies autonomy of governance. Which means that when the Senate has not granted them autonomy they are subservient to the executive. I say the executive, because it simply cannot be the judiciary since they wield judicial authority under Article 9§1 and the Senate holds legislative authority under Article 1§1. It goes without saying that the legislative and judicial body simply do not possess the authority to take executive actions in a colony. So a far less outlandish reading would be that the executive body holds executive authority over a colony until and unless the Senate applies checks and balances upon that power.
- [B3.4] Furthermore, under the principles of ex proprio regulam/Exception proves the rule. The Senate granting autonomy to a body, implies that else they would not be autonomous i.e. subservient to a higher authority. For the reasons stated above I believe that it would be the executive.
[B4] I also note that the powers described in [B3.3]-[B4.4] exist at all times.
[B5] For the reasons above, the executive has authority within a colony within the limits of the charter and the other checks established by the Senate. Which also means that if a colony has been given autonomy over a particular matter, the executive cannot interfere, regardless of the operational status of the government, unless the autonomy has been revoked.
[B6] Finally, if the executive possesses authority over a colony in any shape or form, then the challenged clause cannot come into effect, since though limited, there is still a government (this is the most likely situation due to the list in Article 14§3 is not exhaustive). If the colony has complete autonomy, then the executive still cannot use the challenged clause since that would be unconstitutionally taking control of an autonomous region.
[B7] For the reasons above, I agree with the majority. The EO is meaningless and unconstitutional if used.