Kaizen pro Guava (Appellant) v SD (Respondent) 2026 SDCR 23
Kaizen ex parte Guava (Appellant) v SD (Respondent) [2026] SDCR 23
| Date of judgment | 19th March 2026 |
| Judge(s) |
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| Held |
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| Ruling | 2-0 |
| Applicable precedent |
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MAJORITY OPINION by Judge Muggy
(with Judge Matty and Chief Judge Brandmal agreeing)
Introduction
[1] This case comes before the Court as (ex) SimDemocracy citizen Guava (633459687022657557) was banned pursuant to the Protecting Our Online Peace (herein “POOP”) Amendment. The stated reason is “doxxing”, which this Court will consider to be pursuant to Article 22 §2.4.1 (c) of the Constitution.
[2] As this appeal concerned sensitive information, it was heard in a private courtroom after a certain point where only necessary individuals were recognized and heard.
On the Motion to Dismiss and Jurisdictional Considerations
[3] Shortly after the appeal’s proceedings had commenced, the respondent sought to dismiss the case on the grounds that the appellant was requesting the overturning of the “act of certification” and not “the certificate” itself.
- [3.1] Further, the respondent argues that an action cannot be the same thing as its direct result, referring to how certifying a POOP ban and the resulting ban being carried out are legally distinct. Based on that, the respondent argues that the only reason that the act of certifying a ban would be unlawful would be due to the certifying individual not having the legal authority to certify, and because a judge certified the ban, that the appeal had no legal basis.
[4] The appellant did not directly respond to the respondent’s motion to dismiss, but did clarify in both argumentation and through statements to the Court that they were appealing the merits of the ban being certified, and that they apologize for any wording that may seem inconsistent.
- [4.1] As the appellant is not a bar certified attorney, and is still in their internship phase of the bar exam, this Court recognizes that legalese can oftentimes be confusing.
[5] On the distinctness of the “act of certifying” and “the certificate” itself, this Court finds that there does not seem to exist much logical or legal backing for the distinction to be made, as the line drawn between both actions is incredibly blurred, and isn’t exactly merited outside of semantics.
[6] As we have covered that the motion to dismiss does not offer enough legal backing as to rule in favor of it, the motion was denied. Now, the Court turns to whether or not it can hear the appeal of the ban at all, considering the fact that such jurisdiction has lied with the Supreme Court up until now.
[7] It is the opinion of this Court that the Court of Review has the necessary jurisdiction to hear appeals of POOP bans, considering the fact that Article 22, §3 of the Constitution states that “[a] person […] detained under due process […] for […] issues […] concerning the Terms of Service […] may appeal their arrest or detention to a competent court,” and as Article 3 §1 of the Judiciary Act 2025 gives the Court of Review appellate jurisdiction over the matters of the Inferior Court, it is a competent court under Article 22 §3.
MAJORITY OPINION by Chief Judge Brandmal
(with Judge Muggy and Judge Matty agreeing)
Procedural Matters
[8] Since many factual issues were unclear and no previous record existed, this Court saw it fit to collect substantive amounts of evidence through witnesses and subpoenas. While doing so, it respected the potential victims Right to not be doxxed again and did not make public any more personally identifying information.
[9] The Court also granted the following subpoena in a decision, which shall be made public now: Subpoena decision. It shall form part of this verdict and precedent.
[10] There were no great procedural hurdles for this Court to overcome in order to protect the potential victim however, as the accused was banned anyways.
On the second motion to dismiss
[11] Due to the aforementioned evidence having to be collected and such collection taking time, these proceedings took longer than expected. Meanwhile, the Petitioner, who merely petitioned ex parte and not as a representative of the banned user, was also banned pursuant to Art. 22 §§ 2.3. and 2.5. Constitution. As such, they were unable to either participate themselves, nor could they appoint another to participate for them in this appeal. The Respondent therefore again requested the dismissal of the matter.
[12] While the Court had originally precluded such motions via deadline, such a preclusion shall not be applied for circumstances which neither the Court nor the moving party could reasonably have foreseen beforehand.
[13] It is not perfectly clear what happens, when the petitioner is banned in the middle of a proceeding before the CoR. The Court looks towards In re Banning Political Affiliation of Supervisors Act [2025] SDCR 14 regarding non-responsiveness, as well as the recently affirmed Art. 25 §1. CPA (see Question of Law in Juliana v Tech Support [2026] Civ 2 [2026] SDCR 18).
