Notcommunist366 (Appellant) v Lucas (Respondent) 2026 SDCR 26
Notcommunist366 (Appellant) v Lucas (Respondent) [2026] SDCR 26
| Date of judgment | 16th March 2026 |
| Judge(s) |
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| Held |
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| Ruling | 2-0 |
| Applicable precedent |
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MAJORITY OPINION by Judge Mypenjustbroke
(With Chief Judge Brandmal and Judge Muggy agreeing)
Introduction and Factual Background
[1] Appellant Notcommunist366 (“Notcom” or “Appellant”) brings this appeal as to the Inferior Court’s decision for default judgment in favor of Respondent, Lucas. See Lucas v Notcommunist366 [2026] Civ 5, [2]. Appellant alleges that they responded within the applicable timeframe pursuant to the Courtroom Procedures Act 2025 Article 20, § 4. Appellant’s central objection is that this section states that “should either party fail to respond…” but has no mention of a time limit. They contend both that “there is no actual requirement to respond at any time” and that they did respond. Appeal, Notcommunist366 (Appellant) v. Lucas (Respondent) [2026] SDCR 26, ¶ 3 (Court of Review; February 22, 2026). As a remedy, Appellant requests remand for a retrial consistent with this opinion.
[2] Upon a one-fourth vote of this Court, the Court of Review heard this appeal en banc, with Court of Review Judge Tech Support recusing themself.
Issue Before This Court
[3] First, we are required to review whether the Inferior Court’s default against Appellant was justified. Next, we are tasked with the onus of deciding whether this default judgment is consistent with precedent, namely with Question of Law in Juliana v. Tech Support [2026] Civ 2 [2026] SDCR 18. To uncover this answer, we must decide whether the time limit in [2026] Civ 5 was allowable, which is founded upon the solidarity of the Courtroom Procedures Act 2025, Art. 20, § 4.
Standard of Review
[4] The Court of Review takes this appeal to decide whether the Inferior Court’s decision to execute a default judgment against Appellant was clearly erroneous, based upon the case’s preceding facts. In determining that answer, we review the question upon the time limit cited in [2026] Civ 5 de novo.
I. Discussion on the Time Limit of CPA Art. 20, § 4.
[5] The foundational question that we must ponder requires us to focus on Article 20, § 4 of the Courtroom Procedures Act 2025. This section, in relevant part, reads:
§4. Should either party fail to respond to the pre-trial, the case will automatically be found in favor of the party present. . . . §4.3. If the absent party had a reasonable excuse for their absence and could not reasonably give notice, this section shall not apply and the pre-trial shall be rescheduled.
Courtroom Procedures Act 2025, Art. 20, § 4, et seq. This section necessarily mandates the judiciary to perform a default judgment upon satisfaction of § 4’s failure to respond condition.
[6] It is also necessary for us to ascertain the facts in the record.
- [6.1] At 17:32 UTC on February 3, 2026, Judge Ferris began pre-trial proceedings for [2026] Civ 5. At 21:50 UTC that same day, Appellant said “I didnt even know copyright protections existed on simdem[,]” and “Ok ill get my attorney ig[.]” Trial Record, Lucas v. Notcom [2026] Civ 5 (Inferior Court, February 3, 2026).
- [6.2] No messages were sent afterwards until 13:25 UTC the next day, February 4, 2026, when Respondent notified the Inferior Court of his counsel’s identity. Id. (Inferior Court, February 4, 2026). Approximately one hour later, Judge Ferris asked Appellant whether she had any updates, and Appellant responded that she had no updates and requested an extension. See id. The next day, approximately twenty-seven hours later, Judge Ferris pinged Appellant, saying that “[i]t has been well over 48 h since the original order. You have until I wake up (10 h) to appoint counsel[.]” See id. (Inferior Court, February 5, 2026).
- [6.3] Approximately eleven and a half hours after this message, seeing no message from Appellant, Judge Ferris declared a pre-trial in absentia pursuant to Courtroom Procedures Act 2025 Art. 23, § 1.1. Id. Two minutes after this, Respondent’s counsel, Ben, reminded the court of Art. 20 § 4’s mandate. Id. Eight and a half hours later, on February 6, 2026, Judge Ferris made a default judgment against appellant through CPA Art. 20 § 4. Id. (Inferior Court, February 6, 2026).
I.A. On the timeframe of response
[7] Appellant contends that she did, indeed, respond to the Inferior Court within the appropriate timeframe. However, at law, our common law system has become confused as to what that timeframe is since our recent verdict in Question of Law in Juliana v. Tech Support [2026] Civ 2 [2026] SDCR 18, [16]–[17]. The foundation of this issue, then, relies upon what the timeframe of response is.
[8] Question of Law in Juliana v Tech Support [2026] Civ 2 [2026] SDCR 18 holds that imposing judicial sanctions as a result of non-compliance with court rules or time limits, specifically without leniency, is unconstitutional. See id. at [8], [15]. However, it also notes that CPA Art. 20, § 4, et seq., provides an opportunity for leniency. See id. at [13]. Thus, we must make a determination as to whether Judge Ferris provided appropriate leniency, since Appellant failed to meet the necessary timeline.
[9] Based upon the facts stated supra, we find that Appellant did not respond, as both the request for extension, if it counts as one, and the refusal to use a public defender, when taken together, were not satisfactory to culminate as a response. Even if the extension request were proper, Judge Ferris followed the standard 48 hours for response under his discretion. See supra, [6.2], sent. 2; see, e.g., Courtroom Procedures Act 2025 Art. 25 § 1. No matter what the parties may say, the statutory standard for inactivity is fixed in statute. What is not fixed is the factor of leniency. Therefore, to answer that, we recognize that, after the 48 hour time limit, Judge Ferris provided leniency with his additional time grant of ten hours—which turned out to be eleven and a half hours. See id. In turn, we conclude that leniency, as interpreted in the context of § 4, may be an extension of time past a standard deadline. Therefore, we find that Judge Ferris followed the appropriate timeline, and he provided appropriate leniency for failure to satisfy such a timeline.
