In re TCAA 5 2026 SDCR 34
In re Article 5 of the Terrorist Connected Accounts Act [2026] SDCR 34
| Date of judgment | 29th March 2026 |
| Judges |
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| Held | TCAA Art. 5 is constitutional. |
| Applicable precedent |
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MAJORITY OPINION by Judge Mypenjustbroke
(With Judge Matt Cheney and Judge Zepz agreeing.)
Introduction
[1] This matter comes as a judicial review of Article 5 of the Terrorist Connected Accounts Act—hereinafter “TCAA.” Petitioner Lucas—hereinafter “Petitioner”—alleges that the aforementioned article violates citizens’ rights to liberty and security, as enumerated in Article 22 of the Constitution. Petitioner alleges that TCAA Art. 5 allows the President of SimDemocracy to unilaterally usurp the judiciary’s ability to interpret the law. Additionally, Petitioner contends that § 2.4.1 of Art. 22 is the only possible justification.
Examination of Statutes
[2] As we noted in [2026] SDCR 27, members of government are subject to Article 22 limits on their summary banning powers. See In re Writ of Habeas Corpus for Guava [2026] SDCR 27, [12]. The TCAA was drafted and passed completely separate from Article 22—even the amendment that placed § 2.4.1 within the article. That was the Protecting Our Online Peace Amendment. When two separate statutes are alleged to be in conflict, an adjudicative body must examine how those specific provisions interact with each other, especially in how the hierarchy of one affects the other.
[3] When examining both Article 22, § 2.4.1 and Article 5 of the TCAA, one thing becomes immediately clear: one of the provisions is part of the Constitution of SimDemocracy. Thus, we must treat the concerned TCAA article as a servant to Article 22, § 2.4.1.
[4] Article 5 provides the President of SimDemocracy may, “in a state of caution or emergency, ban accounts that have been citizens for under thirty (30) days for terrorist conspiracy, or any other crime described as terrorism under other acts for the duration of the state of the emergency, but shall only do so if it is an exceptional circumstance affecting public safety.” This article also provides for a trial in absentia for that banned citizen, as well as immediate and mandatory joinder for a potentially banned group.
[5] Petitioner contends that, while there cannot be any permissible infringement upon Article 22 rights, “the only due process allowed is the one laid out in the Constitution.” Perplexingly, though, we immediately see the due process that would allow for Article 5’s use in Article 22, § 2.4.1. Every remedial statute and governmental action, whether criminal or civil, must comply with Article 22’s due process rights and obligations. See [2026] SDCR 27, [12]; see also id. at [22]–[23]. Thus, when a conflict between Article 22 and a statute is alleged in a legal conflict, a court must identify the enforcement mechanism, its statutory basis, and whether the mechanism abided by Article 22’s mandate. If the action, its basis, or its mechanistic compliance fails such scrutiny, then it obviously must not stand.
[6] But for today, we see that Article 5 of the TCAA provides for due process that interlocks with the aforementioned Constitutional provision. Article 5 tells us who may enforce what specific action, and it also provides for post actio, in absentia due process. The fact that due process happens after an enforcement action is not just allowable; it is commonplace. Article 22 tells us how enforcement interacts with individual rights. “These provisions interlock. They do not conflict.” Id. at [22].
Verdict
[7] We hold that Article 5 of the Terrorist Connected Accounts Act is constitutional.