[14] In short, proceedings with a non-responsive petitioner cannot proceed. The CoR may be inquisitorial (as correctly assumed in SimDem Common law, mentioned in Motion for Recusal of Judge ppatpat 2026 SDCR 14 and exhibited in the Judiciary Act 2025), but it is surely not able to act sua sponte (although not mentioned clearly in Art. 3 Judiciary Act, implied heavily in Art. 4 Judiciary Act and by now most likely also customary law).
- [14.1] The petitioner requested the trial to be held in a Google Docs format. That is generally possible, seeing how this Court usually employs this technique and the CPA allows for it. However, the Court cannot see how the witnesses, which remain to be questioned, could be questioned on there in a reasonably efficient way, especially seeing all the ways to edit messages. Hence, this way to do a trial under Art. 4 CPA is also not possible.
- [14.2] The Court also considered whether to hold a trial outside of Simdem, pursuant to Art. 4 §1. CPA. Since the CPA tasks us with holding a trial on the Discord, so far as possible, we shall only hold a trial outside of the Discord if:
- [14.2.1] The trial can under no circumstance be held in the Discord, which was the case
- [14.2.2] Holding the trial elsewhere, for example in a group chat, would not lead to a material danger to either witnesses or other participants. The petitioner is banned before his trial for association with a proscribed association. While Association is illegal, it in and of itself does not pose a material danger to those outside (assuming the allegations were true for this purpose). The opposite may be true for example in cases of harassment or sexual misconduct.
- [14.2.3] The risks to the participants do not outweigh the risks of dismissal for the case of the petitioner. Such can not be said in this case. While Association does not pose an immediate danger, it surely, if true, puts the parties involved in some amount of risk, as TIDE is certainly a dangerous organisation, with a long criminal track record. At the same time, the Court can also still dismiss the matter without prejudice, so that the petitioner can resume the case at any time. The Court does not see fit to put all participants into this perilous situation, if we could also effectively pause the proceedings. We will therefore not hold the trial outside the Discord.
[15] The Court could now also go into great depths whether this dismissal violates a general principle of leniency (if one was indeed to construct such a principle) under Nighteye (Appellant) v LordDeadlyOwl (Respondent) 2020 SDSC 5. It could also discuss whether the similarity to In re Fair Use of Alternate Accounts Act 2025 [2026] SDSC 1 warrants a similarly deep analysis on whether the State removing the petitioner must be ruled in in some way to prevent the ability of the State to keep persons from appealing POOP bans.
[16] The Court decides against doing so. In accordance with In re Banning Political Affiliation of Supervisors Act [2025] SDCR 14 any dismissal would be without prejudice. Any future bench has access to the records or can at least gain such access should another choose to appeal the ban of guava. Consequently, even under the most generous interpretation of all the petitioners Rights above in conjunction with the Right to be presumed innocent before proven guilty, dismissal is the proper route. It prevents this Court from effectively acting sua sponte and at the same time preserves all the petitioners Rights when found innocent. If the petitioner was indeed to be found guilty, their presence on these territories would not be allowed any longer anyways. As explained above, that would render any proceeding impossible.
Verdict
[17] The case is dismissed without prejudice. No judgement is made regarding the merits of it.
Decision on the requested Subpoena for the Bot Code against Guava
Issued on 8th March 2026 by Chief Judge Brandmal with Judge Muggy agreeing.
Introduction
[S1] The Respondent in Kaizen ex parte Guava (Appellant) v SD (Respondent) SDCR 23 [2026] motioned for a subpoena against Guava. They request the Court order Guava to turn over the Code for a Bot that was used to follow persons of interest on Instagram. The Bot following citizens on Instagram is what first caused Guava to be banned for egregious ToS violations.
On the Parties Argumentation
[S2] The Respondent argued that such a Court order is necessary to unveil whether the Bot was indeed used to scrape personal data and whether it did in fact collect such data. The Appellant disagreed, claiming that not the entire Code is material (hence the subpoena is overly broad) and that the internal Code of the Bot could not support the claim of an egregious case of a ToS violation at all. Instead, testimony and descriptions shall suffice. Lastly, no evidence was presented that the Bot did indeed have a scraping function, hence, according to the Appellant, the subpoena is just a fishing expedition.