I.B. On Appellant’s alleged response
[10] The second sub-issue within this discussion is one of fact. In essence, whether Appellant actually responded within the relevant and appropriate timeframe is disputed. Ordinarily, this Court defers to the trial court’s findings of fact and restricts its review to whether such findings are clearly erroneous. See, e.g., Appeal of the Decision to Dismiss with Prejudice in Ppatpat v. Electoral Comm’n [2025] Civ 39, [2026] SDCR 17, [6] (reviewing factual determinations for clear error “based upon the case’s preceding facts”). However, where the material facts are not in genuine dispute between the parties, the remaining question—whether those undisputed facts satisfy a statutory standard—is a mixed question of law and fact that this Court may resolve without remand.
[11] The Judiciary Act 2025, Art. 7, § 1, confers upon this Court “all the powers and duties of the Inferior Court,” including the power to make factual determinations where the record permits. That Act further provides that “[t]he Court may receive evidence if it deems it necessary to do so,” confirming that fact-finding is within our competence even if ordinarily exercised with restraint. Id. at Art. 7, § 2. Here, Appellant does not contest the timeline established by Judge Ferris, nor does she dispute Respondent’s showing that she interacted 323 times within the SimDemocracy server during the fifty-nine hours allotted for response. The only question is whether those undisputed facts, taken together, demonstrate that Appellant’s claimed inability to participate was genuine within the meaning of CPA Art. 20, § 4.3. This is the precise species of inquiry—applying a legal standard to an uncontested factual record—that appellate courts routinely resolve. Cf. ppatpat & brandmal, ex parte thesigmasquad' (Appellant) v. State of SimDemocracy (Respondent) [2025] SDSC 13, [21] (holding that misapplication of a legal test to facts is a question of law subject to appellate correction). Moreover, remand would serve no purpose when the record is complete and the operative facts are settled, as this Court held before that remand is inappropriate where “no amelioration is needed.” Appeal of the Decision to dismiss with prejudice in Ppatpat v. Electoral Comm’n [2025] Civ 39, [2026] SDCR 17, [23]. We therefore proceed to resolve this question on the existing record.
[12] Appellant contends that she did respond within the mandated timeframe. She also asserts that a default would contradict Nighteye (Appellant) v LordDeadlyOwl (Respondent) [2020] SDSC 5. Appellant is partially correct. She did respond to the Inferior Court. However, statute dictates that a response that does not comply with court instruction or participate in the current procedural step—excluding requests for extensions—is not a reply at all for purposes of time limits, defaults, and proceedings in absentia. See Courtroom Procedures Act 2025 Art. 25, § 1.1; see also Courtroom Procedures Act Art. 23, §§ 1.2, 2.4 (treating irrelevant responses as equivalent to non-participation). Appellant’s responses acknowledged the proceeding and requested an extension, but she never complied with the court’s instruction to appoint counsel—the operative procedural step—within either the standard or lenient timeframe. Additionally, when offered a public defender free of charge, she refused.
[13] As to Nighteye, we disagree with its specific application in this type of case. Nighteye considered leniency in circumstances where a party neither could have participated in a judicial proceeding nor could have given notice to the relevant court. See Nighteye, [2020] SDSC 5 at [9]. CPA Art. 20, § 4.3 mirrors this principle: default shall not apply where “the absent party had a reasonable excuse for their absence and could not reasonably give notice.” The critical distinction is between a voluntary and an involuntary failure to respond.
[14] The undisputed record resolves this distinction. Appellant argued that she could not have participated in the pre-trial because she was studying for a science test. See Appeal, Notcom (Appellant) v. Lucas (Respondent) [2026] SDCR 26 (Court of Review, February 26, 2026). However, Respondent demonstrated—and Appellant did not contest—that in the fifty-nine hours Judge Ferris allotted Appellant to respond, she interacted 323 times within the SimDemocracy server. See Respondent’s Answers, Notcom (Appellant) v. Lucas (Respondent) [2026] SDCR 26 (Court of Review, March 10, 2026). Interaction alone does not necessarily rebut a claim of inability to participate, just as thanking a user for a birthday wish does not necessarily mean that the inactive party can engage in complex legal analysis. However, 323 interactions across fifty-nine hours—an average of more than five per hour—is not the profile of a person who “could not reasonably give notice” or who lacked the capacity to respond to a court proceeding. Moreover, tests and events that regularly require preparation are typically and reasonably foreseeable; a party who knows such an obligation is coming has a duty to notify the court in advance, not after the deadline has passed.
[15] We find, on the undisputed record, that Appellant’s claimed excuse was pretextual. The volume and sustained nature of her server activity over the entire fifty-nine-hour period demonstrates that she was present on the platform and capable of engaging with the court but chose not to do so. Nighteye does not shield a party who voluntarily elects not to participate in a proceeding from the consequences of that choice. CPA Art. 20, § 4.3 requires both a “reasonable excuse” and that the party “could not reasonably give notice”—neither condition is met here. The Inferior Court’s decision to enter default judgment against Appellant was therefore not clearly erroneous.
Verdict
[17] The judgment of the Inferior Court in Lucas v Notcommunist366 [2026] Civ 5, is affirmed in whole.
Post-Script
[18] Judge Muggy agreed with this case before she was elected and accepted the position of Senator. We wish her well in her legislative journey.