On the procedural admissibility
[S3] Art. 15 § 3. CPA states that a motion for a subpoena shall only be made in the pretrial stage of the proceedings. However, since there is no pretrial in an appeal, that section cannot be read to illegitimise all subpoenas in an appeal. Instead, the limits of new evidence for appeals is to be drawn by the precedent we have on such evidence in those proceedings. Especially in cases of POOP bans, where no extensive evidence collection can happen beforehand, the Court will not disallow either side from introducing any evidence. So far, the Court has instead conflated steps which usually would happen in pretrial with trial steps, like cross examination. A similar understanding shall apply here.
[S4] Guava can also not make use of his Right to not self incriminate, the Constitution generally explicitly allows for subpoenas, even if they would lead to incriminating material being uncovered, Art. 21 §7.1. Constitution.
[S5] There remains however the question on whether new evidence can be presented in Appeal Proceedings at all. The CoR generally can already hear new arguments, not presented in the original trial Court (dominax273 (Appellant) v State of SimDemocracy (Respondent) [2025] SDCR 1 [6]). That alone may not suffice to justify new evidence being considered, however, it does not stand alone. Even if one was indeed to formulate the general rule that a Court of Appeal cannot hear new evidence, such a rule can surely not apply in the case of an Appeal of the certification of a POOP ban. In those cases, no prior trial record exists. This Court would be entirely unable to even consider evidence other than that submitted by the State to obtain the certification. However, Art. 22 §3. [Constitution]] promises the Right to an appeal even for POOP bans. That cannot be read as just a formal guarantee for a certain procedure but must also include an effective appeal on the merits. That would be rendered impossible, if the person banned was not allowed to introduce their own evidence and to provide their own version of the events (unless even that would present a real risk of another violation of the ToS or any real life law). But if the Court extends this option to one side, it must, in the spirit of fairness, also extend it to the other, if only to rebut the arguments made by the banned person. An appeal not allowing for either one of these cannot be considered fair. The subpoena is therefore procedurally admissible.
On the merits of the subpoena
[S6] There are several rules in the CPA for subpoenas. They must be motioned to in compliance with Art. 15 §2. CPA, which the motion in its current form does. There are also several defects a subpoena can suffer from, that make it appealable. However, the appellant, Kaizen, has appealed ex parte and therefore the Court will not consider their submissions as appeals of the motion, as they are neither counsel nor subpoenaed party, Art. 14 §3.1. CPA. Regardless, the Court will now look at the mentioned defects to see whether the requested subpoena would suffer from any.
[S7] The requested information is relevant to the proceeding, as it could directly contradict the claim of Guava that no data was collected. The information is also not overly broad, as the entirety of the Code is necessary to guarantee that no part that is used to collect personal data is left out. No classified information was requested. This Court also has the legal authority to order it, the correct procedure was followed, the subpoena does not reach beyond the scope of the trial, it is not unfairly restrictive, as it is limited to exactly only what is absolutely necessary, and adequate reasoning supports it.
[S8] On that last point, intent is crucial for the finding of serious (attempted) doxxing. The Bot Code (not) containing the explicit possibility to collect personal data would be a very strong indicator towards such intent.
[S9] The Respondent requested the Court order the subpoena to be complied with within 24 hours. The Court believes this is unfairly short, especially because the subpoenaed party is not a party in this proceeding. The Court therefore grants the order, modifying it to be complied within 48 hours.
Decision
[S10] Guava (ID: 633459687022657557) is ordered to supply to this Court a copy of the Code of the Bot used, in a commonly used and readable format. The Court informs Guava of his duty to comply. He shall have 48 hours to do so. The Court will certify the compliance with this order only if it is satisfied such compliance has occurred, not only to the letter, but also to the spirit of this order. Guava is informed of his Right to appeal under Art. 14 CPA. Violating this order may be a criminal offense under Art. 24 and Art. 24a Criminal Code 2020.
[S11] Seeing how this subpoena makes it possible to authenticate the previous affidavit of Guava, Judge Ben will not be questioned to authenticate it. The motion to hear him is rejected.